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ABSTRACT
ROBERT SMITHSON: Paradise Regained: Naive Semantics and Regulative Metaphysics.
(Under the direction of Thomas Hofweber)
In this dissertation, I identify areas of language that are not threatened by empirical
evidence or theoretical argument in ways that we typically expect when doing philoso-
phy. Examples I consider include assertions about ordinary objects, laws of nature, depen-
dence, causation, and existence. In each case, I argue that our mistaken epistemological
assumptions are the result of mistaken semantic assumptions about our ordinary linguis-
tic expressions. I appeal to these semantic conclusions to clarify and regulate a variety
of metaphysical debates, such as the dispute between Humeans and non-Humeans about
natural laws and the dispute between ontologists and deflationists over the substantivity of
ontological debates.
iii
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Suppose we travel to the all-knowing Oracle to settle once and for all whether there
is an external world of material objects. There, we receive a disheartening report: our
experiences are caused not by material objects, but rather by a malicious demon intent on
deceiving us. This testimony would surprise and dismay us. We might say things like
‘Tables and chairs don’t really exist!’ and ‘We don’t have bodies after all!’
But this initial shock would pass. And after several minutes, we would go back to
saying things like ‘There is an apple in the kitchen’ or ‘The bus arrives soon’ just as we
always had. This is because we would have to return to the ordinary concerns of human
life: buying groceries, getting to the bus stop on time, and so on.
This raises a puzzle. Ordinarily, when we receive evidence that we think contravenes
our judgment that P , we abandon our judgment that P . But in the above thought experi-
ment, after temporarily abandoning our judgments about material objects, we would soon
return to making such judgments.
Why? Is it because we are irrationally ignoring the evidence? Is it because we’ve
changed the meanings of our object terms? Is it because we engage in pretense when we
talk about objects? In this dissertation, I argue that none of these proposals are correct.
What our return to ordinary speech really shows, I argue, is that we — or those of us
who regard the demon scenario as a skeptical challenge to our judgments about objects
— have false beliefs about what our ordinary object terms refer to. We initially retract our
object judgments because we assume these judgments purport to describe some fully mind-
independent external world. But we soon return to our object talk because this assumption
1
is mistaken. What we refer to with ordinary object terms depends on how we use these
terms, and how we use these terms depends on our interests and concerns. When making
judgments about objects in ordinary life, we do not care about what the mind-independent
external world is like “in itself”; we care about the world as it appears to us. So I defend
a semantic version of idealism — edenic idealism — on which our object terms refer to
items in the world presented to us in experience.
Similar remarks apply to other areas of our discourse. When doing philosophy, we
often treat our ordinary judgments as if they are theoretical hypotheses: hypotheses that
aim at a certain objectivity, or unity, or explanatory power. So when evidence suggests that
our discourse fails to meet these standards, we are tempted to conclude that our ordinary
judgments are defective. But when the concerns of ordinary life impinge upon us, we return
to speaking as we always have. This is because the use of our language is driven by our
interests and concerns, and what matters to us in ordinary life is very different from what
matters to us when giving philosophical theories.
In this dissertation, I identify areas of language that are not threatened by empirical
evidence or theoretical argument in ways that we typically expect when doing philoso-
phy. Examples I consider include assertions about ordinary objects, laws of nature, depen-
dence, causation, and existence. In each case, I argue that our mistaken epistemological
assumptions are the result of mistaken semantic assumptions about our ordinary linguis-
tic expressions. I appeal to these semantic conclusions to clarify and “regulate” a variety
of metaphysical debates, such as the dispute between Humeans and non-Humeans about
natural laws and the dispute between ontologists and deflationists over the substantivity of
ontological debates.
1.2 Regulative metaphysics
In the argument sketched in the introduction, I leveraged facts about the epistemology
of our object discourse into an argument against realism about ordinary objects. This style
2
of argument owes its greatest debt to Berkeley and Hume, each of whom thought that we
could use epistemic results to diagnose mistaken semantic presuppositions in our theoriz-
ing. I will refer to arguments of this form as “regulative arguments” since results from
ordinary epistemology are used to regulate admissible philosophical theories.
In my dissertation, I offer updated versions of the arguments from Berkeley and Hume.
So it will be helpful to briefly review the importance of regulative arguments for these
historical philosophers.1
1.2.1 Historical examples
Consider Hume’s arguments against necessary connections. Hume (1999, 7.2) claims
that, even if necessary connections were intelligible, the fact remains that necessary con-
nections aren’t what we are actually talking about when we use the ordinary term ‘cause’.
According to Hume, we are able to infer (in ordinary contexts) thatC causesE when we ob-
serve certain types of regularities. But, says Hume, if our ordinary term ‘cause’ expressed
necessary connections, we would be unjustified in making this inference. So theories where
causation involves necessary connections are incompatible with the ordinary epistemology
of our causal judgments.
Berkeley (1948a, 171-207) offers a similar argument against mind-independent mate-
rial objects. Berkeley claims that we are able to know, on the basis of our sensations, that
ordinary objects like tables and chairs exist. But if our ordinary object terms referred to
items in some mind-independent external world, this inference would be unjustified. So
Berkeley concludes that theories where ordinary objects are mind-independent do not use
ordinary object terms with their normal meanings.
1For ease of presentation, I will present Berkeley’s and Hume’s regulative arguments within the frame-
work of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of language. For example, I have replaced early modern
talk of “ideas” with contemporary talk of “terms” and “concepts”. I have similarly replaced early modern
talk of “knowledge” with the contemporary talk of “epistemic justification”. Despite these and other anachro-
nisms, I have tried to respect the spirit of Berkeley’s and Hume’s arguments as much as possible.
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These “regulative” arguments share three basic features. First: each argument iden-
tifies a tension between a philosophical theory T and certain judgments we make during
everyday life. Second, it is claimed that T is defective, not our ordinary judgments. Third,
the arguments identify T ’s defect as a mistaken presupposition about the semantic role of
our ordinary linguistic expressions. We can precisify this form of argument as follows2:
Traditional regulative argument
1. On the T -theorist’s conception of X , judgments about X are not epistemi-
cally justified on the basis of ordinary evidence E.
2. Judgments about X are epistemically justified on the basis of ordinary evi-
dence E.
3. The semantic role of the expression ‘X’ is different from the one presup-
posed by T .
Here, X might stand for causation, ordinary objects, colors, free will, etc.
1.2.2 Motivations
In a regulative argument, there is a tension between our ordinary judgments and a
philosophical theory T . Given the tension, why locate the problem with T instead of locat-
ing the problem with ordinary judgments?
One might defend ordinary discourse by appealing to common sense. For example,
one might think that the claims of common sense deserve more confidence than we could
ever have in a philosophical theory challenging them.3 Berkeley, in particular, often ap-
pealed to common sense in order to defend the correctness of our ordinary judgments.4
But at present, I want to focus on a second possible defense, one that figures promi-
nently in the arguments of this dissertation. Berkeley and Hume were much impressed by
a phenomenon we might call the “powerlessness of theorizing”: no matter how convincing
2See Garrett (1997, chs. 1-2) for further discussion of this style of argument.
3Cf. Moore (1925).
4See, e.g., Berkeley (1948a, 172-173).
4
philosophical challenges to our ordinary beliefs might seem at the time, such theorizing has
little hold on us when we return to the business of everyday life. Says Hume (1999, 120):
“Nor need we fear, that this philosophy, while it endeavors to limit our en-
quiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life,
and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. Na-
ture will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract
reasoning whatsoever. ... If the mind be not engaged by argument to make [in-
ferences from experience], it must be induced by some other principle of equal
weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as
human nature remains the same.”
Similarly, Berkeley (1948b, 25) observes:
“...the illiterate majority of people, who walk the high road of plain common
sense and are governed by the dictates of nature, are mostly comfortable and
undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears hard to explain or to
understand. They don’t complain of any lack of certainty in their senses, and
are in no danger of becoming sceptics.”
Why is it that, so often, arguments that seem convincing when doing philosophy fail to
move us in everyday life? Berkeley and Hume offer a very simple explanation: our interests
and concerns when doing philosophy are very different from our interests and concerns in
everyday life. Says Hume (2000, 1.7):
“I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my
friends. And when, after three or four hours’ amusement, I would return to
these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I
cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.”
Similarly, Berkeley (1948a, 182) claims that our language is “framed by the Vulgar,
merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, without any regard to
speculation.”5 This is why we see Philonous try to draw Hylas away from skepticism by
appealing to ordinary human concerns:
5For an excellent exposition of Berkeley’s view of ordinary subjects’ resistence to philosophical argu-
ments, see Bordner (2011).
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“But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded
that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to write,
would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not
know what it is you call for? ... I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe
my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that
the real things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses.
These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life,
have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings.” (Berkeley
(1948a, 228-229))
We might characterize Berkeley’s and Hume’s insight as follows. There are certain
desiderata for our judgments when doing philosophy; perhaps we aim for judgments with a
certain objectivity, or a certain unity, or a certain explanatory depth. But these desiderata do
not matter to us in ordinary contexts. Because of this difference in the norms that matter to
us, it is no surprise that discourse that seems satisfactory in ordinary contexts often seems
defective when doing philosophy. But by the same token, it is no surprise that philosophical
theorizing can sometimes fail to move us when we return to ordinary life.
This difference in norms explains why Berkeley and Hume locate the problem with
theorizing rather than ordinary language. A philosophical theory could have authority over
our ordinary discourse only if only if we were inclined to defer to that theory in everyday
contexts. But, at least according to Berkeley and Hume, we do not actually care about
theoretical norms in ordinary contexts.6
1.2.3 Project
Despite their historical importance, regulative arguments are no longer so prominent
in contemporary philosophy. This is because regulative arguments have traditionally been
associated with views in epistemology and the philosophy of language that no longer enjoy
support.
6Cf. Carnap (1950, sections 2-3) on the difficulty of critiquing a practice from the outside.
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As I mentioned earlier, my dissertation updates regulative arguments for a contempo-
rary setting. This project involves two tasks. First, I defend regulative arguments against
contemporary objections, showing that they can be formulated without problematic episte-
mological and semantic assumptions. Second, I identify contemporary targets of regulative
arguments. I will discuss these tasks in the next two sections, respectively.
1.3 A contemporary defense
In this section, I’ll discuss three challenges to regulative arguments from contempo-
rary philosophy. Each of these objections challenges an epistemic or semantic assumption
traditionally associated with regulative arguments. To respond to these objections, I show
that these assumptions are unnecessary.
N.b.: There is not one specific context in my dissertation where I discuss these objec-
tions. They are objections that periodically arise throughout the chapters ahead.
1.3.1 Objection 1: worries about common sense
Regulative arguments identify a tension between our ordinary judgments and a philo-
sophical theory T . And as discussed in 1.2.2, these arguments locate the problem with T
rather than with our ordinary judgments.
In 1.2.2, I mentioned two ways one might justify this choice. One option is to simply
appeal to common sense; another option is appeal to the phenomenon I called “the power-
lessness of theorizing”. As it happens, the former option receives the most attention in the
contemporary literature.7 So we might say that, at least within contemporary philosophy,
regulative arguments are associated with the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (A1): Our ordinary judgments are epistemically justified be-
cause they are common sense.
7For a notable exception, see Hirsch (2011, ch. 6).
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Because of this association, one way a contemporary philosopher might resist a regulative
argument is by denying A1. For example, some philosophers think that common sense
should have no role to play in philosophical theory choice. Says Sider (2013, 10):
“there is no independent reason to think that common sense is reliable about
whether there exist tables and chairs as opposed to there merely existing suit-
ably arranged particles. Our forbears presumably did not even consider the
latter possibility. The Mooreanism I oppose says that we should trust common
sense even in the absence of independent reason to think that it is reliable. And
that seems no better than the absurd: “believe the masses...”
Other philosophers are inclined to afford common sense at least some measure of respect.
For example, many philosophers regard the fact that a theory T violates common sense to
be a cost of T .8 But even among this group, it is often thought that common sense can be
abandoned if the theoretical utility is great enough. In other words, respecting common
sense is not considered a constraint of adequacy for T ; it is just one virtue among many.9
On either of the above views, common sense judgments are defeasible. One reason
this view may seem compelling is that, in many cases, common sense is mistaken. For ex-
ample, common sense says that the world is flat, that simultaneity is observer-independent,
etc. These examples show us that common sense is fallible. So, it might be argued, we
should not automatically rule a theory T simply because it conflicts with common sense
(as regulative arguments seem to suppose).
Response: the powerlessness of theorizing
In my dissertation, I show that regulative arguments do not actually require A1. As
discussed in 1.2.2, Berkeley and Hume did not rest their critiques of philosophical theories
solely on common sense. They were also motivated by facts about the kinds of evidence
that subjects are responsive to in ordinary contexts.
8See, e.g., Lewis (1973b) and Lycan (2001, 41).
9For explicit endorsement of this stance, see Merricks (2001, 24), Paul & Hall (2013, 40-41), and Rinard
(2013).
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Suppose, for example, that a subject S asserts ‘That table is brown’ on the basis of
her sensory experience. There are various types of evidence that would cause S to revise
this judgment. For example, she might realize that the table only looked brown because of
a trick of the light. Or she might remember that she took hallucinogenic drugs that affect
her color vision. But there are other kinds of evidence that would not cause S to revise her
judgment. For example, the Oracle thought experiment in the introduction to this chapter
suggests that S would not (permanently) revise her judgment in response to evidence about
evil demon scenarios.
In my dissertation, I argue that the best explanation of this behavior is the one given
by Berkeley and Hume: our interests and concerns in ordinary life are different from our
interests and concerns when doing philosophy. Since our ordinary judgments are governed
by different norms, these judgments cannot be threatened by philosophical arguments in
ways that are typically supposed.
The proponent of regulative arguments need not and should not endorse any claim
to the effect that our ordinary judgments are infallible; these judgments are threatened by
ordinary evidence all the time. But these beliefs are not threatened by distinctly philosoph-
ical evidence or argumentation. This is because philosophical discourse is governed by
different norms than ordinary discourse.
Two types of evidence
Speaking more carefully: we should not assume that ordinary judgments are never
threatened by philosophical theorizing. Instead, it is best to consider particular areas of our
discourse one by one, examining the evidence in each case. There are two main types of
evidence that I consider in my dissertation: scrutability results and Oracle arguments.
Scrutability results: Let C ′ be the conjunction of a set of sentences C. We can say
that a sentence S is scrutable from C iff the sentence ‘If C ′, then S’ has the status of an a
9
priori truth in ordinary language.10 One way to show that an ordinary judgment O is not
threatened by philosophical theorizing is to show that O is scrutable from the evidence E
subjects ordinarily consider relevant to assessing O’s truth. For example, consider Ei ≡ ‘x
has a mass of 2.5 kilograms’. Any competent subject given Ei could trivially infer Oi ≡
‘x has a mass’. Since Oi has the status of a a priori truth (conditional on the truth of Ei),
it is not the kind of sentence that could be threatened by philosophical argument (while
supposing that Ei is true). While this example is very simple, I discuss more interesting
cases of scrutability in 1.3.3.
We can leverage results about scrutability into a strengthened form of regulative argu-
ment:
Updated Regulative Argument, Scrutability Version
1. On the T -theorist’s conception of X, sentences about X are not inferable a
priori from ordinary evidence E.
2. Sentences about X are inferable a priori from ordinary evidence E.
3. The expression ‘X’ does not refer to an item meeting the T -theorist’s con-
ception.11
This argument is not threatened by concerns about common sense because it shows
that X-judgments are not merely judgments that “seem obvious” to ordinary subjects. Be-
cause these sentences are a priori conditional on E, it is better to think of them as having
the same status as conceptual truths in these contexts.
Oracle arguments: Let ET be evidence that, acccording to philosophical theory T ,
contravenes ordinary judgment O. If ordinary subjects would not abandon their judgment
O even after receiving and accepting ET , this is strong evidence that ET is not actually
evidentially relevant to O (and that T relies on mistaken semantic presuppositions). To
10Here, and throughout the rest of this chapter, I am putting aside any Quine-inspired qualms with aprior-
ity.
11I offer arguments of the above form to show that: (i) Quinean ontologists are mistaken in their concep-
tion of ordinary objects, numbers, and properties (ch. 3) and (ii) the items involved in conceptual grounding
claims are not involved in metaphysical grounding claims (ch. 5).
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obtain this kind of evidence, I sometimes appeal to Oracle thought experiments like the
one from section 1.1. In such cases, an all-knowing and completely trustworthy Oracle
gives ordinary subjects the evidence ET . We can put Oracle arguments into the following
step-by-step form:
Updated Regulative Argument, Oracle Version
1. Even if ordinary subjects were to accept (allegedly) contravening evidence
ET , they would continue to make judgments about X on the basis of ordinary
evidence EO.
2. If ordinary subjects would continue to make judgments about X on the basis
of ordinary evidence EO, the term ‘X’ does not refer to an item meeting the
T -theorist’s conception.
3. The expression ‘X’ does not refer to an item meeting the T -theorist’s con-
ception.12
Throughout my dissertation, I consider various objections to premise 2. This premise as-
sumes that the best explanation of the behavior in the Oracle thought experiment is that
subjects are not referring to an item meeting the T -theorist’s conception. But there are
other possible explanations. For example, one might diagnose the behavior as a case of
conceptual change. Or one might say that ordinary subjects are merely pretending to talk
about X after the Oracle’s testimony. I argue that, at least in the cases considered in this
dissertation, these alternative explanations are not plausible.
1.3.2 Objection 2: weaker standards of justification
Premise 1 of the traditional regulative argument asserts that, on the semantic presup-
positions of theory T , our judgments about X are unjustified. Whether this premise is true
will depend on our standards for epistemic justification. Traditionally, many proponents of
regulative arguments have endorsed strong assumptions about these standards, such as:
12I offer arguments of this form to show that: (i) the term ‘cause’ does not express a relation with a unified
nature (ch. 2), ii) the scientific term ‘law’ does not refer to non-Humean items (ch. 3), and (iii) ordinary
object terms do not refer to items in the external world (chs. 6-11).
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Assumption 2 (A2): A belief O is justified iff one has evidence that favors O
over every alternative hypothesis.
But many philosophers would worry that A2 sets the standard for justification too high. So
if premise 1 relies on A2, traditional regulative arguments will be unconvincing.
For example, most theorists today believe that, pace Berkeley, we can have justified
beliefs about mind-independent material objects. For example, many philosophers (such as
Vogel (1990)) claim that we can support the existence of material objects using inference
to the best explanation (IBE). Other philosophers have given a contextualist defense of
our knowledge of material objects, claiming that skeptical hypotheses only threaten our
knowledge in philosophical contexts.13 Other philosophers endorse dogmatism, claiming
that our beliefs in material objects enjoy a default justification that is not threatened by
skeptical hypotheses.14
Response: the powerlessness of theorizing
In the chapters ahead, I argue that regulative arguments do not require A2 or any other
substantive assumptions about epistemic justification. To illustrate this defense, I will again
consider ordinary object discourse.
On each of the above views (IBE, contextualism, and dogmatism), the objector as-
sumes that our judgments about objects are “hostage to fortune” in the following sense: it
is coherent to suppose that all actual and counterfactual experiences are just as they are,
but due to facts about some external reality independent of the human mind, truths about
objects are different. One such example might be a scenario where an evil demon causes
our experiences.
But there is a problem: the Oracle thought experiment (see section 1.1) suggests that
our object judgments are not actually hostage to fortune in the way that these responses
13See, e.g., Neta (2003).
14See Pryor (2000).
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suppose. It suggests that our object judgments would be true even if an evil demon were
the cause of our experiences. So the explanationist, contextualist, and dogmatist are tilting
at windmills: they are defending our object judgments from possibilities that were never a
threat to begin with.15
At least in the ordinary object case, objection 2 represents a second way of failing
to appreciate “the powerlessness of theorizing”. For the same reasons that philosophical
arguments cannot threaten our ordinary judgments, so too they cannot vindicate or justify
them. Philosophical arguments could only vindicate our object judgments if these judg-
ments were threatened by the skeptical possibilities that interest philosophers (e.g., evil
demon scenarios). But there is no such threat to begin with. Says Berkeley (1948a, 231):
“What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath
it proved to him from the veracity of God; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls
short of intuition or demonstration!”
For example, I mentioned above that Vogel uses inference to the best explanation to
defend the existence of ordinary objects. But ordinary subjects would continue talking
about tables and chairs whether his argument was successful or not. So any alleged justifi-
cation such an argument would provide is idle and a mirage; given their ordinary evidence,
subjects already possess all the justification ever wanted or needed.
We can show that a theory T cannot vindicate an ordinary claim O in the same ways
that we show that T cannot threaten O (see 1.3.2). One strategy is to show that O is
scrutable from our ordinary evidence E. If O is inferable a priori in this way, then it isn’t
hostage to fortune in the way that the proponent of T assumes. A second strategy is to use
an Oracle argument to show that O is not actually threatened by the possibilities that — by
T ’s lights — falsify O.
15Here is an alternative way to make the point. The Oracle thought experiment suggests that our object
judgments are “conditonally a priori”: so long as all possible ordinary evidence supports them, they cannot
be threatened by hypotheses about what the external world is like “in itself”. Even if the contextualist, et al
can account for our knowledge of objects, they cannot account for the (conditional) apriority of our object
judgments.
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1.3.3 Objection 3: the unavailability of analysis
Traditional regulative arguments do not explicitly offer any positive account of how
sentences about X are epistemically justified by ordinary evidence E. But historically,
proponents of regulative arguments have tried to account for ordinary epistemology by
providing conceptual analyses of X-sentences in more basic terms (i.e., terms involved in
sentences that are less epistemologically problematic):16
Assumption 3 (A3): Sentences about X can be given concise conceptuual anal-
yses.
The project of conceptual analysis still has its contemporary adherents. But for several
reasons, most theorists today no longer think this project carries much chance of success.17
One major challenge was Wittgenstein’s (1968) suggestion that we apply terms based on
family resemblances; this suggestion was the guiding idea behind “prototype” theories of
concepts (see Rosch (1978)). A second challenge was the recognition of a posteriori ne-
cessities by theorists like Putnam (1975), who argued that names and natural kind terms are
not a priori equivalent to descriptions. But perhaps the most important challenge has been
the poor track record of attempts at conceptual analysis. For example, given the dozens of
failed attempts to provide a suitable conceptual analysis of terms like ‘knowledge’, many
theorists have concluded that the term ‘knowledge’ has no definition.18
As I mentioned above, regulative arguments do not explicitly appeal to A3. But the
fact that the positive epistemological account traditionally associated with regulative argu-
ments has proved problematic can be seen as constituting an indirect objection to this style
16See, e.g., Russell (1985, 160-161). I note that Hume (1999) himself is often interpreted as a proponent
of conceptual analysis. But Garrett (1997) persuasively argues that this is a mistaken interpretation; Hume
never thought we needed to be able to give a precise definition of terms like ‘cause’, ‘free’, etc. As shall be
seen in 1.3.3, I think Hume was exactly right on this point.
17For discussion, see Chalmers (2012, 10-12), Margolis & Laurence (1999, 2.2), and Prinz (2002, chs.
2-3).
18See Shope (1983).
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of argument. If the proponent of regulative arguments cannot provide a better account, we
might conclude that the epistemology of X-judgments is just a problem for everyone.
Response: scrutability without definitions
In this dissertation, I argue that regulative arguments do not require A3. As I described
in 1.3.1, updated regulative arguments merely require that X-sentences are scrutable from
(i.e., a priori inferable from) ordinary evidence E. And the very counterexamples that tell
against the definibility of X-sentences actually support the claim that they are scrutable in
this sense.
To sketch the basic idea, I’ll consider the term ‘knows’.19 Because of the Gettier
literature, the term ‘knows’ is the most famous example of the failure of the project of
conceptual analysis. Still, we can make the following observation. Across a wide variety of
ordinary cases, when a situation is described without using the term ‘knows’ or its cognates,
we are able to judge a priori whether or not the situation is a case of knowledge. For
example, let ¬S be the sentence ‘John does not know that: either Jones owns a Ford or else
Brown is in Barcelona’. Let D be the conjunction of the sentences in the following Gettier
case:
Smith believes with justification that Jones owns a Ford. Smith initially has
no beliefs about Brown’s whereabouts. Smith forms a belief that Jones owns
a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, based solely on a valid inference from his
belief that Jones owns a Ford. Jones does not own a Ford, but as it happens,
Brown is in Barcelona.
Competent subjects can judge a priori that ¬S is true when presented with D. The same
goes for all other cases in the Gettier literature: the entire progress of this literature de-
pended on our ability to make these a priori judgments when presented with descriptions
of cases. Taken together, these cases suggest the following: when we are told sufficient
information about truth, evidence, and causes of a subject’s beliefs, we can often judge a
19I discuss this case further in chapter 5.
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priori whether or not that subject has knowledge. It is striking dialectical situation: while
Gettier cases threaten the the definability of the term ’knows’, they seem to support the
more fundamental idea that sentences involving the term ‘knows’ stand in a priori inferen-
tial relations to sentences describing a subject’s belief state.20
What can explain our ability to make these a priori judgments? Here’s one very
plausible explanation: it is partially constitutive of the meaning of the term ‘knows’ that
one is disposed to judge that ¬S when presented with D (and similarly for other cases).
This suggests that, even if the term ‘knowledge’ cannot be given an explicit definition, there
is still a weaker type of conceptual link between ‘knowledge’-sentences and more primitive
sentences describing subjects’ belief states.
This is not an isolated case. Philosophers have tried to give analyses of dozens of
philosophically-interesting concepts (‘cause’, ‘good’, ‘compose’, ‘law’, ‘freedom’, ‘possi-
ble’, ‘person’, ‘chance’, ‘fragile’, ). But in each case, the counterexamples that rule against
the proposed analyses actually support the more basic claim that there are a priori inferen-
tial relations between sentences about X and the ordinary evidence for such sentences.
Deference Principles
It was a mistake to think there was ever a need to provide conceptual analyses of sen-
tences about X. Instead of offering an analysis that purports to explain the ordinary episte-
mology of our judgments about X, the regulative theorist should simply defer to ordinary
epistemology itself to determine when sentences about X are true. So in my dissertation,
I endorse “deference principles” of the following schematic form (here, O is an ordinary
judgment):
Schematic Deference Principle: O is true in a possible case C iff (actual)
20Importantly, I am not claiming that our judgments of the form ‘X knows that P’ are never subject to
revision; we revise these judgments all the time. For example, if we were to learn that Jones actually does
own a Ford (but just had not told anyone about it yet), we would revise our judgment that ¬S. But these
types of revisions only reinforce the idea that there are a priori inferential connections between knowledge-
sentences and sentences describing the ordinary evidence for these sentences. Give subjects enough ordinary
information about a case, and they always seem able to make judgments about whether X knows that P.
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subjects would (ideally) judge that O when fully-informed of all evidence or-
dinarily considered relevant to assessing the truth of O at C.
For instance, here are two specific deference principles I defend in my dissertation (in chs.
7 and 8, respectively):
Deference Principle for Laws: P is a law of nature in a possible world W
iff (actual) scientists would (ideally) judge that P falls under the predicate ‘is
a law of nature’ when given an appropriate description of the Humean base at
W .
Deference Principle for Causation: x causes y in a possible caseC iff (actual)
subjects would (ideally) judge that x and y fall under the predicate ‘causes’
when given an appropriate description of C.
In the chapters ahead, I will clarify how exactly these principles should be understood.
1.3.4 Summary
In each of 1.3.1-1.3.3, I have identified a problematic epistemic or semantic assump-
tion traditionally associated with regulative arguments. In each case, I have argued that the
assumption is inessential. We can summarize the above discussion with the following key
points:
1. Our interests and concerns in ordinary life are different from our interests
and concerns when doing philosophy (see 1.2.2).
2. Because of (1), the ordinary epistemology of our judgments can neither be
threatened nor vindicated by philosophical argument (see 1.3.1 and 1.3.2).
3. Because of (1), there is no need for a philosophical theory explaining the
ordinary epistemology of our judgments (see 1.3.3).
Stripped of their problematic assumptions, I think that regulative arguments should have an
important role in contemporary metaphysics.
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1.4 Contemporary applications
In this section, I’ll briefly describe some of the targets of the regulative arguments
developed in my dissertation. This section will summarize and draw from the main results
of the chapters ahead.
1.4.1 Causation (ch. 2)
We think that some things have a unified nature for us to discover.21 For example, we
think science has revealed the nature of water to be H2O. We think that other things do not
have a unified nature for us to discover. For example, we do not think that there is anything
to discover about what it is to be a game.
What about the causal relation, or dispositions, or free will? For any philosophically-
interesting item X , one can find a host of competing theories regarding the nature of X . In
offering such analyses, philosophers assume thatX is relevantly similar to water, not game-
hood. My project in chapter 2 is to show how, in a given particular case, this assumption
might be challenged.
I begin by identifying a semantic difference between terms like ‘water’ and terms like
‘game’ that explains why an informative analysis is possible for the former but not the
latter.22 This difference can be seen by comparing two thought experiments.
Suppose that all of our ordinary evidence suggests that a certain sample X is water: it
has the right appearance, taste, boiling point, etc. On the basis of this evidence, we would
justifiably endorse the sentence P ≡ ‘X is a sample of water’. But notice that P is hostage
to empirical fortune: if we were to find out that X has a different chemical structure from
the one shared by all the other water-like liquids in our environment, we would revise our
judgment and conclude that P is false. This shows that P ’s truth presupposes thatX shares
21I precisify what I mean by a “discoverable, unified nature” in chapter 2.
22I actually identify two semantic differences, but for ease of presentation, I will describe only one of
those features here.
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some unified nature with other water-like substances in our environment.
But the following thought experiment shows that game judgments are different.23 Sup-
pose we become convinced that a certain theoryA is the best possible analysis of gamehood
(on whatever desiderata for theory choice one prefers24). But suppose (plausibly enough)
that there are still some cases where A conflicts with our intuitions; for example, perhaps
A classifies multiplication tables as games. Now consider: how would our belief that A
is the best possible analysis of gamehood affect the game-judgments we are disposed to
make in ordinary contexts? For example, how would it affect our disposition to assert Q ≡
‘Multiplication tables are not games’ in ordinary contexts? I submit that, even if we were
convinced that A was the best possible analysis of gamehood, we would feel no pressure
at all to revise our judgment that Q (in any ordinary context). We would continue to assert
Q just as we always had. This is because, when judging whether Y is a game in ordinary
contexts, we do not care whether it shares some unifying feature with other cases of games.
This thought experiment reveals an important difference between ‘water’ and ‘game’.
The fact that we revise our water-judgments when we learn that X does not share some
unifying feature with other water-like samples suggests that ‘water’ expresses a property
with a unified nature. But the fact that we feel no similar pressure to revise our game-
judgments suggests that ‘game’ does not express a property with a unified nature. To
capture this difference, I will say that game judgments are epistemically secure in a way
that water judgments are not: our judgment that X is a game is not threatened by the
possibility that X fails to share some unifying feature with other games.
The above discussion provides a method for determining whether a philosophically-
interesting item X can be given an informative analysis: we test whether X-judgments
are epistemically secure in the way described above. To illustrate this method, I consider
23While this thought experiment does not directly appeal to an Oracle (see 1.3.1), it has a very similar
structure and purpose.
24For example, perhaps we become convinced that A upholds more of our our intuitive judgments than
any other comparatively simple analysis.
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causal judgments, ultimately defending the following thesis:
Thesis: The term ‘cause’ does not have the semantic role of expressing a rela-
tion with a discoverable, unified nature
1.4.2 Existence (ch. 3)
There is a vigorous debate over the existence of material objects like tables and trees.
But deflationary theorists like Thomasson (2007) and Hirsch (2011) have argued that there
is something misguided about this debate. It seems that, in ordinary language, the sen-
tence ‘The table exists’ has the status of a trivial truth (on the assumption that there are
particles arranged table-wise). So deflationists claim that the composition debate can be
trivially resolved in favor of realism simply by reflecting on how we use ordinary English.
Deflationists have made similar claims about other areas of ontology as well.25
Recently, some ontologists have claimed that there can still be substantive debates
in ontology even if deflationists are correct about ordinary language.26 The claim is that,
even if it is trivially true in ordinary English that tables exist, there is still a substantive
debate over whether tables exist*, where the existence* quantifier is a quantifier stipulated
to correspond to the world’s most natural carving. Following Sider (2014), we can call the
proposed shift in quantifiers the Ontologese gambit.
Some deflationists have worried that the notion of an existence* quantifier is unintel-
ligible.27 But in this chapter, I will raise an independent objection. I will argue that, even if
we grant that some existence* questions are substantive, there are no substantive questions
to ask about the existence* of things like ordinary objects, numbers, and properties – things
whose ordinary existence is given a deflationary treatment. More precisely, I defend the
following thesis:
25For example, Schiffer (2003, 2.3) argues that we can trivially establish the existence of properties by
looking to the ordinary use of property terms.
26See, e.g., Cameron (2010).
27See Hirsch (2011, 195).
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Thesis: If the deflationist offers the correct explanation of the triviality of a
certain ordinary existence statement, then there is no substantive question to
ask about the truth of the corresponding existence statement
To defend this conclusion, I appeal to scrutability results (see 1.3.1) involving our ordinary
object discourse.
1.4.3 Laws of nature (ch. 4)
Many philosophers have worried about the epistemology of non-Humean laws.28 It is
clear how we learn about the Humean base; at least in many cases, we directly observe and
measure it. But if the laws are something over and above the Humean base, it is not clear
how we could ever be epistemically justified in our beliefs about the laws.
The above argument has the form of a traditional regulative argument (see 1.2.1). But
it is inconclusive as it stands. Along the lines of 1.3.2, non-Humeans have claimed that
justified belief in the laws is possible even on the non-Humean view. For example, some
non-Humeans have claimed that we are justified in positing non-Humean laws because they
are needed to explain the striking empirical regularities science has discovered.29
In chapter 4, I give an updated regulative argument for Humean laws which evades
this non-Humean response:
Updated Regulative Argument for Humeanism
Premise 1: Even if scientists were to receive evidence E that — by the non-
Humean’s lights — falsifies their law judgments, they would not alter their law
discourse.
Premise 2: If scientists would not alter their law discourse upon learning E,
scientists are not referring to non-Humean laws when they use the term ‘law’
in ordinary scientific contexts.
3: Scientists are not referring to non-Humean laws when they use the term
28See, e.g., Earman & Roberts (2005).
29See, e.g., Armstrong (1983, 52-59).
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‘law’ in ordinary scientific contexts. (from 1,2)
Corollary: two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless
they also differ in their Humean base.
To establish premise 1, I consider Oracle thought experiments (see 3.1.2) where the
Oracle tells us that the non-Humean laws are different than what ordinary scientific evi-
dence leads us to believe. I argue that scientists would not change their law discourse in
response to this testimony because of the central role that the law/non-law distinction has
within ordinary scientific practice.
1.4.4 Dependence (ch. 5)
Some theorists (e.g., Schaffer (2009)) have recently claimed that the world has an or-
dered, hierarchical structure. Entities at lower ontological levels are said to metaphysically
ground entities at higher ontological levels. In general, theorists claim that we need meta-
physical grounding in order to accommodate cases of non-causal explanation:30
1. x is roughly spherical in virtue of its having determinate shape R.
2. x is fragile in virtue of its molecular arrangement and the physical laws.
3. x’s action is wrong in virtue of its being done with the sole motive to cause harm.
It is said, for example, that the fact x’s being roughly spherical is metaphysically
grounded by the fact x’s having a determinate shape R. But in chapter 5, I argue that there
is another way to understand cases of non-causal explanation. Consider the following ex-
amples:
1′. x is a vixen in virtue of the fact that x is a female fox.
2′. x is a piece of furniture in virtue of fact that x is a chair.
30The examples are from (in order): Schaffer (2012, 126), Rosen (2010, 110), and Fine (2012b, 1).
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3′. x is bald in virtue of the fact that x has 20 hairs.
In cases [1′]-[3′], the relevant explanation seems to be conceptual rather than meta-
physical. We can say that these cases involve conceptual grounding, where conceptual
grounding is a semantic relation between our sentences rather than a metaphysical connec-
tion between things out in the world. Intuitively, S conceptually grounds T if the sentence
‘If S, then T ’ is true because of the constitutive inferential roles of the expressions in S and
T (see 1.3.3).
My project in chapter 5 is to clarify the relation between these two types of grounding.
I argue that conceptual and metaphysical grounding are exclusive: if a given in-virtue-of
claim involves conceptual grounding, then it does not involve metaphysical grounding.
Here is one such argument for grounding exclusion. Suppose we consider a case like
[1], which features the property being roughly spherical. There are various views one
might take of this property. One option is to say that being roughly spherical doesn’t exist
(eliminativism). Another option is to identify it with a set or a predicate (nominalism).
Another option is to view it as a deflationary entity: a mere “shadow of a predicate”.31 Or
one can adopt a “heavyweight” view of this property, which I use as a catch-all term for
any view not canvased above.
In chapter 5, I first argue that anyone who views [1] as a case of metaphysical ground-
ing is implicitly committed to viewing the property being roughly spherical as heavy-
weight. Next, I argue that we cannot trivially infer that any given heavyweight property
is instantiated. But now suppose that [1] involves conceptual grounding. Then the infer-
ence between the sentences ‘x has determinate shape R’ and ‘x is roughly spherical’ will
be trivial for ordinary subjects. So I use this scrutability result in a regulative argument to
establish that the property being roughly spherical is not heavyweight.32 This entails that
31See Schiffer (2003).
32This argument is an example of the scrutability version of a regulative argument; see 1.3.1.
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[1] does not involve metaphysical grounding.
I argue that the same considerations apply to many other proposed cases of meta-
physical grounding. Once we recognize that these cases involve semantic connections, we
cannot view the relevant objects and properties in the heavyweight way that is needed to
view the case as involving metaphysical grounding.
1.4.5 Edenic Idealism (chs. 6-11)
Science suggests that the “external world” is very different from the world presented
to us in experience. For example, most theorists today reject the claim that external objects
have the vivid, sensuous color properties that they seem to have in experience. For a second
example: results from special and general relativity suggest that external space is very
different from the space presented to us in experience.
Despite these results, most philosophers think that we can uphold the truth of our
everyday judgments about ordinary objects through a strategy called functional identifica-
tion. The basic idea is: even if the world does not contain vivid, sensuous redness, the world
does contain properties (such as surface reflectance properties and dispositional properties)
whose role is similar enough to preserve our ordinary usage. By saying that ‘redness’ refers
to one of those properties, we can preserve the truth of our ordinary color judgments.33
But in chapter 6, I present a series of puzzles for this standard strategy. The puzzles
are cases where it is very difficult to match up the objects and properties presented in
experience with corresponding items in the external world.
On first pass, we might be tempted to say that the puzzles are cases where ordinary
objects don’t exist. But I use an Oracle argument like the one given in the introduction to
show that this conclusion is mistaken. On the basis of this Oracle argument, I offer the
following regulative argument (see 1.3.1) against realism about ordinary objects:
33Tye (2000) and McLaughlin (2003) adopt this strategy for colors, while Thompson (2010) and Chalmers
(2012) endorse this strategy for spatial properties.
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Updated regulative argument against realism
Premise 1: Even if ordinary subjects were to learn that the external world
WE does not contain suitable denotations for their ordinary object terms,
they would not alter their discourse about objects.
Premise 2: If ordinary subjects would not alter their object discourse upon
learning that WE has no suitable denotations for their object terms, terms
like ‘table’ and ‘chair’ do not have the semantic role of referring to items
from WE .
3. Terms like ‘table’ and ‘chair’ do not have the semantic role of referring to
items from WE .34.
Supposing this argument is successful, what do our ordinary object terms refer to? I
argue that the best way to explain the our response to the Oracle’s testimony is to adopt the
following semantic form of idealism:
Edenic Idealism (EI): Ordinary object terms refer to items in the manifest
world: the world WM of primitive objects and properties presented by our
experiences.
For example, suppose you have a phenomenal experience of an apple. The realist
wants to identify this apple with some item in the external world. But according to edenic
idealism, the apple is a denizen of the possible world WM presented by your experience.
Far from being some outlandish metaphysical theory, I argue that, in fact, EI is the position
of common sense. It is the most intuitively plausible view about what we are actually
talking about when we use terms for ordinary objects.
In chapter 7, I develop the edenic idealist’s positive metaphysical account in more
detail. In chapters 8-10, I defend edenic idealism from various traditional objections to
idealism. I conclude by discussing some applications of edenic idealism in chapter 11.
34Cf. Wittgenstein (1968, §293).
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1.5 Future prospects for regulative metaphysics
In this chapter, I have sought to show that regulative arguments still have an important
role in contemporary philosophy. To this end, I have explained why these arguments do
not require certain problematic epistemic and semantic assumptions traditionally associ-
ated with them (section 1.3). I have also identified a variety of contemporary targets for
regulative arguments (section 1.4).
In future research, I hope to apply the regulative approach to metaphysics to further
areas of discourse. To conclude this chapter, I will mention a few further areas of discourse
where regulative arguments may be relevant:
-Scientific ontology. In chapter 8, I discuss what view the edenic idealist should take
towards scientific ontology. There, I observe that the same thought experiments used to
challenge a realist view of ordinary objects may also challenge a realist view of items
from scientific ontology (e.g., electrons, fields, quarks, etc.). This suggests the intriguing
possibility of motivating a semantic form of idealism for scientific ontology as well. I am
interested in defending this view, which I call microphysical idealism, in future work.
-Time: With edenic idealism (see 1.4.5), I argue that the semantics of our ordinary
object judgments are closely tied to our experience of objects. I suspect that there is also
a close link between the semantics of our temporal discourse and our experience of time.
For example, I think Oracle thought experiments may help clarifiy certain debates in the
philosophy of time (e.g., A-theory vs. B-theory).
-Chance: In future work, I am also interested in extending my argument for Humean
laws (see 1.4.3) to an argument for a Humean view of objective chance.
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2 WATER, GAMES, AND CAUSES: A DECISION PROCEDURE FOR
ESSENCE HUNTERS
2.1 Introduction
We think that some things have a unified nature for us to discover.1 For example, we
think science has revealed the nature of water to be H2O. We think that other things do not
have a unified nature for us to discover. For example, we do not think that there is anything
to discover about what it is to be a game.
What about the causal relation, or dispositions, or free will? For any philosophically-
interesting item X , one can find a host of competing theories regarding the nature of X .
In offering such analyses, philosophers assume that X is relevantly similar to water, not
gamehood. My project in this chapter is to show how, in a given particular case, this
assumption might be challenged.
I will identify two semantic features of the term ‘water’ that distinguish it from the
term ‘game’. These features explain why an informative analysis is available for water but
not gamehood. They also provide a method for determining whether a philosophically-
interesting item X can be given an informative analysis. As an application, I will consider
the term ‘cause’, defending the following thesis:
Thesis: The term ‘cause’ does not have the semantic role of expressing a rela-
tion with a discoverable, unified nature.
1I will precisify what I mean by a “discoverable, unified nature” in 2.2.3.
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2.2 The project of analysis
Before beginning, it will be useful to distinguish two main ways in which philosophers
have thought about the project of philosophical analysis.
2.2.1 Conceptual analysis
On the traditional view, the project of analysis is an investigation of our concepts. For
example, (1) would be interpreted as a definition of the term ‘cause’:
(1) Event C causes distinct event E iff there is a (possibly empty) set of events
D1, D2, ... , Dn such that D1 counterfactually depends on C, D2 counter-
factually depends on D1, ..., and E counterfactually depends on Dn. (Lewis
(1973a))
The standard strategy for evaluating traditional conceptual analyses is the method by coun-
terexample.”2 On this method, we test a proposed analysis of a term ‘X’ by checking
whether it agrees with our intuitive judgments aboutX across various possible cases. Since
these intuitive judgments plausibly involve the exercise of our conceptual capacities, any
proposal that conflicts with these judgments fails as an analysis of the term. For example,
consider the following case:
“Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a bottle. Suzy throws first, or maybe she throws
harder. Her rock arrives first. The bottle shatters. When Billy’s rock gets to
where the bottle used to be, there is nothing there but flying shards of glass.
Without Suzy’s throw, the impact of Billy’s rock on in the intact bottle would
have [shattered the bottle]. But, thanks to Suzy’s preempting throw, that impact
never happens.” (Lewis (2000, 184))
Since (1) fails to uphold our intuition that Suzy’s throw causes the shattering of the bottle,
this case is a counterexample to (1).3 So the task for the theorist analyzing the term ‘cause’
2For discussion, see Williamson (2007, ch. 6) and Paul & Hall (2013, chs. 2 and 6).
3In this case, the set of events connecting Suzie’s throw to the shattering would be: the flight of Suzie’s
rock just as it leaves her hand, the flight of Suzie’s rock an instant later, ... , and the flight of Suzie’s rock just
before it hits the bottle. But the shattering does not counterfactually depend on the flight of Suzie’s rock just
before it hits the bottle, since if the latter had not occurred, Billy’s rock still would have shattered the bottle.
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would now be to provide an amended analysis that avoids this counterexample.
2.2.2 Metaphysical analysis
While conceptual analysis still has its contemporary adherents, this project no longer
enjoys its traditional prominence.4 While there are several reasons for this decline, perhaps
the most important reason is that successful definitions have been very difficult to come by.
For example: after many iterations of the method by counterexample, some philosophers
have concluded that the term ‘cause’ simply does not have a definition.5
In response to these failures, some theorists have suggested that we reorient our ap-
proach to theorizing about causation, dispositions, knowledge, etc. Instead of interpreting
biconditionals like (1) as an analysis of the term ‘cause’, we should instead view them as
“metaphysical analyses” of the causal relation itself.6 Here is a representative quotation
from the causation literature:
“Conceptual analysis ... is an explication of everyday concepts. ... On the other
hand, [metaphysical] analysis seeks to establish what causation in fact is in the
actual world. [Metaphysical analysis] aims to map the objective world, not our
concepts” (Dowe (2000, 3))
This proposed shift from conceptual to metaphysical analysis is found in many other areas
of the literature as well.7
4For discussion, see Chalmers (2012, 10-12).
5See Schaffer (2007, 872). Another famous example is the Gettier literature: after dozens of failed
attempts to define the term ‘knows’, some philosophers have concluded that this term cannot be defined. See
Shope (1983) for an overview.
6See, e.g., Sosa (2015, ch. 1). This project has various other names in the literature, including “factual
analysis” (Mackie (1985, 178)), “empirical analysis” (Dowe (2000, ch. 1)), and “ontological reduction” (Paul
& Hall (2013, 29)).
7For example, Milikan (1984, 73) claims that she is not analyzing the concept of meaning, but is instead
analyzing the nature of meaning. Swoyer (1982, 221-222) clarifies that he is offering an “ontological” theory
of natural laws that may not neatly line up with our concept of a law. Van Inwagen (1990, 66-68) is interested
in when composition really occurs, as opposed to when we ordinarily judge that composition occurs. Korn-
blith (2002, 1-2) claims that he is not analyzing the concept of knowledge, but is instead giving an account
of the nature of knowledge itself. Relatedly, many theorists (e.g., Locke (1689), Heil (2012, 196)) make a
distinction between real essences and nominal essences.
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One can motivate the project of metaphysical analysis with examples of a posteriori
necessities. The identification of water with H2O was not the result of traditional conceptual
analysis; instead, it was a substantive discovery about the metaphysical nature of water.
Similarly, the alleged identification of pain states with neural states is typically viewed as
a substantive discovery about the nature of consciousness.
Metaphysical analyses have different criteria of adequacy than traditional conceptual
analyses. They do not need to be analytic or a priori.8 They may not even have to be
metaphysically necessary.9 But perhaps the most important difference is that metaphysical
analyses are not required to align with our linguistic intuitions across all possible cases.
For the purposes of this chapter, I will consider this a sufficient condition for a theory to
count as an attempt at metaphysical analysis.10
2.2.3 The path ahead
To clarify the target of this chapter’s arguments, this section has provided background
on the various ways in which theorists have understood the project of analysis. Given the
decline of the traditional project of conceptual analysis, the arguments ahead are primarily
directed towards proponents of metaphysical analysis.
Let’s say that X has a unified nature iff there is some single, natural feature that is
necessary and sufficient for being an instance of X . Let’s say that X has a discoverable
nature iff learning X’s nature involves genuine discovery (i.e., extends beyond mere re-
flection on our concepts). Then, differences notwithstanding, proponents of metaphysical
8See Fair (1979, 231), Bigelow & Pargetter (1990), and Dowe (2000, 3).
9While some theorists (e.g., Earman (1976, 24), Tooley (1987, ch. 7)) require metaphysical analyses to
be necessary, other theorists (e.g., Aronson (1982, 302), Salmon (1984, 239-242), and Dowe (2000, 3)) only
require truth in the actual world. Paul & Hall (2013, 40-41) take a middle position, claiming that metaphysical
analyses should not rely on facts “too specific to one’s own world.”
10Given this sufficient condition, here are some examples of metaphysical analyses in the literature. Cau-
sation: Aronson (1971), Mellor (1988, 229-230), Bigelow & Pargetter (1990, 278), Dowe (2000, 11), Wood-
ward (2003, 115-117). Composition: van Inwagen (1990, see esp. 66-68), Merricks (2000, ch. 1). Desire:
Morillo (1990), Arpaly & Schroeder (2013, ch. 6). Knowledge: Kornblith (2002, 1-2). Possibility: Armstrong
(1989, ch. 4). Laws of nature: Swoyer (1982, 221-222).
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analysis share a major assumption: that the item X under analysis has a discoverable, uni-
fied nature. The arguments ahead will show how we might challenge this assumption in a
given particular case.
To make this challenge concrete, consider again the contrast between water and game-
hood. Intuitively, the project of metaphysical analysis seems interesting for water but not
for gamehood. This is because, unlike water, gamehood doesn’t seem to be a thing with
a discoverable, unified nature. I want to raise the following question: why should we as-
sume that things like the causal relation, dispositions, etc. are like water instead of like
gamehood?
2.3 ‘water’ vs. ‘game’
In this section, I will identify two important semantic differences between the terms
‘water’ and ‘game’. These differences explain why the project of metaphysical analy-
sis is legitimate for water but not for gamehood. We will then have a test for whether a
philosophically-interesting item X can be given a metaphysical analysis by seeing whether
the term ‘X’ shares these features.
2.3.1 Epistemic security
Suppose that all of our ordinary evidence suggests that a certain sample X is water: it
has the right appearance, taste, boiling point, etc. On the basis of this evidence, we would
justifiably endorse the sentence P ≡ ‘X is a sample of water’. But notice that P is hostage
to empirical fortune: if we were to find out that X has a different chemical structure from
the one shared by all the other water-like liquids in our environment, we would revise our
judgment and conclude that P is false. This shows that P ’s truth presupposes thatX shares
some unified nature with other water-like samples in our environment.11
11This is not to say that we can know a priori that water has a unified nature. For example, if it had turned
out that half of the water-like stuff around us was H2O while the other half was some other chemical, it is
plausible that our term ‘water’ would have referred to both types of substances (see Block & Stalnaker (1999,
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But the following thought experiment shows that game judgments are different. Sup-
pose we become convinced that a certain theoryA is the best possible analysis of gamehood
(on whatever desiderata for theory choice one prefers12). But suppose (plausibly enough)
that there are still some cases where A conflicts with our intuitions; for example, perhaps
A classifies multiplication tables as games.
Now consider: how would our belief that A is the best possible analysis of gamehood
affect the game-judgments we are disposed to make in ordinary contexts? For example,
how would it affect our disposition to assert Q ≡ ‘Multiplication tables are not games’ in
ordinary contexts? I submit that, even if we were convinced that A was the best possible
analysis of gamehood, we would feel no pressure at all to revise our judgment that Q (in
any ordinary context). We would continue to assert Q just as we always had.13 This is
because, when judging whether Y is a game in ordinary contexts, we do not care whether
it shares some unifying feature with other cases of games.14
This thought experiment reveals an important difference between ‘water’ and ‘game’.
The fact that we revise our water-judgments when we learn that X does not share some
unifying feature with other water-like samples suggests that ‘water’ expresses a property
with a unified nature. But the fact that we feel no similar pressure to revise our game-
judgments suggests that ‘game’ does not express a property with a unified nature.15
21ff) for discussion). To speak more precisely: P ’s truth presupposes that X shares some unified nature with
the other water-like samples around us conditional on the supposition that these other samples (generally)
share a unified nature. I will leave this precisification tacit because it will not affect the arguments ahead.
12For example, perhaps we become convinced that A upholds more of our our intuitive judgments than
any other comparatively simple analysis.
13By “ordinary context”, I mean: contexts where we aren’t engaged in the philosophical task of analyzing
“gamehood”. An example of such a context might be: a competition where players quickly write down the
names of objects within various categories beginning with a given letter. If someone wrote down “multipli-
cation tables” as their response to the category “game” and the letter “M”, we would protest.
14Note that nothing in this argument hinged on the choice of Q as an example; we wouldn’t feel pressure
to change any of our determinate game judgments in order to make them conform to some neat analysis.
15Might the difference in revisability between P and Q instead be explained by a difference in our con-
fidence in these judgments? For example, might our unwillingness to revise our judgment that Q reflect the
fact that, unlike in the water case, we are more confident in Q than in any proposed analysis conflicting with
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To capture this difference, I will say that game judgments are epistemically secure in
a way that water judgments are not: our judgment that X is a game is not threatened by the
possibility that X fails to share some unifying feature with other games.16
2.3.2 Epistemic rigidity
The term ‘water’ is metaphysically rigid: it refers to the same substance across meta-
physical possibilities. But ‘water’ is epistemically non-rigid: it refers to difference sub-
stances across epistemic possibilities. For example, since the dominant water-like sub-
stance in our actual environment turned out to be H2O, the term ‘water’ refers to H2O in
the actual world. But if the dominant water-like substance in our actual environment had
turned out to be XYZ, the term ‘water’ would have referred to XYZ.17
The epistemic non-rigidity of the term ‘water’ explains the sense in which an analysis
of water involves substantive discovery. Before we did chemistry, there were many open
epistemic possibilities about what ‘water’ refers to; perhaps it refers to H2O, perhaps it
refers to an element, etc. But by performing experiments, we learned which substance
‘water’ actually refers to. This result closes epistemic space and is justifiably considered to
be a substantive discovery.
In contrast, the term ‘game’ seems epistemically rigid. Although we can imagine
it?
In response: while it may be true that we are more confident in Q than any analysis conflicting with it,
this difference between P and Q potentially obscures a more important difference between them. The more
important difference is that, when judging that X is water, we care (at least implicitly) that X shares some
unifying feature with other water-like samples — this is why we revise our judgment that P upon learning
that X has some different chemical structure. But when making game judgments, we do not care whether the
given practice shares some unifying feature with other games.
This difference — a difference in what we care about — is the real explanation of why game-judgments
cannot be threatened in the same way as water judgments. Indeed, this explanation shows that it would be a
mistake to think of our game-judgments as being weighed against theories of gamehood in the same way that
our water-judgments are (apparently) implicitly weighed against theories of water.
16Of course, this is not to say that game judgments are epistemically secure simpliciter. For example, we
might mistakenly judge that X is a game because we are not fully aware of the details of X (its rules, its
aims, its history, etc.).
17For discussion of epistemic rigidity, see Chalmers (2012, E14).
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“twin-worlds” where functional and phenomenal duplicates of us use the term ‘water’ to
refer to XYZ, we cannot imagine twin-worlds where functional and phenomenal duplicates
of us use the term ‘game’ to refer something other than games.18 So unlike the water case,
there are no discoveries for us to make about what ‘gamehood’ refers to in the actual world.
Given this disanalogy, it is unclear in what sense an analysis of gamehood could involve
substantive discovery.
2.3.3 A test
Both ‘water’ and ‘game’ are famous examples of the failure of traditional concep-
tual analysis. But only in the case of ‘water’ does the alternative project of metaphysical
analysis seem well-motivated. I’ve explained this intuition by identifying two semantic dif-
ferences between the terms ‘water’ and ‘game’. Because of the epistemic security of game
judgments, there is no reason to think that ‘gamehood’ refers to a property with a unified
nature. And because this term is epistemically rigid, there is no reason to think that it refers
to a property with a discoverable nature.
This discussion provides a test for when metaphysical analysis is appropriate. Con-
sider any philosophically-interesting term ‘X’ (e.g., ‘cause’, ‘free’, ‘law’, etc.). If we de-
termine that X-judgments are epistemically secure and that the term ‘X’ is epistemically
rigid, it is inappropriate to ask for a metaphysical analysis of X .
2.4 ‘cause’ vs. ‘water’
To illustrate this test, I will consider the term ‘cause’. I will argue that, when we
compare the term ‘cause’ to terms like ‘game’ and ‘water’, the close analogy is with the
term ‘game’.
18Of course, we can imagine worlds where speakers use the term ‘game’ to refer to other types of things:
granite, trees, bikes, etc. But these worlds wouldn’t be twin-worlds.
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2.4.1 Epistemic security
As discussed in 2.2.2, metaphysical analyses are not required to agree with our intu-
itive judgments across all possible cases. For example, on Aronson’s (1971) transference
theory of causation, it is incorrect to say that the ice’s melting caused the water to cool (424-
425). On Dowe’s (2000) conserved quantity theory, causation by omission (e.g., ‘John’s
failure to take the medicine caused his illness’) is not genuine causation at all (124ff). Paul
& Hall (2013) argue that metaphysical analyses need not uphold our causal intuitions about
exotic possible cases, such as those involving magical spells (40-41).
The common problem with these proposals is that our causal judgments are not the
types of things that can be falsified through philosophical theorizing. To be sure, we often
revise our causal judgments in response to receiving more ordinary evidence; for example,
we would revise our judgmentR≡ ‘The melting ice caused the water to cool’ upon learning
that there wasn’t actually any ice. But we would never revise this judgment simply because
a philosophical theory of causation conflicted with it.
For example, suppose we become convinced that the best theory of causation (on
whatever desiderata for theory choice one prefers) is Aronson’s transference theory. Even
if this were the case, we would feel no pressure in ordinary contexts to revise our judgment
that R. We would continue (in ordinary contexts — say, when swimming in a cold lake)
to assert R just as we always had. Similar remarks apply to any of our determinate causal
judgments. We would never revise our robust causal judgments just to make them conform
with some attractive theory of causation. This is because, in ordinary contexts, we do not
care whether our causal judgments align with any theory. Again, it is worth contrasting
this case with the case of our water judgments.
Of course, philosophers sometimes make provisions for cases where ordinary judg-
ments conflict with their preferred theory. For example, Dowe (2000, ch. 6) claims that,
while judgments like V ≡ ‘John’s failure to take the medicine caused his illness’ do not
express genuine cases of causation, it is still correct to make such judgments since they are
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pragmatically useful. I agree with Dowe that sentences like V are often correctly assertible,
but there are better and worse explanations of why they are correctly assertible. On Dowe’s
explanation, V is assertible because it paraphrases sentences that describe “real” causation.
But a better explanation is that the term ‘cause’ doesn’t express a relation with a unified
nature in the way that Dowe supposes.
When arguing that our intuitive causal judgments are defeasible, Paul & Hall (2013,
41) claim: “[when considering intuitions about cases], you should reflect on whether in-
tuition has been set up as an arbiter of questions it may not be competent to judge.” But
the above thought experiment suggests the opposite result: at least in the case of causation,
metaphysical analyses are not competent to judge the truth of our ordinary judgments. A
philosophical theory could have authority over our ordinary causal judgments only if we
were inclined to defer to that theory in everyday contexts. But we aren’t: we feel no pres-
sure to revise our ordinary causal judgments to conform to any theory. So metaphysical
analyses cannot “reveal” that any of our ordinary intuitions about causation are misguided.
(Of course, we can imagine speakers who are inclined to conform their causal judg-
ments to a philosophical theory. For example, we can imagine speakers who, upon ac-
cepting Aronson’s theory of causation, no longer judge (in ordinary contexts) that the ice’s
melting causes the water to cool. For these speakers, ‘cause’ would express a relation with
a unified nature. But this is not how we use the term ‘cause’.)
Use and reference magnetism
It is plausible that use has at least some role in determining what our linguistic ex-
pressions refer to. Some theorists have appealed to this meta-semantic principle in order to
criticize theories of causation that depart too radically from ordinary usage.19 The intuitive
objection is that, if a theory T conflicts with our ordinary causal judgments across a large
range of cases, T doesn’t deserve to be called a theory of causation (as opposed to a theory
19See, e.g., Schaffer (2004).
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of something else).
While I find this style of argument convincing, the above thought experiment suggests
that it does not go far enough. It isn’t just that use makes some contribution to determining
the relation expressed by the term ‘cause’; the thought experiment suggests that use makes
the entire contribution.20 So it is not enough to reject theories of causation that substan-
tially conflict with our intuitions. We must reject theories that conflict with any our robust
intuitive judgments.
Proponents of reference magnetism will resist this conclusion.21 According to refer-
ence magnetism, certain types of properties are more natural than others, and this natural-
ness helps determine the extensions of our linguistic expressions. If reference magnetism
applies for the term ‘cause’, then this term will express whatever natural relation best fits
our use. So causation may have a unified nature even if our causal judgments themselves
do not line up with any natural relation.
My response is that a semantic theory is adequate only to the extent that it accords
with our linguistic behavior. It is part of our linguistic behavior that, when we learn that a
water-like sample X has a different chemical structure than other samples, we deny that X
is water. Insofar as reference magnetism explains this result, it is a plausible theory for the
term ‘water’. But the situation is different when we consider terms like ‘game’ and ‘cause’.
As explained earlier: in these cases, it is not part of our linguistic behavior to revise our
judgments so that they conform to some unified nature. So even if there is some unified
nature in the vicinity of our judgments about games and causes, reference magnetism isn’t
a plausible semantic theory for terms like ‘game’ and ’cause’.
20Of course, this does not mean that all of our causal judgments are correct. For example, we might falsely
judge that x causes y because of ignorance about the basic empirical facts of a case. See section 2.2.5 for
further discussion.
21For discussion, see Sider (2011, 3.2).
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2.4.2 Epistemic rigidity
In the literature, it is not uncommon to use nomologically impossible cases as coun-
terexamples to theories of causation. For example, Earman’s (1976, 24) counterexample
to Aronson’s transference theory is a possible world where collisions do not conserve en-
ergy. Similarly, Schaffer’s (2000) counterexample to counterfactual theories of causation
involves a “wizard world” where magical laws govern the casting of spells. In offering
these cases, Earman and Schaffer implicitly assume that causation is the same kind of
thing across the space of epistemic possibilities.
Other philosophers deny this assumption. For example, Aronson (1982) claims that
his transference theory “is intended to make sense of how causation takes place in this
world, ... not in some alien universe where the laws of physics do not in the least resemble
ours” (302). Paul & Hall (2013) also claim that the nature of causation might differ from
world to world (41-42).
The above difference amounts to a disagreement over whether the term ‘cause’ is
epistemically rigid: Earman and Schaffer endorse the rigid view, while Aronson, Paul, and
Hall endorse the non-rigid view. I’ll now present an objection to the non-rigid view.
On the non-rigid view, ‘causation’ is supposed to be like ‘water’: just as ‘water’ would
refer to something different if the water-like stuff in our actual environment turned out to
be XYZ, so too ‘causation’ would refer to something different if the actual world were
Schaffer’s wizard world. But this proposed analogy breaks when we compare the following
cases:
(A) Suppose that the water-like stuff in our local environment turns out to be
H2O. But in some distant part of the universe, there is a twin-world P where
the water-like stuff is XYZ.22
(B) Suppose that the physical laws are just as we normally think them to be.
But there is one exception: in some distant part of the universe, there is a
22This is Putnam’s (1975) twin earth thought experiment.
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planet P* where wizards cast spells according to magical laws (as in Schaffer’s
(2000) example).23
In both cases, we are supposing that an isolated region of the actual world is different
from our local environment. But there is an intuitive difference between the cases. In the
case of (A), we judge that P does not contain water; it merely contains a substance that
resembles water.24 But in the case of (B), we do not similarly judge that spells in P* are
not causes. For example, suppose a wizard in P* mutters a spell and, because of the laws of
magic, a window shatters immediately thereafter. We judge this to be just as much a case of
causation as one billiard ball striking another. This example shows that, unlike the truth of
our water judgments, the truth of our causal judgments does not depend on facts about our
actual environment.25 This in turn suggests that the term ‘cause’ does not express different
relations across the space of epistemic possibilities.26 And since ‘cause’ is epistemically
rigid, it is unclear how an analysis of causation could involve any substantive discovery.
23This example may worry philosophers (e.g., Lange (2009)) who believe that fundamental natural laws
cannot have exceptions. To assuage this worry, we might stipulate that the laws, while universal, are different
than we think in such a way as to permit spells. But as it happens, these spells are instantiated only in some
distant part of the universe.
24Or at least, this will be the judgment of anyone who agrees with Putnam (1975).
25Schaffer (2004, 207) notes that, in a metaphysically possible world governed by magical laws, we do
not hesitate to use the term ‘cause’ to describe spells in such a world. So Schaffer concludes, contra theorists
like Aronson (1982, 302), that it is legitimate to appeal to possible cases when investigating the nature of the
causal relation.
Schaffer’s argument has one shortcoming: opponents can accomodate Schaffer’s case by denying that
‘cause’ is metaphysically rigid. On this response, causal sentences are true in worlds different from ours, but
this is because the causal relation is different in those worlds. So Schaffer’s argument is unlikely to convince
his opponents.
Case (2) amends Schaffer’s argument by locating P* not in some other possible world, but in some distant
part of the actual world (on a certain epistemic possibility). This amendment rules out the possibility that
‘cause’ expresses different relations depending on what the actual world is like.
26There are two ways to resist this last step. First, one could argue that the term ‘cause’ expresses a
different relation on the epistemic possibility that the actual world includes P* than it does on the epistemic
possibility that it does not. But this is implausible: we do not think the identity of the causal relation depends
on what’s happening in some distant region of the universe. Second, one could argue that in judgments like
‘The spell caused the shattering’, we employ a different sense of the term ‘cause’. But there is no evidence
for this proposal. From the sentences ‘The spell caused a shattering’ and ‘John’s throw caused a shattering’,
we could legitimately infer ‘Both the spell and John’s throw caused a shattering’.
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2.4.3 Summary
The above discussion suggests that the term ‘cause’ is more similar to the term ‘game’
than the term ‘water’. The epistemic security of causal judgments and the epistemic rigidity
of the term ‘cause’ together support the following thesis:
Thesis: The term ‘cause’ does not have the semantic role of expressing a rela-
tion with a discoverable, unified nature.
(N.b.: There are two arguments from the literature on causation that, if successful, would
provide independent support for the above thesis. So as not to disrupt the main flow of the
chapter, I discuss these arguments in appendix A.)
As discussed in 2.2.3, the project of metaphysical analysis presupposes that the item
under analysis has a discoverable, unified nature. So the above thesis rules out the possi-
bility of providing a metaphysical analysis of causation.
My aim in considering the above test case has been to illustrate how one might chal-
lenge assumptions implicit in the project of metaphysical analysis. Of course, the above
discussion does not show that this project is never viable; whether it is viable will depend
on the specific case. But it does suggest a methodological lesson: before engaging in the
project of metaphysical analysis, we should first check whether this project is compatible
with the semantic role of the relevant term.
Due to limitations of space, I will not consider any further cases. But my own view is
that the above heuristic can be used to motivate analogous theses for a variety of philosophically-
interesting items. Other cases to consider include: ‘knowledge’, ‘free will’, ‘desire’,
‘chance’, ‘law of nature’, and ‘goodness’.
2.5 A deflationary alternative
Suppose we conclude that a certain philosophically-interesting item X has no discov-
erable, unified nature. Is it then possible to give any precise analysis of X? For example,
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is it posssible to give any precise analysis of causation? In this section, I will provide such
an analysis by appealing to the linguistic dispositions of competent speakers.
As discussed in 2.2.1, competence with the term ‘cause’ plausibly involves the ability
to make causal judgments across various possible cases. For example, competent speakers
are able to immediately judge that Suzy’s throw causes the shattering in the case described
in 2.2.1. The same goes for the many other cases discussed in the causation literature.
Taken together, these cases suggest the following: when we are told sufficient information
about a possible situation, we can often trivially judge whetherX causes Y in that situation.
Now, if ‘cause’ expressed a relation with a unified nature, we should not expect any
neat correspondence between these judgments and genuine instances of causation.27 But
the arguments of section 2.2.4 suggest that ‘cause’ does not have this role. This motivates
the following deflationary characterization of the causal relation:
Causal Deflationism: x causes y in a possible case C iff actual subjects would
(ideally) judge that the predicate ‘causes’ applies to x and y when given an
appropriate description of C.
Intuitively: C is a case of causation if and only if we are inclined to call C a case of
causation. Here are a few remarks on how to interpret this analysis.
(i) Actual subjects: The above analysis should not be interpreted as saying that x
causes y in some possible case C iff subjects in C would judge that the predicate ‘causes’
applies to x and y. On this reading, the analysis would be obviously false; it would imply,
for example, that any world without humans subjects is a world without causation. The
correct interpretation is: x causes y in some possible case C iff we ourselves — here in
the actual world using our concepts as we actually do — would judge that x causes y
when given a description of C. For example, since we judge that Suzy’s throw causes
the shattering in the section 2.2.2 case, the deflationary analysis predicts that Suzy’s throw
27For example, consider the case of ‘water’. In ordinary life, we often judge that certain liquids are
water. But because water has a unified nature, we should not expect a neat correspondence between our
water-judgments and genuine samples of water.
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causes the shattering in these cases.28
(ii) “Appropriate description”: The description in the above analysis should specify
all of the facts about C that a competent speaker needs to make a fully-informed causal
judgment. For example, the description might include information about the relevant mat-
ters of particular fact, information about the laws of nature, etc.29
(iii) Idealization: As I discussed earlier, the fact that the term ‘cause’ does not express
a relation with a unified nature means that we should expect a close link between our causal
judgments and genuine instances of causation. But of course, there will be cases where the
two come apart. For example, we can imagine possible cases that are too complex for
any human to form a judgment about. Similarly, we can imagine cases where subjects are
mistaken in their causal judgments due to insufficient reflection on the case. To account for
such cases, the analysis requires an idealization on judgments that abstracts away from our
contingent cognitive limitations.30
(iv) Explanatory power: One might worry that the deflationary analysis isn’t appro-
priately explanatory. But the deflationist will claim that there is nothing the analysis needs
to explain. Since the term ‘cause’ probably doesn’t have a definition (see 2.2.2), there is no
need to explain how the term ‘cause’ is built from other terms. Nor does an analysis need to
explain what unites all cases of causation: there isn’t any natural feature that unites them.
Nor does an analysis need to explain how we use the term ‘cause’: as competent speakers,
28What about cases where we have no determinate intuitions about whether causation occurs? In such
cases, the causal deflationist should say that it is indeterminate whether x causes y.
Could there be a case C∗ where two communities A and B of (fully-informed) subjects have conflicting
intuitions over whether causation occurs? This would be unsurprising; after all, we see exactly this type of
disagreement with other terms, such as the term ‘knows’ (see Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich (2001)). We might
initially be tempted to say that there is a fact of the matter about whether causation occurs in C∗. But if we
accept that the term ‘cause’ does not express a relation with a unified nature, it becomes much more plausible
to say that A and B simply use the term ‘cause’ in slightly different ways. So the causal deflationist will say
that, in case C∗, ‘x causes y’ will be true in the mouths of A-speakers but not B-speakers (or vice versa).
29One important question is whether the description can be entirely specified using non-causal language.
That is: can subjects make causal judgments without antecedently knowing anything else about the causal
structure of the case? I suspect that they can, but this position is controversial (see Cartwright (2004) and
Schaffer (2007) for discussion).
30See Chalmers (2012, 63-71) for an example of an idealization that would work in this context.
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we already know how to use this term.
(v) Other cases: If we conclude that other philosophically-interesting items have no
discoverable unified nature, we can give deflationary analyses for those items as well. For
example, here is how such analyses would look for parthood and dispositions:
Parthood Deflationism: x is a part of y in a possible case C iff we would
(ideally) judge that the predicate ‘is a part of’ applies to x and y when given
an appropriate description of C.
Disposition Deflationism: x has disposition y in a possible case C iff we
would (ideally) judge that the predicate ‘has disposition y’ applies to x when
given an appropriate description of C.
2.5.1 The corresponding metaphysical picture
If we adopt a deflationary analysis for an item like the causal relation, what metaphys-
ical view should we take toward that item? Here are two attractive possibilities.
First, we might identify the causal relation with a set-theoretic entity. For example, we
might identify the causal relation with: the set of ordered pairs 〈x, y〉 such that we would
(ideally) judge that the predicate ‘causes’ applies to x and y when given an appropriate
description of the (possible) case.
Philosophers like Armstrong (1978) have raised various objections to set-theoretic
reductions of properties. But most of these objections apply to views where all properties
are identified with sets. In contrast, the current proposal only applies to properties and
relations that do not have a discoverable, unified nature.
A second possibility is to view the causal relation as a lightweight entity. According
to theorists like Schiffer (1996) and Thomasson (2001), properties and relations are mere
“shadows of predicates”: ontologically thin entities with no discoverable nature for meta-
physics to discover. On this conception, there is nothing true of properties other than what
is correctly assertible of them in ordinary discourse (Schiffer (1996, 159)).
Schiffer suggests that we should view all properties in this lightweight manner. It is
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outside the scope of this chapter to assess this view. But whatever its status as a global
theory, a lightweight view seems very natural for items like the causal relation which lack
a discoverable, unified nature.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I developed a test to determine whether a philosophically-interesting
itemX can be given a metaphysical analysis. I argued that, if ourX-judgments are epistem-
ically secure, and if the term ‘X’ is epistemically rigid, then no such analysis is available
for X . To illustrate this test, I considered the term ‘cause’, ultimately concluding that this
term does not express a relation with a discoverable, unified nature.
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3 THE CONTEXT PRINCIPLE AND ONTOLOGESE GAMBITS
3.1 Introduction
Here is a familiar dialectic between an ontologist and a deflationist:
O: I grant that there are particles arranged “table-wise”, but I deny the existence
of tables.
D: If you accept that ‘There are particles arranged table-wise’ is true, you
cannot deny ‘There is a table’. In ordinary English, the second sentence is
trivially entailed by the first.
O: I’m willing to grant that you are correct about ordinary English. But when
I deny the existence of tables, I do not mean to be speaking ordinary English.
Instead, I mean to use a special “heavyweight” notion of existence: existence*.
I deny that tables exist*.
Following Sider (2014), we can call the third step of this dialectic an Ontologese gambit.
With such a gambit, the ontologist introduces a new metaphysically-privileged quantifier
from the language of “Ontologese” in order to resist deflationary pressures from ordinary
language. In this chapter, I will offer a criticism of this gambit by defending the following
thesis:
Thesis: If the deflationist offers the correct explanation of the triviality1 of a
given ordinary existence statement, then there is no substantive question to ask
about the truth of the corresponding existence* statement
For example: if we give the ordinary existence of tables a deflationary treatment, then
there is likewise no substantive question about the existence* of tables. Similarly, if we
1N.b.: Throughout this chapter, when I say that assertions like ‘The table exists’ are trivial truths in
ordinary language, I mean that these sentences are trivially true conditional on the empirical assumption that
there are particles arranged table-wise.
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give the ordinary existence of properties a deflationary treatment, then there is likewise no
substantive question about the existence* of properties.
The basic form of the argument is as follows. If the deflationist offers the correct
semantic treatment of ordinary existence statements, then expressions like ‘the table’, ‘2’,
and ‘redness’ have a specific kind of semantic role in our language. But I will argue that to
apply the existence* quantifier to terms with this semantic role involves a category mistake.
If this is correct, then there are no substantive2 questions to ask about the existence* of
things like ordinary objects, numbers, and properties. So the ontologist cannot simply
retreat from ordinary language in order to defend the substantivity of ontological debates.
3.2 Background
There is a vigorous debate over the existence of material objects like tables and trees.
Nihilists claim that their existence would lead to various troublesome metaphysical con-
sequences, such as causal overdetermination, collocated entities, and metaphysical vague-
ness, while realists have offered counter-arguments to each of these objections.3
But deflationary theorists like Thomasson (2007) and Hirsch (2011) have argued that
there is something misguided about appealing to these types of “metaphysical” arguments
to settle whether tables exist. It seems that, in ordinary language, the sentence ‘The table
exists’ has the status of a trivial truth (on the assumption that there are particles arranged
table-wise). So deflationists claim that the composition debate can be trivially resolved in
favor of realism simply by reflecting on how we use ordinary English. Deflationists have
2On the usage of this chapter, an ontological question is non-substantive if, as deflationists suppose, it can
be decided merely by reflecting on the ordinary use of our linguistic expressions (in the sense discussed in the
next section). In contrast, an ontological question is substantive if it instead should be decided by evaluating
“metaphysical” arguments like the ones typically offered by ontologists (see section 3.3.2). So, for example,
to say that the question over the existence* of tables is non-substantive is to say that this question is not to
be decided by, e.g., arguments concerning metaphysical vagueness or causal overdetermination. Note that,
on this usage, a question can be non-substantive without its answer being obvious; to say that a question is
non-substantive is just to say that it should not be decided in the way that ontologists typically suppose.
3See van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks (2001, ch. 3) for examples of arguments for nihilism. See Elder
(2011, chs. 3-6) and Lewis (1986, 211-213) for examples of arguments for realism.
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made similar claims about other areas of ontology as well.4
Earlier in the literature, many ontologists resisted the deflationist’s claim that asser-
tions like ‘The table exists’ are often trivially true in ordinary language.5 But more recently,
some ontologists have claimed that there can still be substantive debates in ontology even
if deflationists are correct about ordinary language.6 The claim is that, even if it is trivially
true in ordinary English that tables exist, there is still a substantive debate over whether
tables really exist.
What is “real existence”? Here, ontologists appeal to the idea that the world has a
“privileged ontological structure”: it is naturally carved into a certain set of objects. The
goal for ontologists is to figure out how the world is carved. This question has to do with
the world; it doesn’t depend on the use of language.
If the quantifiers in ordinary English do not express real existence, how can we talk
about the world’s privileged structure? Here, it has been suggested that we think of ontolo-
gists as speaking a special language called “Ontologese”. Ontologese is much like ordinary
English except that the ordinary existential quantifier is replaced with a special “existence*
quantifier” that is stipulated to correspond to the world’s most natural carving. Whether or
not ‘The table exists*’ is true does not depend on how speakers use this expression; it de-
pends only on whether the table is a member of the world’s privileged domain. Following
Sider (2014), we can call the proposed shift to Ontologese the Ontologese gambit.
Some deflationists have worried that the notion of an existence* quantifier is unintel-
ligible.7 But in this chapter, I will raise an independent objection. I will argue that, even if
we grant that some existence* questions are substantive, there are no substantive questions
to ask about the existence* of things like ordinary objects, numbers, and properties – things
4For example, Schiffer (2003, 2.3) argues that we can trivially establish the existence of properties by
looking to the ordinary use of property terms.
5See Sider (2001, xix-xxiv) for this type of response.
6See, e.g., Cameron (2010).
7See, e.g., Hirsch (2011, 195).
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whose ordinary existence is given a deflationary treatment. More precisely, I will defend
the following thesis:
Thesis: If the deflationist offers the correct explanation of the triviality8 of a
given ordinary existence statement, then there is no substantive question to ask
about the truth of the corresponding existence* statement
For example: if we give the existence of ordinary objects a deflationary treatment, then
there is likewise no substantive question about the existence* of ordinary objects. Simi-
larly, if we give the existence of properties a deflationary treatment, then there is likewise
no substantive question about the existence* of properties. (In contrast, the thesis does
not challenge the substantivity of debates about the existence* of superstrings, since the
existence of superstrings is not trivial in ordinary language.)
To defend this thesis, I will first explain a difference in how ontologists and defla-
tionists typically think about language (section 3.3.3). This discussion will help clarify the
dispute between ontologists and deflationists and will serve as the foundation for the later
arguments. In section 3.3.4, I will defend the main thesis. In section 3.3.5, I will consider
a response on behalf of the ontologist.
3.3 Two pictures of language, two pictures of the world
In this section, I’ll sketch two views on the relative explanatory priority of truth and
reference: the truth-priority view and the reference-priority view. I’ll explain why defla-
tionists tend to adopt the truth-priority view while ontologists tend to adopt the reference-
priority view. Consider the following sentence:
(1) 7 is prime.
On the traditional reference-priority view, we begin with a meaningful referential ex-
pression like ‘7’: this term purports to refer to a certain entity. Referential expressions
8N.b.: Throughout this chapter, when I say that assertions like ‘The table exists’ are trivial truths in
ordinary language, I mean that these sentences are trivially true conditional on the empirical assumption that
there are particles arranged table-wise.
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combine with meaningful expressions from other grammatical categories to form mean-
ingful sentences with truth values. The truth of a sentence like (1) is then explained by
the fact that ‘7’ successfully refers and its referent satisfies the predicate ‘is prime’. In this
sense, the question of whether ‘7’ refers is explanatorily prior to the question of whether
(1) is true.
But some theorists have claimed that, at least for arithmetical sentences like (1), truth
is actually explanatorily prior to reference. Consider Dummett (1978, 40-41):
If a word functions as a proper name, then it is a proper name. ... If its syn-
tactical function is that of a proper name, then we have fixed the sense, and
with it the reference, of a proper name. [W]e can determine whether the name
has a reference by finding out, in the ordinary way, the truth-value of the cor-
responding sentence ‘There is one and only one x such that Fx’. There is no
further philosophical question whether the name really stands for something
or not.9
Similar remarks are made by Wright (1983, 51):
the question whether a particular expression is a candidate to refer to an object
is entirely a matter of the sort of syntactic role which it plays in whole sen-
tences. If it plays that sort of role, then the truth of appropriate sentences in
which it so features will be sufficient to confer on it an objectual reference
In these passages, the order of explanation is reversed. We start with a discourse of arith-
metic that is governed by certain norms of assertibility. What it is for an arithmetical
sentence like (1) to be true just is for it to be correctly assertible within that discourse. And
what it is for the term ‘7’ to refer just is for this term to have a certain syntactic role in true
sentences like (1).
The guiding inspiration for these theorists is Frege’s (1953) context principle. What
does the meaning of our number terms consist in? Frege’s suggestion was the context prin-
ciple: “it is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning” (73). Frege
9It should be said that Dummett’s views on using the context principle to justify the existence of mathe-
matical entities have shifted over the years. See Dummett (1978, xlii-xliii) for discussion.
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thought that we have no grip on the meaning of the term ‘7’ apart from our grip on how
‘7’ features in mathematical discourse. This is why, for Frege, the truth of mathematical
sentences is explanatorily prior to the reference of number terms.10
As a second example, consider (2):
(2) Mt. Everest is tall.
On the traditional reference-priority view, the truth of a sentence like (2) is explained
by the fact that ‘Mt. Everest’ successfully refers and its referent satisfies the predicate ‘is
tall’. But theorists have argued that truth is constitutively prior to reference in the cases like
(2) as well. For example, says Hirsch (2009, 248):
The insight [into the nature of language] is that “only within the context of
a sentence does a word have meaning.” What must be given up is a picture
of language in which the characters at the level of sentences are generated by
some underlying referential mechanisms at the level of words. This “bottom-
up” picture is misguided because the references of words depend upon the
characters of sentences.
Here again we have a reference to Frege’s context principle. Hirsch specifically views
the order of explanation in the following way: first, principles of charity determine the
coarse-grained truth conditions of sentences (i.e., those truth conditions that obtain on the
most charitable interpretation of a language). The meaning of sub-sentential expressions is
then constituted by how these expressions contribute to forming sentences with these truth
conditions.11
One upshot of Hirsch’s view is that if two groups of speakers agree on which coarse-
grained truth conditions obtain and yet disagree on the truth values of sentences like (2),
10There are other competing interpretations of the context principle. For example, Milne (1986, 494-
495) argues that the context principle was not a thesis about reference, but was only required because Frege
wanted sentences to determine whether a sign stands for its content or for itself. Without taking a stand on
this exegetical issue, I will simple assume a link between the context principle and the truth-priority view,
since this is the interpretation most relevant to contemporary deflationists.
11See, e.g., Hirsch (2008, 213): “Charity to use is an external constraint constitutive of interpretation [of
a language].”
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it follows automatically that these speakers are not using terms like ‘Mt. Everest’ and ‘is
tall’ with the same meaning (beyond these terms having similar syntactic roles).12 This
is because, for Hirsch, the (fully-informed13) use of our sentences determines their truth
conditions, which in turn determines the meanings of the expressions in those sentences.14
3.3.1 Priority and metaontology
How do one’s views on priority relate to metaontology? As it happens, theorists who
endorse truth-priority are also deflationists. This correlation is no accident. Suppose you
endorse truth-priority. On this view, what it is for a sentence like S ≡ ‘John has the property
of tallness’ to be true just is for it to be properly assertible within a discourse. And what
it is for the term ‘the property of tallness’ to refer just is for this term to feature in certain
types of properly assertible sentences. So if S is correctly assertible, it is trivial that ‘the
property of tallness’ refers, and it is therefore trivial that the property of tallness exists. So
any debate about the existence of this property is misguided.
Contrariwise, ontologists endorse reference priority (at least when they are doing on-
tology). For example, if you think that there is a substantive question about whether number
terms refer, you cannot endorse a view where what it is for a number term to refer just is
for it to feature in sentences that are correctly assertible within arithmetical discourse. On-
tology requires a more heavyweight notion of reference, which we might distinguish with
the term ‘reference*’.
12See Hirsch (2009, 230-231). Hirsch also adopts this stance towards quantifier expressions. Says Hirsch
(2011, xiv): “I need to emphasize that I attach no importance to claiming any similarity [in the meaning of
quantifier expressions in different langages] beyond ... formal-syntactic similarity.”
13The qualification here (“fully-informed”) is important. Hirsch does not think that charity requires us
to interpret everything a speaker asserts as true (and, relatedly, to interpret every disagreement as merely
terminological). Rather, charity requires us to consider many aspects of linguistic behavior, such as whether
a speaker would be inclined to retract their assertions in response to receiving further evidence or upon
hearing further arguments. What Hirsch denies is that there can be substantive disagreement “when all is said
and done.” For discussion, see Hirsch (2005, 149-152).
14For a third example of a truth-priority view, see Schiffer (2003, ch. 2), who cites Frege’s context
principle when defending a truth-priority view of discourse about properties and propositions.
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Of course, ontologists can still accept the context principle in some form. For example,
according to some ontologists, patterns of usage may help select which of the world’s
privileged constituents links up with a given term.15 So there is at least a sense in which
ontologists can grant that use determines meaning. But deflationists endorse the stronger
claim that the use of a term is constitutive of its meaning.
3.3.2 The Hirsch-Sider dispute
The above discussion helps clarify the dispute between Hirsch and Sider over the On-
tologese gambit. This dispute is sometimes characterized as a disagreement over whether
there is a single most natural way to carve up the world (Sider’s view) or whether instead
“reality lacks ontological structure” (Hirsch’s view).16 In other words, it is a debate about
what the world is like.
But the above discussion shows that there may be a more basic dispute between Hirsch
and Sider: the dispute over the relative priority of truth and reference. As discussed above,
for Hirsch, it is part of the nature of language that two groups of fully-informed speakers
that assert seemingly inconsistent sentences in ordinary conditions cannot be using terms
with the same meanings. This is the most basic reason why Hirsch doesn’t think there
can be a substantive dispute over ‘There exists* a table’: the meaning of the expression
‘there exists*’ will always depend on what sentences a theorist ends up asserting “when
all is said and done” (i.e., when the theorist is fully-informed about which coarse-grained
truth conditions obtain and has considered all of the relevant arguments – see footnote
12).17 So if two ontologists end up asserting different things when all is said and done, that
15See, e.g., Sider (2001, xix-xxiv).
16See Sider (2011, vii) for this kind of characterization of the dispute.
17Of course, the arguments that influence the use of existence* statements may very well include the
“metaphysical” arguments discussed by ontologists. But even if this were so, it would not imply that Hirsch
views existence* questions as substantive (on the usage of this chapter – see footnote 2). Hirsch would still
deny that existence* questions should by decided by evaluating metaphysical arguments. These arguments
are only indirectly relevant, in the sense that how theorists are disposed to respond to such arguments is a part
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very fact is proof enough that the existence* quantifier has a different meaning for each of
them.18 When we recognize this underlying disagreement about language, we see why the
Ontologese gambit will not be persuasive to a theorist like Hirsch.
This is not to say that the Ontologese gambit doesn’t have an important dialectical role.
After all, a theorist could be skeptical that there is a single most natural way to carve up
the world even without endorsing a global truth-priority view of language. These remarks
suggest that the Ontologese gambit actually requires two assumptions: (i) that reference
priority is coherent and (ii) that the world has a privileged ontological structure. A theorist
who rejects (i) will probably also reject (ii), but it is possible to reject (ii) without rejecting
(i).
In the next section, I’ll raise a third type of objection to the Ontologese gambit. For
the purposes of this argument, I will grant the ontologist the assumptions (i) and (ii). In
so doing, I’m effectively granting the ontologist that at least some existence* questions are
substantive. But as will be seen, these assumptions do not guarantee that every existence*
question is substantive. Indeed, I will argue that existence* questions about items like
ordinary objects, properties, and numbers involve a type of category mistake.
3.4 A new objection
A category mistake is a “semantic or ontological error in which things belonging to
a particular category are presented as if they belong to a different category” (Blackburn
(1994, 54)). One of Ryle’s (1949, 16) famous examples is a visitor who, after being shown
the colleges and the library, asks: “But where is the University?” This question is mis-
guided because it rests on a semantic confusion: the visitor mistakenly thinks that the term
‘University’ has the same type of semantic role as a term like ‘library’ (i.e., the role of
referring to a specific building).
of linguistic use.
18For a clear statement of this point, see Hirsch (2009, 230-231).
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Ryle’s examples of category mistakes typically involve infelicitous property ascrip-
tions (e.g., trying to ascribe a specific spatial location to a university). But it seems there
can also be category mistakes involving quantifiers.19 For example, consider the following
speech:
O: I grant that, in ordinary English, ‘There is a lawyer’ trivially entails ‘There
is an attorney’. But I’m interested in the following substantive question: on the
assumption that there exists* a lawyer, does there also exist* an attorney?
Even if we grant that there are substantive questions about the existence* of certain kinds
of things, it is clear that this particular gambit is misguided. Intuitively, this is because
of the semantic role of the term ‘attorney’. Just as it is a category mistake to ask where
the university is after having been shown the university’s buildings, so too it is a category
mistake to ask about whether an attorney exists* after granting the existence* of a lawyer.
The question presents attorneys as belonging to a different category than lawyers, but in
fact ‘attorney’ is just a synonym for ‘lawyer’.
For a second example, suppose an ontologist asked: “Do sakes exist*?” Again, this
gambit seems misguided. This is because, while expressions like ‘John’s sake’ are syn-
tactically singular terms, their semantic role isn’t to refer to anything. So to try to ask a
substantive question about the existence* of sakes involves a category mistake.
In this section, I will make a similar point for terms like ‘the table’ and ‘2’. Even if
there are substantive questions about the existence* of certain kinds of things20, there are no
substantive questions to ask about the existence* of things like ordinary objects, numbers,
and properties – things whose ordinary existence is given a deflationary treatment. The
form of the argument is simple. On the assumption that the deflationist is correct about
19For the purposes of this chapter, it is irrelevant whether the examples ahead technically count as category
mistakes on Ryle’s usage. I will call them category mistakes due to the close analogy with Ryle’s own
examples, but the reader can use an alternative term if that is preferred.
20I.e., things whose ordinary existence is not trivial, such as superstrings or God.
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truth priority in ordinary language21, expressions like ‘the table’ and ‘2’ have a specific
kind of semantic role. But, as I will explain in 3.4.1, to apply the existence* quantifier
to terms with this semantic role involves a category mistake. If this is correct, then there
are no substantive questions to ask about the existence* of things like ordinary objects,
numbers, and properties.
3.4.1 The tifleron example
To intuitively illustrate the category mistake I have in mind, it will be useful to first
consider a toy case involving a discourse where truth is clearly prior to reference.
Suppose there is a community C whose language is just like English except that it
also includes three extra singular terms (‘tifleron’, ‘jeren’, and ‘miresa’) and three extra
predicates (‘is dessel’, ‘is fessel’, and ‘is gessel’). C-speakers use these terms in such
a way that sentences involving these terms are trivially inferable from certain “ordinary”
sentences.22 These trivial inferences are described in the following table, where P 
Q means that the inference from P to Q is trivial for members of C (n.b.: the English
sentences in the table below were chosen randomly, so one should not worry about looking
for an explanation of why C-speakers make these particular inferences).
Grass is green.  Tifleron is dessel.
John is tall.  Tifleron is fessel.
Ally is running.  Tifleron is gessel.
It is raining.  Jeren is dessel.
A window is open.  Jeren is fessel.
There is a brown table.  Jeren is gessel.
21This assumption is appropriate since I am defending a conditional thesis: “If the deflationist offers the
correct treatment of a given ordinary existence statement, then ...”. In section 3.3.5, I will consider whether
the ontologist can preserve the substantivity of ontological debates by denying this antecedent.
22When I say that an inference from P to Q is trivial, I mean that it has the same status as the inference
from ‘John is tall’ to ‘John has the property of tallness’ or the inference from ‘John has two hands’ to ‘The
number of John’s hands is two’.
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Mary is in pain. Miresa is dessel.
Birds are singing. Miresa is fessel.
The car is blue. Miresa is gessel.
We can suppose that the C-speakers apply logical operators to the above sentences with
their standard inferential roles. So, for example, C-speakers are inclined to infer ‘Tifleron
is dessel’ from ‘Tifleron is dessel and jeren is fessel’, and they are inclined to infer ‘There
is something that is dessel’ from ‘Tifleron is dessel’. In addition, C-speakers are disposed
to infer ‘The term ‘tifleron’ refers’ and ‘It is true that tifleron is dessel’ from sentences like
‘Tifleron is dessel’. Furthermore, C-speakers embed the above sentences in ‘that’-clauses
in the usual ways (for example, C-speakers who assert ‘Tifleron is dessel’ are inclined to
assert ‘I believe that tifleron is dessel’, and so on).
Summing up: the above sentences are stipulated to have the same kinds of inferential
roles as any other subject-predicate sentences in our language.23 But because these sen-
tences are stipulated to have such strange truth conditions, there is almost no temptation to
think that reference is prior to truth in this area of discourse.24 On the contrary, it is much
more natural to say that ‘tifleron’ is just a term that contributes in a certain syntactic way
to sentences with certain coarse-grained truth conditions (as on the truth-priority view).
(If one is accustomed to the reference-priority view of language, one might be tempted
to go further and say that the term ‘tifleron’ does not refer at all. But this would be a
mistake. What matters for present purposes is that, from the standpoint of the truth priority
view, the term ‘tifleron’ does refer. Remember: on the truth priority view, what it is for
the term ‘tifleron’ to refer just is for this term to have a certain syntactic role in correctly
23There are various details left unspecified in this example. For example, I haven’t specified what speakers
are inclined to say about sentences like ‘That car is fessel’ or ‘Tifleron is tall’. I think we can imagine these
details filled out in different ways (perhaps C-speakers are inclined to view such sentences as indeterminate,
or perhaps C-speakers are inclined to deny such sentences, etc.) without it affecting the present argument.
24One might try to say ‘tifleron’ refers to a set-theoretic entity, such as the set {grass, John, Ally}. To rule
out this possibility, we can suppose that C-speakers are inclined to assert ‘Tifleron is not identical to the set
{grass, John, Ally}’.
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assertible sentences like ‘Tifleron is fessel’.25)
Now suppose an ontologist were to say: “I grant that the sentence ‘Tifleron exists’ is
trivially true in ordinary language when grass is green. But I want to ask the substantive
question: does tifleron exist*? That is: does ‘tifleron’ refer* to one of the world’s privileged
constituents?” I think it is intuitively obvious that such a gambit would be misguided. We
can explain the problem with this gambit as follows.
For ‘Tifleron exists*’ to be true, it must be that ‘tifleron’ links up with one of the
world’s privileged constituents. To use the terminology from 3.3.1, ‘tifleron’ must refer
in the heavyweight sense (i.e., refer*). But if truth priority holds for tifleron discourse,
heavyweight reference is completely unrelated to the actual type of contribution the term
‘tifleron’ makes to the language. As discussed above, the semantic role of ‘tifleron’ is
merely to contribute in a certain syntactic way to sentences that express coarse-grained
truth conditions. So to ask whether ‘tifleron’ links up with one of the world’s privileged
constituents involves a category mistake: ‘tifleron’ just isn’t a term whose role involves
(potentially) linking up with one of the world’s privileged constituents.
3.4.2 A few clarifications
It is worth explicitly heading off a few mistaken interpretations of what I am claiming
is defective about ‘Tifleron exists*’. First, the problem has nothing to do with the exis-
tence* quantifier’s being a new introduction to the language; it is perfectly permissible to
introduce new expressions to a discourse with truth priority. For example, there is nothing
stopping C-speakers from introducing the predicate ‘is tessel’ to the language and using
the sentence ‘Tifleron is tessel’ to express certain coarse-grained truth conditions. Such
introductions are completely in line with the semantic role of ‘tifleron’ and generate no
category mistakes.
25Furthermore, I have stipulated that the inference from ‘Grass is green’ to ‘The term ‘tifleron’ refers’ is
trivial for C-speakers. So we should at least grant that ‘tifleron’ refers in a deflationary sense.
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Nor is the problem attributable to any vagueness in the term ‘tifleron’. For one thing,
I noted in footnote 22 that ‘tifleron’ may have a very determinate inferential role on which
other atomic sentences like ‘Tifleron is tall’ are always regarded as false. On this possibility,
there wouldn’t be anything semantically defective about ‘Tifleron is tall’ or ‘Tifleron is
negatively charged’. But even if such sentences lacked determinate truth conditions, this
would not by itself suggest the type of category mistake I identified in 3.4.1. Perhaps, in
this case, there would be a sense in which ‘Tifleron is tall’ is semantically defective, but it
wouldn’t be the same sense in which ‘Tifleron exists*’ is semantically defective.
Nor is the problem the result of the term ‘tifleron’ having a very simple inferential role.
By “randomly” assigning truth conditions to further atomic ‘tifleron’-sentences, one could
make the inferential role of ‘tifleron’ arbitrarily complex. Even so, the sentence ‘Tifleron
exists*’ would still involve the category mistake outlined in 3.4.1.
In contrast: the real problem with ‘Tifleron exists*’ is that ‘tifleron’ just isn’t a term
whose role involves (potentially) linking up with one of the world’s privileged constituents.
Instead, its role is merely to contribute in a certain syntactic way to sentences that express
coarse-grained truth conditions.26 This is the reason why asking whether ‘tifleron’ links up
with one of the world’s privileged constituents involves a category mistake.
3.4.3 The original examples
For the reason just described, no actual ontologist would ever think to give serious
arguments for or against the existence* of tifleron. But here is the crucial point: from the
standpoint of the deflationist, ‘tifleron’ and terms for numbers, properties, and ordinary
objects are on a par. For example, consider ‘David’, the name of Michelangelo’s statue.
While ‘David’ may be embedded in a more complex linguistic practice than ‘tifleron’, both
terms’ role in the language is merely to contribute in a certain syntactic way to sentences
26As discussed in 3.4.1, any temptation to think that ‘tifleron’ has some other role, such as the role of
heavyweight reference, is counteracted when we consider the strange truth conditions of sentences involving
this term.
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with certain coarse-grained truth-conditions. In other words, the deflationist will say that
‘David’ refers in the exact same sense that ‘tifleron’ refers.
On the assumption that neither ‘tifleron’ nor ‘David’ has the semantic role of (poten-
tially) linking up with the world’s privileged constituents, what happens when we try to
apply an existence* quantifier to these terms? Perhaps we should say that ‘Tifleron exists*’
and ‘David exists*’ are trivially false, or perhaps we should say that they are indetermi-
nate. But this is a matter for semantic decision, not a matter for substantive philosophical
argument.27
Of course, ontologists will think that it does make sense to ask whether David exists*.
The ontologist might even say: if the truth-priority view of ordinary object discourse treats
‘tifleron’ and ‘David’ on a par, then so much the worse for the truth-priority view.28 I am
not unsympathetic to this line of response. But it must be remembered: there is a strong
motivation for adopting the truth-priority view. Deflationists adopt this view because it
explains why the sentence ‘David exists’ is trivial in ordinary language (on the assumption
27One might worry: given that the term ‘David’ in the sentence ‘David exists*’ is an Ontologese term
(and not an English term), why should it matter what semantic role the term ‘David’ has in English?
(This objection may seem to be supported by the fact that, in the literature, theorists have suggested that
replacing ordinary quantifiers with existence* quantifiers induces a shift in meanings throughout the rest of
the language (see, e.g., Sider (2007, 217-219)). But, in fact, the meaning-shifts discussed in the literature
are different. While it is outside the scope of this chapter to present the details, suffice to say that when
Sider discusses the meaning-shifts induced by changing quantifiers, he is assuming a reference-priority view
of both English and Ontologese. But the current objection requires a much more radical type of meaning
shift: the term ‘David’ in Ontologese would have a completely different type of semantic role then it does in
English.)
To see the problem with this suggestion, consider the analogous response: “I know that in the C-speakers’
language, the semantic role of the term ‘tifleron’ is merely to contribute in a certain syntactic way to sentences
with certain coarse-grained truth conditions. But in Ontologese, it has a different semantic role. So there is a
substantive question about the existence* of tifleron.” We would be unable to make any sense of this speech.
The ontologist is evidently using the term ‘tifleron’ in a way that is completely unrelated to its ordinary use.
So we would have no idea what the ontologist is talking about when they use this term.
Of course, one might think that this response makes more sense for a term like ‘David’. But remember:
under the assumption of the truth-priority view, ‘tifleron’ and ‘David’ are on a par.
28To be sure, there are many disanalogies between the terms ‘tifleron’ and ‘David’. For example, one
difference is that ‘David’ has a more complex inferential role than ‘tifleron’. But as discussed in 3.4.2,
the complexity of an expression’s inferential role is unrelated to the incompatibility between truth-priority
terms and the existence* quantifier. To avoid the present worry about category mistakes, a different kind of
disanalogy is needed: ‘David’ must be a reference-priority term instead of a truth-priority term like ‘tifleron’.
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that there are particles arranged David-wise).29
In conclusion: perhaps it makes sense to ask questions about the existence* of certain
types of things, but there is no substantive question about the existence* of David. This
is because, if we allow that the deflationist is correct about ordinary discourse, applying
the existence* quantifier to the term ‘David’ involves a category mistake. Similar remarks
would apply for anything else whose ordinary existence is given a deflationary treatment.
So this argument supports the following conditional thesis:
Thesis: If the deflationist offers the correct explanation of the triviality30 of a
given ordinary existence statement, then there is no substantive question to ask
about the truth of the corresponding existence* statement
3.4.4 The relevance of ordinary language
One might think that the truth of Ontologese sentences depends on facts about the
world, not facts about the use of our language. But the tifleron example reveals a difficulty
with this suggestion. It would be silly to stipulate that we do not need to consider the
ordinary use of the term ‘tifleron’ when asking whether tifleron exists*; ordinary use shows
that tifleron isn’t the kind of thing you can ask interesting existence* questions about.
The lesson is that Ontologese assertions do not merely depend on the world; they also
presuppose that the relevant term (or predicate) has an appropriate semantic role. When
this presupposition fails, existence* assertions will involve a category mistake (and their
truth will be a matter for semantic decision).
In the next section, I will consider a possible response to the category mistake objec-
tion on the behalf of the ontologist.
29In response, the ontologist could try to offer some alternative explanation of this assertion’s triviality. I
will consider this possible response in section 3.3.5.
30N.b.: Throughout this chapter, when I say that assertions like ‘The table exists’ are trivial truths in
ordinary language, I mean that these sentences are trivially true conditional on the empirical assumption that
there are particles arranged table-wise.
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3.5 Denying the antecedent
Section 3.4 establishes a conditional thesis: if the deflationist offers the correct ac-
count of a given ordinary existence statement, then the truth of the corresponding exis-
tence* statement is a matter for mere semantic decision. One natural way to try to preserve
the substantivity of ontological debates would be to deny the antecedent of this conditional.
If the deflationist offers an incorrect treatment of ordinary language, then the category mis-
take objection loses its relevance.
One way to reject the antecedent would be to deny that the ordinary existence state-
ments in question have the status of (conditionally) trivial truths. But since the point of
Ontologese gambits is to grant the assumption that ordinary existence statements are triv-
ial, I will set this proposal aside.
The other way to deny the antecedent would be to reject the deflationist’s specific
explanation of the triviality of ordinary existence statements. If the ontologist could ex-
plain the triviality of ordinary existence statements without truth priority, the difficulties
of section 3.4 would be avoided. In this section, I’ll consider several alternative semantic
proposals.
But first, a dialectical observation: even if the ontologist can provide an alternative
semantic proposal, the current proposed response shifts the terms of the debate. Usually,
the dispute between ontologists and deflationists is thought to hinge on whether or not
the world has a privileged ontological structure. But on the current proposal, the ontologist
must also engage the deflationist in a dispute over the proper semantic treatment of ordinary
language.
3.5.1 Paraphrase
One alternative way to accommodate the triviality of ‘David exists’ would be to say
that the latter is a paraphrase of the sentence ‘There are particles arranged David-wise’. On
this treatment, ‘David’ is syntactically a singular term but it doesn’t function semantically
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as a singular term.
But this proposal is no help to the ontologist. If the current proposal is right, then
asking ‘Does David exist*?’ is akin to asking ‘Does the average professor exist*?’ Such a
question is clearly misguided. Perhaps we should say that ‘David exists*’ is trivially false,
or perhaps we should say it is ungrammatical. But this is a matter for semantic decision,
not a matter for substantive philosophical argument.
An ontologist might reply: “This doesn’t show that debates about David’s existence*
are non-substantive because it isn’t obvious that the sentence ‘David exists’ involves para-
phrase.” But on my usage (see footnote 2), a question is non-substantive when it isn’t to be
decided by evaluating the types of “metaphysical” arguments typically offered by ontolo-
gists. In the present case, we are supposing that the paraphrase story is adopted to explain
the triviality of the sentence ‘David exists’. So this makes debate about the existence* of
David non-substantive according to the usage of this chapter.
3.5.2 Composition as identity
Some theorists have claimed that wholes are identical to their parts (see, e.g., Baxter
(1988)). This view faces an immediate objection: how can there be an identity between
these entities given that the whole is one and the parts are many? Still, this view has one
nice advantage: if David and its parts are identical, it is no surprise that the inference from
‘There are particles arranged David-wise’ to ‘David exists’ is trivial.
Unlike with the paraphrase approach, there is nothing ungrammatical about the sen-
tence ‘David exists*’ with composition as identity, since ‘David’ is a genuine singular
term. But this proposal is still no help to the ontologist. If ‘David’ in ordinary English
is just a term that refers to the same thing as ‘the particles’, then it is trivial that David
exists* (assuming we’ve granted, as most ontologists do, that the particles arranged David-
wise exist*). So on this case, too, the Ontologese gambit doesn’t generate a substantive
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metaphysical dispute.31
3.5.3 Fictionalism
Some ontologists have suggested that we can accommodate the trivial truth of ‘David
exists’ by appealing to fictionalism. The basic idea is that, when speakers assert ‘David
exists’, they are really asserting: within the fiction of ordinary mereology, David exists.32
I think fictionalism is one of the ontologist’s better responses to the category mistake
argument. If ordinary speakers are pretending that David exists, then the triviality of exis-
tence questions in ordinary language would not in and of itself tell against the substantivity
of existence* questions in the ontology room.
This being said, there are serious worries about fictionalism as a semantic treatment
of ordinary object discourse. One very basic worry is that it does not seem that we are
engaged in a fiction when we ordinarily assert ‘There is a table’. So if fictionalism is
true, it introduces “a novel and quite drastic form of failure of first-person authority over
one’s own mental states” (Stanley (2001, 47)). As a second objection, many philosophers
(such as Thomasson (2013)) have worried about the coherence of viewing an entire area of
ordinary discourse as fictional. It seems that, in order to make sense of a fictional use of a
sentence like ‘There is a table’, we need to be able to distinguish a non-fictional use of this
sentence. But if ordinary assertions of ‘There is a table’ are fictional, we may be unable to
draw this distinction.
Unfortunately, it is outside the scope of this chapter to discuss fictionalism in any
depth. If the above concerns can be overcome, fictionalism may provide the ontologist
a response to the category mistake objection. But suffice to say that there are concerns
31Again, a theorist might object that it is not obvious that the identity view of composition is correct. But
I am supposing that we adopt this story in order to accommodate the (conditional) triviality of the ordinary
sentence ‘David exists’. So once again, reflection on language settles the question of whether David exists*,
which is sufficient for a debate to count as non-substantive on the usage of this chapter.
32Different versions of fictionalism offer different accounts of the assertoric content of fictional utterances;
these differences won’t affect the current discussion.
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about whether fictionalism can provide an adequate semantic treatment of ordinary object
discourse.
3.6 Conclusion
My purpose in this chapter has been twofold. First, I have suggested that one basic
source of disagreement between ontologists and deflationists is over the relative priority
of truth and reference in ordinary language. When we recognize this difference, we can
understand why Ontologese gambits are unlikely to be persuasive to a truth-priority theorist
like Hirsch.
Second, I have raised a new type of objection against Ontologese gambits. I’ve argued
that, if truth-priority holds for ordinary discourse, then there are no substantive questions
to ask about the existence* of things like tables, numbers, and properties. This is because,
if truth-priority holds for ordinary discourse, terms like ‘table’, ‘7’, etc. do not have the
semantic role of (potentially) linking up with the world’s privileged constituents. So asking
questions about the existence* of such items involves a category mistake.
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4 A NEW EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT FOR HUMEAN LAWS
4.1 Introduction
Many philosophers have worried about the epistemology of non-Humean laws.1 The
worry is that, if laws do not supervene on the Humean base, it is not clear how we could
ever be empirically justified in our beliefs about the laws. This argument is inconclu-
sive; philosophers have offered a variety of responses to defend the epistemology of non-
Humean laws.2 But in this chapter, I offer a new type of epistemic argument for Humeanism
to which these standard responses do not apply.
After providing background on the debate over Humeanism (section 4.2), I will present
the new epistemic argument in sections 4.3 and 4.4. In sections 4.5-4.7, I will sketch how
the new epistemic argument can also be used to deflect certain objections to Humeanism
found in the literature.
4.2 Background
The debate between Humeans and non-Humeans over the laws of nature can be inter-
preted as a debate over the following thesis3:
Humean Supervenience about Laws (HS): two possible worlds cannot differ
on what is a law of nature unless they also differ in their Humean base.
Intuitively, the Humean base will include particular facts about the existence of physical
objects, their physical properties, and their spatiotemporal relations to one another. It will
1See Mellor (1980, 108), Earman & Roberts (2005), and Roberts (2008, ch. 4).
2See Armstrong (1983, 107-110), Carroll (1994, 102-116), and Carroll (2008).
3See, e.g., Carroll (1994, 58) and Loewer (1996).
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exclude facts that involve laws of nature, causation, counterfactuals, or dispositions. There
are different ways to precisify the notion of a Humean base, but this intuitive characteriza-
tion will suffice for the purposes of this chapter.
4.2.1 The traditional epistemic argument
The denial of HS raises an epistemic puzzle. It is clear how we learn about the Humean
base; at least in many cases, we directly observe and measure it. But if the laws are some-
thing over and above the Humean base, it is not clear how we could ever be empirically
justified4 in our beliefs about the laws. There are various ways to make this worry precise.
But for ease of presentation, I will focus on a specific form of the argument given by Ear-
man & Roberts (2005). Let T be any scientific theory that posits at least one law and which
is formulated as follows:
T : L is a law of nature, and X
Here, X stands for whatever content T has over and above the lawhood of L. Earman
& Roberts define a rival theory T ∗ as follows (256):
T ∗: L is true but is not a law, and X
T ∗ agrees with T that L is a true regularity; the two theories differ only on L’s status
as a law. Earman & Roberts’ argument then proceeds as follows (257):
Traditional Epistemic Argument for HS
Premise 1: If HS is false, then no empirical evidence can favor T or T ∗ over
the other.
Premise 2: If no empirical evidence can favor T or T ∗ over the other, then we
cannot be justified on empirical grounds in believing that T is true.
3: If HS is false, we cannot be justified on empirical grounds in believing that
4One is empirically justified in believing that P just in case “empirical evidence-statements, together
with the norms of the empirical sciences, can be used to offer a positive justification for believing that P ”
(Earman & Roberts (2005, 258)).
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T is true. (from 1,2)
4: If HS is false, we cannot be justified on empirical grounds in believing of
any proposition P that it is a law of nature. (from 3)
To defend premise 1, Earman & Roberts note (given some plausible background as-
sumptions that non-Humeans about laws typically embrace) that T and T ∗ are empirically
equivalent in the following strong sense: every possible world where one of these theories
is true shares its Humean base with a world where the other is true (263). They then argue
that, since T and T ∗ are empirically equivalent, no empirical evidence could confirm one
over the other.5
To defend premise 2, Earman & Roberts claim that the norms of science do not justify
taking pointless epistemic risks: risks that can never conflict with experience. But if no
possible empirical evidence favors T over T ∗, to endorse T over T ∗ would be to take a
pointless epistemic risk. So, if there is no empirical evidence favoring T over T ∗, we are
not empirically justified in believing that T (259-260).
4.2.2 Shortcomings of the traditional argument
While I am sympathetic to the above argument, non-Humeans have resisted it various
ways. One strategy is to challenge premise 1 by claiming that empirical evidence supports
our law judgments through inference to the best explanation. For example, some philoso-
phers claim that we need to posit non-Humean laws in order to explain certain striking
empirical regularities.6
Non-Humeans have also appealed to contextualism to resist the argument.7 Perhaps,
in a context where we actively consider it, the hypothesis T ∗ does threaten the justification
5Without presenting the details, I note that Earman & Roberts consider a variety of ways in which evi-
dence can favor one theory over another, and conclude that none favor T over T ∗ (263-272).
6See Dretske (1977, 261-262), Armstrong (1983, 52-59), and Carroll (2008, 4.2). Earman & Roberts
(2005, 257) and Roberts (2008) argue that we do not need non-Humean laws to explain such regularities.
7See Carroll (2008, 4.3).
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of our law judgments. But in ordinary scientific contexts, T ∗ is not salient. So, just as evil
demon scenarios do not threaten our beliefs about material objects in ordinary contexts, so
too T ∗ does not threaten our belief that T in scientific contexts.8
It is outside the scope of this chapter to assess these objections. Instead, my aim is to
present a new type of epistemic argument for HS to which these objections do not apply.
4.2.3 A new epistemic argument
The new epistemic argument also appeals to rival law hypotheses, but in a different
way. Earman & Roberts argue that our actual empirical evidence does not favor our law
judgments over rival law hypotheses. But in the new epistemic argument, I consider pos-
sible situations in which our evidence conclusively favors a rival law hypothesis. I argue
that, even in these possible cases where — by the non-Humean’s lights — we learn that our
law judgments are false, scientists would continue to talk about laws just as they always
had. I then argue that the best explanation of this behavior is that, in fact, scientists are not
talking about non-Humean laws. Here is the argument step by step:
New Epistemic Argument for HS
Premise 1: Even if scientists were to learn that a rival law hypothesis H ob-
tained, they would not alter their law discourse.
Premise 2: If scientists would not alter their law discourse upon learning that
H obtains, scientists are not referring to non-Humean laws when they use the
term ‘law’ in ordinary scientific contexts.
3: Scientists are not referring to non-Humean laws when they use the term
‘law’ in ordinary scientific contexts. (from 1,2)
Corollary: two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless
they also differ in their Humean base.
I will defend the two premises in the next two sections.
8Earman & Roberts (2005, 274-278) consider this objection, interpreting it as a threat to premise 2.
But according to Carroll (2008, 4.3), we should view the contextualist as granting that premise 2 is true in
certain contexts, but maintaining that this fact does not threaten the justification of law judgments in ordinary
scientific contexts.
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4.3 Defending premise 1
In this section, I will consider two thought experiments in which scientists receive
evidence that — by the non-Humean’s lights — reveals their law judgments to be false. I
will argue that scientists would not alter their law discourse in response to this evidence,
thereby establishing premise 1.
4.3.1 Laws in scientific practice
Since this section makes a claim about the linguistic behavior of scientists, it will be
useful to first review the role of laws in scientific contexts. Here, we can view scientific
contexts as contexts where (i) our ultimate evidence is from observations and empirical
measurements and (ii) reasoning involves inductive, abductive, and statistical inferences
from that evidence (Roberts (2008, 264)).
-Fixed points in counterfactual reasoning: Lange (2000, ch. 2) and Roberts (2008,
chs. 5-7) claim that laws have a special role in scientific counterfactual reasoning. Intu-
itively, laws of nature are held fixed in counterfactual reasoning in ways that mere regu-
larities are not. More precisely, Lange and Roberts defend the principle of Nomological
Preservation (NP)9:
NP: ∀Q∀P (if Q is consistent with the lawhood of all and only the actual laws
of nature, and the lawhood of all and only the actual laws of nature logically
entails P , then: if Q had been the case, then P would still have been the case)
It is controversial whether NP holds in all contexts10, but there is a strong argument that NP
is operative in any scientific context. In any activity that deserves the name of “empirical
science”, evidence must ultimately stem from observations and measurements. But Roberts
(2008, 273-291) argues that, in order to recognize something as an observation or measure-
ment, one must assume the truth of the counterfactual conditionals described by NP. This is
9This formulation is from Roberts (2008, 191). Lange (2000, 53) calls his formulation Λ-preservation.
10Lange (2000, ch. 2) defends this claim, while Roberts (2008, ch. 6) denies it.
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because we cannot distinguish conditions under which a measurement procedure is reliable
without holding the laws fixed in our counterfactual reasoning.
-Supporting induction: Laws of nature also have a special role in scientific inductive
reasoning. Says Lange (2000, 21): “we can regard the observed instance as confirming
the hypothesis “inductively” — roughly, as confirming, of any unexamined case, that it
accords with the hypothesis — only if we believe that the hypothesis may state a law.”11
Lange offers the following example: because it would be a mere coincidence that all coins
received as change today are pennies, we do not regard receiving a penny as change as
evidence that the next received coin will be a penny. In contrast, because we think it follows
(or, at least, may follow) from the laws, the hypothesis that all samples of a compound boil
at temperatureC is thought to be inductively confirmed by an observation of a given sample
of that compound boiling at C.12
-Foundation of important scientific distinctions: Scientists appeal to laws, but not other
empirical regularities, in order to determine what is possible. Maudlin (2007, 7-8) offers
the following example: because a closed universe and an open universe are both consistent
with Einstein’s gravitational law, physicists believe that both types of universe are possible.
Roberts (2008, 12-16) offers the example of statistical mechanics, where the laws are used
to distinguish the dynamically possible trajectories through a system’s state space from the
merely logically possible trajectories.
Laws are also relevant to determining when further explanation of a phenomenon is
called for. Roberts (2008, 17) presents the example of the striking regularity that all planets
and moons in the Solar System orbit in the same direction and roughly in the same plane of
motion. Because scientists do not consider this widespread regularity to be a consequence
of the natural laws, it is seen as requiring further explanation in a way that regularities
11Lange (2000, 143-156) precisifies this characterization in order to avoid certain counterexamples, but I
will set these details aside.
12For further discussion, see Dretske (1977, 261-262) and Armstrong (1983, 52-59).
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following from the laws do not.
-Objects of scientific discovery: Finally, laws are objects of scientific discovery. Sci-
entists do not merely investigate specific matters of particular fact; from these particular
fact, they infer claims about general laws. In the literature, this point is made with the
claim that “laws are confirmed by their instances.”13
4.3.2 Preliminaries
Here are some final preliminary notes on the thought experiments.
(a) The hypotheses: In Earman & Roberts’ (2005) argument, the rival law hypothesis
was T ∗: L is true but not a law, and X . In the thought experiments below, the rival law
hypotheses are more specific. For example, one such hypothesis is H1 ≡ ‘The world’s
fundamental ontology consists of Humean facts and nothing else’. According to the non-
Humean, it is very unlikely that a hypothesis like H1 is true. But the non-Humean will
grant that such hypotheses are at least possible.14 In the thought experiments, I consider
how scientists would respond to evidence conclusively favoring this hypothesis.
(b) The Oracle: Non-Humeans will probably deny that ordinary scientific evidence
could ever support a hypothesis like H1 over our actual law judgments. So in the thought
experiments, I assume that scientists have non-scientific evidence in favor of the rival hy-
potheses instead. Specifically, I assume (in each case) that an all-knowing, completely
trustworthy Oracle tells us that the rival hypothesis obtains. One advantage of this strat-
egy is that, since the Oracle is assumed to be completely trustworthy, we can assume that
scientists have (near-enough) conclusive evidence in support of the rival hypothesis.15
13See Lange (2000, 2.4) for discussion.
14For example, Armstrong (1983, 71-72) and Tooley (1987, 28-29) grant the possibility of a Humean
world.
15Given the focus on ordinary scientific practice in 4.3.1, one might worry that this appeal to an Oracle is
somewhat fanciful. But, in fact, the Oracle does no essential work in the argument ahead. To establish premise
1, we need to consider situations where scientists accept a hypothesis H that — according to non-Humeans
— falsifies their law judgments. The Oracle provides a vivid way of illustrating this type of situation. But
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(c) Scientific contexts: In each thought experiment, I ask how scientists would react to
evidence that — according to the non-Humean — falsifies their law judgments. I focus on
scientists (as opposed to laypersons or philosophers) because the term ‘law’ is a term from
scientific discourse.
We can distinguish scientists’ reaction to the Oracle’s testimony immediately after
receiving it from their “long-term” reaction (i.e., their judgments once they have returned
to ordinary scientific work). I will now explain why only the latter reactions are relevant to
this chapter.
At a general level, I want to leverage facts about the ordinary epistemology of law
judgments into an argument for HS. So, to find out about this epistemology, we need to
consider contexts where the term ‘law’ is used in its ordinary way. Since ‘law’ is a term
from scientific discourse, these ordinary contexts will be scientific contexts: contexts where
we engage in inductive reasoning from evidence obtained through observation and mea-
surement (see 4.3.1). But the context immediately following the Oracle’s testimony is not
an ordinary scientific context; it is a context where a completely different type of evidence
(i.e., testimony from an Oracle) is salient. For this reason, scientists’ reactions immedi-
ately after the Oracle’s testimony are less relevant to ordinary epistemology than scientists’
reactions once they return to scientific work.
Focusing on long-term reactions also helps avoid complications that arise with imme-
diate reactions. To assess the latter would probably require a poll. And we have no reason
to expect scientists would respond to such a poll in any uniform way. After all, the ordinary
norms of use governing the term ‘law’ are not operative in Oracle-testimony contexts.
But for long-term reactions, no polls are needed. This is because we already know
a lot about the role of law judgments in scientific discourse (see 4.3.1). By considering
this role, we can make confident predictions about scientists’ behavior upon returning to
for the purposes of the argument itself, it doesn’t matter how scientists end up accepting H . If one prefers,
one can instead suppose that scientists accept H because they hear a philosopher provide some persuasive
argument for H .
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scientific work.
(d) Theological descriptions: One might worry that, even if we restrict attention to
scientific contexts, scientists’ reactions to the Oracle’s testimony will not be relevant to the
ordinary epistemology of law judgments. After all, most scientists are not familiar with
the terminology of the debate over HS. If scientists do not fully understand the Oracle’s
testimony, their reactions to this testimony (even in scientific contexts) will tell us little
about how they use the term ‘law’.
To finesse this issue, I will invoke the conceit of a divine lawgiver. We can imagine
God performing two tasks when creating the world. First, God assigns all of the particles
initial conditions. Second, God issues a set of decrees (e.g., “Massive bodies attract one
another with a force FG = Gm1m2d1,2 ”) that the particles must obey throughout all history. Of
course, most non-Humeans do not posit an actual divine lawmaker.16 But non-Humeans
should allow that, in a possible world where there is a divine being issuing decrees, the
(non-Humean) laws of nature supervene on those decrees.
This (limited) link between non-Humean laws and divine decrees will allow me to
describe rival law hypotheses without using technical language. Most ordinary people
have an intuitive grip on the idea of a divine lawmaker. Indeed, this is why non-Humeans
sometimes appeal to this idea when intuitively motivating the “governing” conception of
laws.17 So by framing the rival law hypotheses in terms of a divine lawgiver, we can set
aside worries about whether scientists understand the Oracle’s testimony.
4.3.3 Case 1: the Humean world
Suppose we travel to the Oracle to learn about the fundamental metaphysical structure
of the world. There, we hear the following speech:
16For an exception, see Foster (2004).
17See Carroll (1994, 17-18) and Lange (2000, 51). See also Beebee (2000, 580-581) and Loewer (1996,
115) for discussion from a Humean perspective.
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“At the fundamental level, there is a vast mosaic of particular matters of fact,
and that is all. There are certain regularities in this mosaic; for example, mas-
sive particles attract one another according to the equation F = Gm1m2
d1,2
. But
there is nothing that explains why these regularities obtain. For example, it is
not as if God issued a command that particles must conform to the equation
FG =
Gm1m2
d1,2
. Particles just happen to move around in these patterns, as a
matter of brute fact.”
If scientists heard this testimony, how would it affect their law judgments? It is difficult to
say how scientists would immediately react (see 4.3.2, note (c)). Some scientists would not
worry about the Oracle’s testimony at all. Others might find the Oracle’s speech troubling,
perhaps saying things like “So there aren’t really any laws of nature after all!”
But in the long term, even the latter group would return to making law judgments just
as they did before. I base this prediction on the central role that laws have within scientific
practice (see 4.3.1). Given its centrality, it is unlikely that scientists would abandon the
distinction between laws and non-laws as a result of hearing the Oracle’s testimony. To
support this claim, we can consider the specific roles of the laws:
(i) Fixed point in counterfactual reasoning: As discussed in 4.3.1, recognizing some-
thing as a measurement presupposes the truth of the counterfactuals described by NP. So if
scientists were to give up the ordinary distinction between laws and non-laws, they would
have to give up the practice of taking measurements. Immediately after the Oracle’s testi-
mony, we can imagine certain scientists doing exactly this: “Why bother using the cloud
chamber? We have no reason to think its measurements are reliable.” But I do not think
we cannot seriously suppose that scientists would persist in this attitude. Scientists would
not give up the practice of taking measurements just because of some testimony about the
fundamental structure of the world.
(ii) Supporting induction: After the Oracle’s testimony, we can imagine certain scien-
tists exclaiming: “Hume was right! There is no reason to think that the ball will roll down
the inclined plane the next time we release it.” But very soon, scientists would return to
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making inductive inferences just as they did before. This is because Hume was also right
about our psychology: it is part of our psychological nature to reason inductively.18
(iii) Foundation of important distinctions in scientific practice: As discussed in 4.3.1,
the law/non-law distinction is the foundation of other important distinctions in scientific
practice. Scientists would still need these distinctions even after the Oracle’s pronounce-
ment. So this is another reason to expect that scientists would continue to distinguish laws
and non-laws when in scientific contexts.
(iv) Objects of scientific discovery: Perhaps, in the aftermath of the Oracle’s testimony,
certain scientists would succumb to defeatist attitudes: “Why bother taking measurements
with the particle accelerator? After all, there aren’t any laws to discover anyway.” But this
attitude would not persist. To give up the search for lawlike regularities would be tanta-
mount to giving up the practice of science itself.19 But scientists would never give up the
practice of science simply because they learned some facts about the world’s fundamental
metaphysical structure.
4.3.4 Case 2: the fragile world
I will now consider a second possible Oracle proclamation. In this example, let D0,
Dr1 , ... be the total momentary physical states of our universe at times t = 0, t = r1, ... , and
let {D0, Dr1 , ...} be the total set of such states across all times t.
“At the beginning of time, God assigned the Universe initial state D0. Since
that time, the Universe has always conformed to Newton’s equations. But this
is not because God decreed that f = ma, that FG = Gm1m2d1,2 , etc. Instead, it is
because he issued the following conditional decree:
-if the universe is in one of the states from the set
{
D0, Dr1 , Dr2 , ...
}
,
18Says Hume (1999, 120): “Nor need we fear, that this philosophy ... should ever undermine the reason-
ings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. ... If the
mind be not engaged by argument to make [inferences from experience], it must be induced by some other
principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature
remains the same.”
19Or so many philosophers have argued; see Roberts (2008, ch. 1) for discussion.
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then: f = ma, FG = Gm1m2d1,2 , ...
-else: all matter annihilates.”
According to the non-Humean, the above testimony describes a rival law hypothesis. Rather
than there being no laws at all (as in 4.3.3), this is a case where the laws are different from
what we suppose them to be. The most noticable difference is with the supported counter-
factuals. The non-Humean will say that this is a world where, if the universe were to enter
into any state other than one of its actual states, all matter would annihilate.
How would this testimony affect scientific discourse? Rather than considering all the
roles a second time, I will just consider counterfactual reasoning. We can imagine that, in
the short term, certain scientists might say things like: “So if we had released the ball on the
inclined plane, it would not have rolled down. Instead, all matter would have annihilated!”
After all, this seems to be the counterfactual supported by the (conditional) divine decrees.
But these scientists would soon return to reasoning counterfactually just as they had
before. This is because using the divine decrees to assess counterfactuals would be com-
pletely useless; it would be just as useless as not reasoning counterfactually at all. But
scientists would never abandon counterfactual reasoning simply because of facts about the
world’s fundamental metaphysical structure; counterfactual reasoning is much too impor-
tant to be threatened by facts about what divine decrees are operating behind the scenes.
4.3.5 Summary
Once one has seen the basic form of the thought experiments, it is easy to generate
additional examples. These cases establish premise 1 (see 4.2.3):
Premise 1: Even if scientists were to learn that a rival law hypothesis H ob-
tained, they would not alter their law discourse.
I have defended premise 1 by considering the role of laws within scientific practice. Be-
cause of their central role, abandoning law discourse in response to Oracle’s testimony
would amount to abandoning scientific practice itself. But scientists would never give up
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scientific inquiry just because they learned certain about facts about the world’s empirically
inaccessible metaphysical structure.
4.4 Defending premise 2
Premise 1 raises a puzzle. Ordinarily, when we receive evidence E that we think
conclusively falsifies our judgment that P , we abandon our judgment that P . But in the
above thought experiments, scientists do not alter their law discourse (in scientific contexts)
after hearing the Oracle’s testimony. What explains this behavior?
In this section, I will consider some solutions to this puzzle. I will defend my preferred
solution to the puzzle in 4.4.3, which will establish premise 2 (see 4.2.3).
4.4.1 Fictionalism
One possible explanation of the thought experiments is fictionalism. I will use the
term fictionalism to encompass views on which scientists’ law judgments do not aim at the
literal truth, but instead involve fiction, pretense, or non-literal speech.20 If law judgments
do not aim at the literal truth, then it is no surprise that scientists continue talking about
laws even after the Oracle’s testimony.
One problem with this proposal is that there is no independent evidence for fictional-
ism about law discourse. For example, if someone says “He has a heart of stone.” and a
child asks “What type of stone?”, the original speaker will clarify that she was not speak-
ing literally.21 The same goes for all other clear cases of non-literal or fictional discourse.
But in contrast, scientists have no inclination to retract their law judgments in response to
queries like “Is Schro¨dinger’s Equation really a law?”
A second worry is that fictionalism fails to use the term ‘non-literal’ with its ordinary
20To be more precise: this is hermeneutic fictionalism; I focus on hermeneutic fictionalism because I think
it provides the best response to the puzzles of section 4.3. See Stanley (2001, 36) for related discussion.
21See Burgess & Rosen (1997, 532-534).
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meaning. In ordinary use, this expression serves to demarcate judgments of a certain, clear
type: ‘He has a heart of stone’, ‘She was kept in the dark’, etc. So the worry is that, by
viewing all of the judgments in a certain area of discourse as non-literal, the fictionalist is
simply failing to use the distinction between literal and non-literal discourse in the ordinary
way.22
While fictionalism deserves more careful consideration, the above shortcomings should
motivate us to look for a better response.
4.4.2 Conceptual change
Suppose that, in our sleep, we are magically transported to Twin-Earth. Upon waking
up, and still unaware of our journey, we jump into a swimming pool and say ‘This water
is really cold!’ Suppose that the Oracle then tells us about our journey, and tells us that
the liquid in the pool is XYZ, not H2O. We might react by saying things like ‘So this isn’t
water after all!’
But if we were to continue living on Twin-Earth, we would probably return to using
the expression ‘water’ just as we had before. After all, we would need to communicate
with the Twin-Earthlings using this term.
The Twin-Earth case seems very similar to the examples from section 4.3. In each
case, subjects initially retract their judgments in response to the Oracle’s testimony, but
later return to speaking as they did before. In the Twin-Earth example, it is natural to
diagnose this as a case of conceptual change: our term ‘water’ first referred to H2O, but
later referred to XYZ. It is worth considering whether this response might also apply to the
section 4.3 cases.
The problem with this proposal is that there is no independent evidence for conceptual
change. Two main factors thought relevant to reference determination are the speaker’s en-
vironment and usage. A shift in environment explains why the term ‘water’ shifts reference
22Similar remarks apply to proposals that view law discourse as involving pretense or fiction.
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after spending time on Twin-Earth. But in the original thought experiments, we assume that
scientists remain in the same environment. As for usage: I have argued that the Oracle’s
testimony would not affect scientists’ use of the term ‘law’ in ordinary scientific contexts.
So the standard types of evidence for conceptual change seem absent from the cases in
section 4.3.23
Just as with fictionalism, the conceptual change proposal deserves careful considera-
tion. But I will set it aside to present what my own preferred response to the Oracle thought
experiments in section 4.3.
4.4.3 A different semantic role
I think what the Oracle cases really show is that non-Humeans are mistaken about the
semantics of law discourse. The non-Humean supposes that the truth of law judgments
hinges on facts about whatever non-Humean items are behind the scenes governing the
empirical regularities. But when we consider how scientists actually use the term ‘law’,
there is no evidence that law judgments are actually hostage to fortune in this way.
The main lesson from the Oracle thought experiment is that, in scientific contexts,
scientists do not care about whatever non-Humean items are behind the scenes governing
empirical regularities. This is why scientists would continue to make judgments about the
laws even after receiving the Oracle’s testimony. But if this is right, why would we ever
think that the truth of these judgments hinges on facts about non-Humean items operating
behind the scenes? Such facts could only threaten law judgments if scientists cared about
the world’s empirically inaccessible metaphysical structure. But they don’t: in scientific
contexts, scientists make judgments about laws in complete indifference to such structure.
What the term ‘law’ refers to depends on how scientists use the term ‘law’, and how
scientists use the term ‘law’ depends on their interests and concerns. But I’ve argued that,
23Speakers’ referential intentions are also thought relevant to reference determination. Does this factor
suggest conceptual change? For ease of presentation, I will set this proposal aside until 4.4.3 (see fn. 24).
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when making judgments about laws in scientific contexts, scientists do not care about em-
pirically inaccessible non-Humean items. And since scientists do not care about these non-
Humean items, it becomes most plausible to say that the laws supervene on the Humean
base.
Of course, it may initially seem like the Oracle’s testimony threatens scientists’ law
judgments. This is because many of us assume that lawhood requires more than the
Humean base. But this assumption is not borne out when we consider the actual role
of law judgments in scientific practice.24
4.4.4 Summary
In this section, I have argued that the best explanation of the Oracle thought exper-
iments is that scientists are not referring to non-Humean laws. This establishes premise
2:
Premise 2: If scientists would not alter their law discourse upon learning that
H obtains, scientists are not referring to non-Humean laws when they use the
expression ‘law’ in ordinary scientific practice.
Together with premise 1, we can infer (3):
3. Scientists are not referring to non-Humean laws when they use the expres-
sion ‘law’ in ordinary scientific practice.
This conclusion has the following corollary:
Humean Supervenience about Laws (HS): two possible worlds cannot differ
on what is a law of nature unless they also differ in their Humean base.
24 I’ll now consider the proposal from fn. 23: that our (implicit) referential intentions would change
after the Oracle’s testimony. I’ve argued in this section that, in scientific contexts, scientists are completely
indifference to empirically-inaccessible non-Humean items. For this reason, I think that all of the linguistic
dispositions that actually matter to the ordinary use of the term ‘law’ would remain the same after scientists
received the Oracle’s testimony.
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To sum up: reflection on scientific law discourse suggests that law judgments are not
hostage to fortune in ways that non-Humeans suppose. This is because, when making
judgments about laws, scientists do not care about whatever non-Humean items may exist
behind the scenes.
4.4.5 An objection: illegitimate focus on the term ‘law’
The above argument focuses on the inferential role of the term ‘law’ in scientific dis-
course. But one might worry that it is inappropriate to draw metaphysical conclusions from
facts about how scientists use the term ‘law’.25
There are different forms this objection might take. For example, one might worry
that metaphysical theories do not concern our linguistic expressions; instead, they are about
what is out in the world.26 But even if this is correct, it does not imply that we can ignore
the inferential role of the term ‘law’ when theorizing about lawhood. This is because the
inferential role of the term ‘law’ places constraints on what can count as a law of nature. If
a theory of lawhood is incompatible with the inferential role of the term ‘law’, that theory
is simply failing to talk about the laws: the things that scientists try to discover.
One might instead argue that our metaphysical theories should not consider how sci-
entists actually use the term ‘law’; instead, they should consider how scientists ought to
use this term. For example, one might think that scientists’ failure to modify their law dis-
course in response to the Oracle’s testimony merely betrays a failure of imagination or a
failure of nerve. One might insist that the proper response to the Oracle’s testimony would
be for scientists to abandon their law judgments altogether.
In response: it is difficult to see why scientists should use the term ‘law’ any different
25There is a narrow sense in which this objection is well-founded. Which propositions are explicitly
labeled ‘laws’ in scientific practice is largely a matter of historical accident; for example, the axioms of
quantum mechanics are not typically labeled as ‘laws’, while Bode’s Law is. But this type of “explicit” use
has not been the focus of my argument; instead, I have focused on a broader conception of use which includes,
e.g., how scientists would respond if asked whether the axioms of quantum mechanics are laws, etc.
26Cf. Swoyer (1982, 221-222).
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than they actually do. The Oracle thought experiments show that scientists do not care
about whatever non-Humean items might be governing the regularities behind the scenes.
But then, given these interests and concerns, there is no reason why scientists should aban-
don their law judgments after receiving the Oracle’s testimony.
4.4.6 The path ahead
In sections 4.3 and 4.4, I have used the Oracle thought experiments to provide a new
epistemic argument for HS. But these thought experiments may also be useful to Humeans
in another way. Non-Humeans have offered several powerful arguments against HS. In the
next three sections, I will show how the Oracle thought experiments can help the Humean
deflect these arguments.
4.5 The explanatory work argument
Some philosophers motivate non-Humean laws using inference to the best explana-
tion. For example, it has been claimed that Humean laws do not support counterfactuals,
do not support inductive inferences, and do not explain regularities. It is claimed that we
need to posit non-Humean laws in order to perform these important types of explanatory
work.27
There are two ways one might interpret this argument. On one reading, non-Humean
laws are posited to perform certain types of explanatory work within scientific practice. On
a second reading, non-Humean laws are posited to perform certain types of explanatory
work that metaphysicians require of the laws.28
The latter form of argument is misguided. A philosopher cannot come from the outside
and pronounce that, because her metaphysical theory requires non-Humean laws, this is
27See, e.g., Dretske (1977, 255-256) and Armstrong (1983, 39-52).
28See Loewer (1996, 176-177), who argues that Humean laws perform all the work needed for science but
not all the work desired by metaphysicians.
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what scientists mean by ‘law’. When scientists use the term ‘law’, they are not giving a
global metaphysical theory. So whether Humean laws can solve the puzzles that interest
metaphysicians is neither here nor there.
So now consider the first reading of the argument: are non-Humean laws required
to perform explanatory work within scientific practice itself? The Oracle thought experi-
ments suggest that this is not the case. For example, I argued in 4.3.3 that scientists would
continue to reason counterfactually even after learning that the world was Humean. So
within scientific practice, Humean laws apparently do support counterfactuals. Similarly,
scientists would continue to make inductive inferences even after learning the world was
Humean. So within scientific practice, Humean laws apparently do support induction. Sim-
ilar remarks apply to the other kinds of explanatory work scientists assign to laws.
In fact, the thought experiments flip the non-Humean’s argument around; they show
that non-Humean laws do not perform the work required of them by scientific practice.
Consider the fragile world from 4.3.4. If the non-Humean laws in this world supported
counterfactuals, scientists would (in scientific contexts) say things like ‘If the ball was
released down the inclined plane, all matter would annihilate’. But of course, scientists
would never reason this way. Similar remarks apply to the other types of explanatory work
relevant to scientific practice. So it is actually deniers of HS who face difficult explanatory
shortcomings.
The non-Humean might object: “Even if scientists reason counterfactually using the
Humean laws, non-Humean laws are still needed to settle what would really happen if
the ball were released down the inclined plane.” In response: even if we grant that non-
Humean items are needed to perform certain “extra-scientific” explanatory work, this has
no bearing on the question of what the laws are (when using the term ‘law’ in its ordinary
sense). Evidently, scientists do not care about this extra-scientific work when making law
judgments. So it remains true that the laws — the things scientists try to discover — are
Humean.
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4.6 The argument from counterexamples
A second way to argue against HS is to provide counterexamples: cases where we
intuitively think that there is a difference in the laws without a difference in the Humean
base. There are many alleged counterexamples to HS in the literature29, but for simplicity
I will focus on a simple counterexample considered by Roberts (2008, 10.3).
It is possible for the laws of nature to be Newtonian, and given these laws, it is nom-
ically possible for nothing to exist except for a single particle traveling through space at a
constant velocity. It is also possible for the laws of nature to be Newtonian except that the
law f = ma is replaced by the law f = ma2. And given these modified laws, it is again
nomically possible for nothing to exist except for a single particle traveling through space
at a constant velocity. So we seem to have two possible worlds which agree on the Humean
base but which have different laws.
Roberts (2008, 357-361) provides a strong Humean response to this argument. Ac-
cording to Roberts, the truth of law statements depends on which scientific theory is con-
textually salient. For example, when asked to consider a single-particle world with New-
tonian laws, one enters a context where Newton’s theory is salient. In such a context, the
statement ‘f = ma is a law’ is true. But when asked to consider a single-particle world
with modified Newtonian laws, the salient theory changes and the statement ‘f = ma2 is a
law’ is true. So on this account, there is a single possible world that we can consider from
two perspectives. By distinguishing these contexts, the Humean need not reject any of our
intuitions.
The success of this response depends on the plausibility of a contextualist semantics
for law statements. To motivate this view, Roberts (2008, 96-105) offers the following
thought experiment. Let M be some value of mass that is greater than the total mass of
all the matter in the universe. Assume that both of the following regularities obtain in the
29See, e.g., Tooley (1977) and Maudlin (2007, 67).
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actual world:
P : f = ma
P ∗: f = Φ(m)a, where Φ(m) =

m if m < M
2m−M otherwise
P and P ∗ are two possible laws of nature; they are incompatible because of their con-
flicting predictions about the behavior of bodies with mass greater than M . Now suppose
that human scientists endorse the sentence ‘P is a law’ but alien scientists endorse the sen-
tence ‘P ∗ is a law’ (here, we can suppose that the aliens have different cognitive faculties
so that P ∗ seems much more natural to them than it does to us). Roberts’ intuition is that, in
such a case, both communities would be speaking correctly; he accounts for this intuition
by offering a contextualist semantics of law statements.
To respond to Roberts’ arguments, the non-Humean may insist that there is a fact of
the matter about who is right about the laws in the above case. But the Oracle thought
experiments provide support for Roberts’ position.
After talking to the aliens, we can imagine human scientists worrying: “What basis
do we have for thinking that P is a law that the aliens do not equally have for thinking that
P ∗ is a law?” But for the same reasons that scientists would return to their law discourse
after the Oracle’s testimony, scientists would return to asserting ‘P is a law’ when back in
ordinary scientific contexts. Our law discourse is too important to abandon just because
some other community makes law judgments slightly differently than we do. If the aliens
are relevantly similar to us, then analogous remarks will apply to their law discourse as
well.
So we have two communities that agree on all of the relevant evidence, and neither is
moved to change their judgments even after dialogue with the other. The best explanation
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of this situation is that the term ‘law’ is context-dependent in the way Roberts describes.30
As mentioned above, this provides the Humean with an attractive response to alleged coun-
terexamples to HS.
4.7 The argument from the failures of analysis
Proponents of HS often attempt to analyze laws statements in non-nomic terms. For
example, here are three Humean analyses from the literature:
(1) A true, contingent generalization P is a law iff P is confirmable by less
than complete induction. (cf . Goodman (1983, 23))31
(2) A true, contingent generalization P is a law iff P appears as a theorem
in each of the true deductive systems that achieves the best combination of
simplicity and strength. (Lewis (1973b, 73))
(3) ‘P is a law of nature’ is true at world w in context k iff P is a contingent
logical consequence of the set of reliability conditions of all the legitimate
measurement methods of a theory T that is true in w and salient in k. (Roberts
(2008, 324-325))32
In (1)-(3), the right side of the biconditional does not employ nomic vocabulary. So in
any worlds sharing a Humean base, these analyses predict identical laws. So philosophers
endorsing these analyses are committed to HS.
There are two common types of objections lodged against analyses like (1)-(3). One
strategy is to provide counterexamples. For example, Hall (manuscript, 5.8) offers the
following counterexample to (2): “Suppose it turns out that there are exactly 264 particles
in our world. Then a statement to that effect buys a lot of [strength] at a negligible cost
30Alternatively, we might say that humans and aliens employ slightly different law concepts. There is
probably no substantive difference between these proposals.
31This characterization of Goodman‘s analysis is given by Carroll (1994, 40-41).
32Since the details of this proposal are not relevant to the discussion ahead, there is no need to precisify
the terminology of Roberts’ analysis.
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in simplicity. [But] it seems quite wrong to think that ... it ought to count as nomically
necessary that there are 264 particles.”
A second common objection is that, in at least many cases, Humean analyses are too
closely linked to our epistemic practices. For example, many philosophers have worried
that what counts as “simple” or as a “best balance” may vary across cultures, making (2)’s
predictions about the laws too subjective.33
These objections are typically directed against specific Humean analyses of lawhood.
But the difficulties of providing a successful Humean analysis may constitute an indirect
challenge to HS itself.34 For example, one might think that the reason it has proved so
difficult to provide an adequate Humean analysis is that there just isn’t any definition of
law statements in non-nomic terms. Since proponents of HS have traditionally relied on
such definitions to explain the epistemology of law judgments, the unavailability of such
definitions constitutes a threat to HS. And even if one does not view the past failures of
analysis as evidence against HS, one might still think that the Humean has a burden to
provide such an analysis.35
4.7.1 A deflationary analysis
Despite their shortcomings, the Oracle thought experiments suggest that there is some-
thing right about (1)-(3). In particular, the thought experiments suggest that (1)-(3) are
correct in recognizing that whether a regularity counts as a law depends on its role within
actual scientific practice.
Where these proposals go wrong is in their attempt to give an informative analysis of
this role. Traditionally, many philosophers endorsed the view that non-primitive linguis-
tic expressions can be given precise conceptual analyses. But this view has largely been
33Armstrong (1983, 67) and Carroll (1994, 49-54) offer criticisms in this spirit.
34See Carroll (1994, 55-56).
35Says Roberts (2015, section 6): “unless some detailed account of exactly how the laws can somehow
emerge out of the primordial soup that is the Humean base, Humeanism is at best a promissory note.”
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abandoned by philosophers of language and cognitive scientists.36 Since very few (non-
stipulative) terms from human language have informative conceptual analyses, there is no
reason to expect a precise analysis for ‘law’ either.
Does the unavailability of a precise analysis for law statements spell doom for HS?
Not at all: it was a mistake to think that Humeans ever needed to provide such an analy-
sis. Instead of trying to offer a definition of the law/non-law distinction, Humeans should
simply defer to how scientists themselves draw the distinction:
Humean Deflationism (HD): P is a law of nature in a possible world W iff
(actual) scientists would (ideally) judge that the predicate ‘is a law of nature’
applies to P when given an appropriate description of the Humean base at W .
Here is the intuitive picture. Imagine that scientists are “magically afforded a god’s eye
glimpse of the entire Humean base of the universe, with supernatural secretarial help for
organizing it” (Roberts (2015, section 6)). Looking over this vast mosaic, scientists would
in principle be able to identify certain regularities P 1, P 2, . . . as the ones that “most look
like” laws of nature. According to HD, P 1, P 2, . . . just are the laws of nature. Put simply:
Pi is a law of nature if and only if scientists fully-informed about the Humean base would
be inclined to call P a law of nature.
Hall (manuscript, 4.3) also uses the idea of a fully-informed scientist to motivate the
Humean view of laws. After presenting a very similar illustration, Hall says: “What re-
mains is for the [Humean] to supply a specific hypothesis about what the standards are
upon which [the fully-informed scientist] relies” (4.4). For example, Hall views (2) as one
(unsatisfactory) attempt to capture these standards. Given the counterexample mentioned
earlier, Hall thinks the Humean must provide an improved analysis that accurately explains
scientists’ law judgments.37
36For discussion, see Chalmers (2012, 10-12).
37Hall (manuscript, 6.1-6.2) offers an analysis that avoids the problems with (2), but ultimately concludes
that it suffers problems of its own.
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But if ‘law’ is like most other terms in our language, scientists are not following any
explicit standard when making law judgments. So the Humean is under no burden to pro-
vide such a standard. (Compare: it is doubtful that there are irreducible facts about games.
This position is not threatened by the fact that we cannot provide an explicit standard ex-
plaining the game/non-game distinction.)
With HD, the Humean resists the impulse to provide a precise analysis of law judg-
ments. Instead, HD lets scientific practice itself determine the law/non-law distinction.
Since HD completely defers to fully-informed scientists, it will never face counterexam-
ples. For example, since scientists would not judge that ‘There are 264 particles’ is a law
in the possible world described by Hall (manuscript), HD correctly predicts that it is not a
law that there are 264 particles in this world.
4.7.2 Clarifications
Here are a few remarks on how to interpret the above analysis.
(i)“Actual subjects”: HD should not be interpreted as saying that P is a law in some
possible worldW iff scientists inW would (ideally) judge that P is a law. On this interpre-
tation, HD would make lawhood very subjective; it would imply, for example, that in any
worldW where there are no scientists, there are also no laws of nature. The correct reading
is: P is a law of nature in a possible world W iff actual scientists — using their concepts
as they actually do — would judge that P is a law of nature when given a description of
W .
(ii) Correspondence between truths and judgments: HD assumes that truths about the
laws do not outstrip scientists’ (fully-informed, idealized38) law judgments. In this sense,
HD assumes that law judgments are similar to judgments about games. Suppose that we
were given all of the relevant information about the rules, aims, history, etc. of a practiceX .
Suppose that, on the basis of all of evidence, we judge that X is a game. It is implausible
38I explain these qualifications in notes (iii) and (iv).
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that, nonetheless, X could fail to be a game. This motivates the following deflationary
analysis of gamehood:
Game Deflationism (GD): A practice X is a game iff (actual) subjects would
(ideally) judge that the predicate ‘is a game’ applies to X whengiven an appro-
priate description of the practice in question.
Similarly, HD asserts that, if scientists were told all the information in the Humean base,
and thereby judged that P is a law, it could not be the case that P nonetheless fails to be a
law.
This correspondence between law truths and law judgments is supported by the Oracle
thought experiments. As discussed in 4.4.3, these cases indicate that “hidden” non-Humean
facts are irrelevant to ordinary scientific practice. So we should not expect the truth of law
statements to outstrip what we could learn from observing and measuring the Humean base.
Of course, HD does not guarantee that scientists’ actual law judgments are correct; I
discuss this point in the next two notes.
(iii) “Appropriate description of the Humean base”: One reason why truth and judg-
ment diverge is that scientists only have access to limited evidence. For example, 19th-
century Newtonian physicists made false law judgments because they were unaware of,
e.g., the gravitational deflection of light. This is why HD appeals to the judgments of
scientists who are fully-informed about the Humean base.39
(iv) Idealization: Even when assuming full information, we can still imagine law
truths outstripping scientists’ law judgments. For example, a full description of the Humean
base may be too complex for scientists to fully process. Similarly, scientists may make
39Two further notes on this point. (i) The restriction to full information about the Humean base is impor-
tant because HD would be trivial if the evidential base included facts about the laws themselves. This is also
why HD appeals to an an “appropriate description” of the Humean base: the base must not be described in
a way that builds in information about the world’s nomic facts. (ii) One might worry that, since scientists
are never presented with the entire Humean mosaic, the entire mosaic will not be relevant to determining
which regularities count as laws. If this is a legitimate concern, one can modify HD so that scientists are
instead presented with some restricted portion of the Humean mosaic (e.g., the portion of the mosaic that is
observable or measurable by human subjects).
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mistaken judgments about the laws due to careless reflection on the evidence. To account
for such cases, the judgments relevant to HD require a cognitive idealization. For example,
the idealization should allow subjects to entertain thoughts of arbitrary complexity, should
idealize away from missteps in reasoning, etc.40
(v) HD vs. conceptual analyses: HD should not be viewed as a conceptual analysis
of law statements. Traditional conceptual analyses must meet various criteria of adequacy;
common criteria include that the definition be necessary, analytic and/or a priori. But
HD meets none of these criteria. Instead, HD relies on the correspondence between law
truths and scientists’ (fully-informed) law judgments to give an extensionally adequate
characterization of law statements.
(vi) Mistaken metaphysical interpretations of HD: HD says that the regularities that
fall under the predicate ‘is a law’ are the ones that fully-informed scientists judge to fall
under that predicate. In contrast, HD does not say that law facts are constituted by, meta-
physically grounded in, made true by, or reducible to facts about the epistemic practices of
scientists.41 (Compare: what property we express by the predicate ‘is spherical’ is deter-
mined by how ordinary speakers use the term ‘is spherical’. But it would be a confusion
to say that whether something is spherical metaphysically depends on how we use the term
‘is spherical’.)
4.7.3 Objections
I will conclude by considering some possible objections to HD.
Objection 1: “Why suppose that it is the judgments of human scientists that
determine which propositions count as laws? Why not the scientists of some
other alien community?”42
40See Chalmers (2012, 63-71) for an idealization that would work for HD.
41This may be a point where I disagree with Hall (manuscript, 4.6), who claims that scientists’ implicit
standards for judging lawhood are “constitutive” of lawhood.
42This objection is a modified form of Carroll’s (1994, 53) objection to Lewis’ (1973b) account of laws.
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Response: To see the problem with this objection, it is useful to apply it to the case of
games. Why is it that the game judgments of subjects in our community determine which
practices count as games? Why not the judgments of subjects in some other community at
other times?
The response is that GD is a thesis about how we use the term ‘game’, not how some
other community uses the term. Similarly, the reason HD appeals to human scientists is be-
cause the term ‘law’ is a term used by scientists in our community. (Of course, objection 1
would be a much greater concern if HS was an attempt at either conceptual or metaphysical
analysis- see 4.7.2).
Objection 2: “HD isn’t appropriately explanatory. It doesn’t explain what all
the laws have in common. Nor does it explain why scientists draw the law/non-
law distinction the way that they do.”
Response: I have already addressed the issue of what the laws have in common in 4.7.1.
Most likely, there isn’t any unifying feature that all and only the laws have in common.
Most terms from natural language do not have neat analyses, so we shouldn’t expect a neat
analysis of law statements either.
As for why scientists draw the distinction they do: there are different types of explana-
tions we might give. We could give a pragmatic explanation: scientists draw this distinction
because it is (apparently) useful for accomplishing the aims of science. Or we could give a
historical explanation: maybe the distinction derives from a now-abandoned picture where
God’s decrees govern the universe.
These may not be the types of explanations the objector has in mind. But the proponent
of HD will deny that there is any “deeper” explanation available. On this point, it is useful
to again consider the term ‘game’. We can give pragmatic or historical explanations of why
humans draw a distinction between games and non-games in the way they do. But there is
no further “deep” explanation of this distinction: we can imagine communities using the
term ‘game’ in a slightly different way. So too we can imagine communities that use the
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term ‘law’ in a slightly different way.43
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented a new epistemic argument for Humeanism about laws
of nature. Standard epistemic arguments for HS attempt to show that actual empirical
evidence does not justify our law judgments over certain rival law hypotheses that are
coherent if HS is false. But I have argued that, even if scientists were to learn that such a
rival hypothesis obtained, they would continue talking about laws just as they did before. I
then argued that the best explanation of this behavior is that scientists are actually talking
about Humean laws. To conclude the chapter, I discussed how the Humean might use the
new epistemic argument to deflect certain objections to HS from the literature.
43Hall (manuscript, 6.2) raises an objection to HS that is very similar to objection 2. Hall worries that, on a
Humean view, it would be just as informative for scientists to learn about regularities in the initial conditions
as it would be to learn about the regularities we typically consider to be laws. So by the Humean’s lights,
there is no explanation of why scientists do not count such regularities in the initial conditions to be laws.
In response: Hall’s observation only shows that scientists do not use ‘law’ as a blanket term for all regu-
larities worth knowing. And why don’t they? Well, we might provide a pragmatic explanation, or a historical
explanation, or . . ..
93
5 METAPHYSICAL AND CONCEPTUAL GROUNDING
5.1 Introduction
Recently, many theorists have claimed that the world has an ordered, hierarchical
structure.1 Entities at lower ontological levels are said to metaphysically ground entities
at higher ontological levels. It has also recently been claimed that our language has an
ordered, hierarchical structure.2 Semantically primitive sentences are said to conceptually
ground less primitive sentences. It is often emphasized that metaphysical grounding is a
relation between things out in the world, not a relation between our sentences. But I will
argue that not enough care has been taken to distinguish these two types of grounding.
Conflating these relations is easy to do, given that both types of grounding are expressed
by non-causal “in-virtue-of” claims.
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the relation between metaphysical and con-
ceptual grounding. In section 5.2, I’ll argue that conceptual grounding is independent from
metaphysical grounding. In sections 5.3-5.4, I’ll argue that conceptual and metaphysical
grounding are exclusive: if a given in-virtue-of claim involves conceptual grounding, then
it does not involve metaphysical grounding. In section 5.5, I’ll give some heuristics for
deciding which type of grounding is relevant in a given case. These heuristics suggest that
many proposed cases of metaphysical grounding may not involve metaphysical grounding
at all. I’ll conclude by explaining why these results should interest both supporters and
detractors of the study of metaphysical grounding.
1See, e.g., Schaffer (2009), Audi (2012a).
2See Chalmers (2012, 452-460).
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5.2 Distinct types of grounding
I’ll begin by describing metaphysical and conceptual grounding and the explanatory
work each is supposed to perform.
5.2.1 Metaphysical grounding
Theorists often introduce metaphysical grounding with examples:3
1. The fact that there are chemicals arranged in a certain way obtains in virtue of the fact that
there are particles arranged in a certain way.
2. {Socrates} exists in virtue of the fact that Socrates exists.
3. x is roughly spherical in virtue of its having determinate shape R.
4. x is fragile in virtue of its molecular arrangement and the physical laws.
5. x’s action is wrong in virtue of its being done with the sole motive to cause harm.
6. x is in pain in virtue of the fact that x is in brain state P .
For example, [3] is said to correspond to a metaphysical grounding relation between
the fact x’s having determinate shape R and the fact x’s being roughly spherical.
These examples have an important role in the literature because they supposed to
provide us with an intuitive grip on the notion of metaphysical grounding.4 They are also
used to motivate two types of explanatory work that metaphysical grounding is supposed
to perform. First, metaphysical grounding is supposed to underwrite cases of metaphysical
explanation. For example, in [1], we explain the fact that there are chemicals arranged in a
certain way by appealing to the fact that there are particles arranged in a certain way. It is
claimed that, just as we need the causal relation to underwrite cases of causal explanation,
3For ease of presentation, I have adjusted these examples to give them a common form. The examples
are from (in order): Schaffer (2012, 125), Fine (1995, 271), Schaffer (2012, 126), Rosen (2010, 110), Fine
(2012b, 1), and Clark & Liggins (2012, 812).
4For discussion, see Schaffer (2009, 375-376).
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so too we need metaphysical grounding to underwrite cases of metaphysical explanation.5
Second, metaphysical grounding is posited to accommodate intuitions about meta-
physical priority.6 For example, it intuitively seems that the individual Socrates is “more
fundamental” than the singleton set {Socrates}. But we cannot accommodate this intuition
using familiar tools like supervenience, since Socrates and {Socrates} supervene on each
other. Accordingly, it has been argued that metaphysical grounding is needed to capture
the fine-grainedness of metaphysical dependence.
For ease of presentation, I will adopt two assumptions about metaphysical ground-
ing. First, I will assume the standard view that metaphysical grounding relates facts (i.e.,
obtaining states of affairs).7 Facts are individuated by the objects and properties that com-
pose them. Second, I will assume that metaphysical grounding is unitary, i.e., that there is
a single dependence relation corresponding to all cases of metaphysical explanation.8 Of
course, there is one sense in which I am a “pluralist” about grounding: I will argue that
metaphysical and conceptual grounding are independent relations. But this is consistent
with the assumption that all cases of metaphysical dependence are unified. (In this sense,
the pluralism I defend is different from the pluralist views of Wilson (2014) and Koslicki
(2015).)
5.2.2 Conceptual grounding
Metaphysical grounding relates items on different ontological levels; it concerns the
structure of the world. In contrast, conceptual grounding relates items on different semantic
5See Audi (2012a, 687-688) and deRossett (2013, 2-3) for this view. One might instead say that meta-
physical grounding is just identical to metaphysical explanation (see Trogdon (2013, section 3) for discus-
sion). The distinction between these views will not be relevant to the arguments ahead.
6See Clark & Liggins (2012, 813).
7See, e.g., Rosen (2010, 114) and Audi (2012a, 693). Other theorists, such as Schaffer (2009, 375-376),
claim that metaphysical grounding takes different types of entities as relata. Other theorists, such as Correia
(2010) and Fine (2012a), prefer to express metaphysical grounding claims using sentential operators.
8See Trogdon (2013, section 2) for discussion.
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levels; it concerns the meanings of our linguistic expressions. I will assume that conceptual
grounding takes sentences as its relata.
Just as with metaphysical grounding, instances of conceptual grounding are expressed
by non-causal in-virtue-of claims:
1′. x is a vixen in virtue of the fact that x is a female fox.
2′. x is a piece of furniture in virtue of fact that x is a chair.
3′. x is bald in virtue of the fact that x has 20 hairs.
4′. x is an electron in virtue of the fact that x has nomic role R.9
For example, [1′] corresponds to a conceptual grounding relation between the sentences ‘x
is a female fox’ and ‘x is a vixen’.
Intuitively, a sentence A is conceptually grounded by a sentence B when the ex-
pressions in B are semantically prior to those in A and the sentence ‘If B, then A’ is a
conceptual truth. For the purposes of this chapter, it will be fine to rely on this intuitive
characterization, just as metaphysical grounding was left intuitive in 5.2.1.
But there are various ways to make the notion of conceptual grounding more precise.
For example, Chalmers (2012, 464-465) appeals to the idea that certain linguistic expres-
sions have inferential roles that are constitutive of the meanings of those expressions. For
example, suppose that ‘vixen’ is individuated by the obvious inferential links to ‘female’
and ‘fox’. Then we can say that the inference from ‘x is a female fox’ to ‘x is a vixen’
is conceptually warranted by these inferential links. We can then say that a sentence S is
conceptually grounded by a set of sentences T when the constitutive inferential roles of the
expressions of S and T provide a competent speaker a conceptual warrant for asserting S
on the supposition of the conjunction of the sentences in T .
Conceptual grounding does not require explicit definition. For example, let ¬S be the
sentence ‘It is not the case that Smith knows that: either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in
9[4′] involves conceptual grounding on the common view that natural kind terms like ‘electron’ refer to
whatever item fills a certain nomic role.
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Barcelona’. Let D be the conjunction of the following sentences:
Smith is justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford. Originally, Smith has no
beliefs about Brown’s location. By making a logical inference from his belief
that Jones owns a Ford, Smith forms the belief: Jones owns a Ford or Brown is
in Barcelona. In fact, Jones does not own a Ford. But in fact, Brown happens
to be in Barcelona.
It seems that competent speakers can trivially judge that ¬S is true when presented with
D. The same goes for all other cases in the Gettier literature: the entire progress of this
literature depended on our ability to make these trivial judgments when presented with
descriptions of cases. What can explain our ability to make these judgments? Here’s one
very plausible explanation: it is partially constitutive of the meaning of the term ‘knows’
that one is disposed to judge that ¬S when presented withD (and similarly for other cases).
This suggests that, even if the term ‘knowledge’ cannot be given a definition, there is still a
conceptual link between ‘knowledge’-sentences and sentences describing subjects’ belief
states.
Conceptual grounding is supposed to perform analogous theoretical work to meta-
physical grounding. First: conceptual grounding is needed to underwrite cases of concep-
tual explanation.10 For example, in order to account for the explanatory force of [1′], we
might say: “what it means for x to be a vixen just is for x to be a female fox”; this ex-
planation seems semantic, not metaphysical or causal.11 Second, conceptual grounding is
needed to accommodate intuitions about semantic priority (see Chalmers (2012, 315-316)).
For example, even if ‘knowledge’ cannot be given an explicit definition, there is an intu-
itive sense in which ‘knowledge’-sentences seem semantically derivative from sentences
describing beliefs.
10For discussion of conceptual explanation, see Schnieder (2006, 405-406).
11To see the difference between semantic explanation and metaphysical explanation, contrast [1′] with a
case like [1]. We wouldn’t say that “what it means for there to be chemicals arranged in a certain way just is
for there to be particles arranged in a certain way.”
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To head off any potential confusion, it is worth contrasting the claim that [1]-[4] in-
volve conceptual grounding from two other claims encountered in the literature.
First: conceptual grounding is unrelated to the dispute over whether metaphysical
grounding claims should be expressed using relational predicates or using sentential op-
erators.12 This is a debate about the logical form of metaphysical dependence claims; in
contrast, conceptual grounding concerns the semantic links between our sentences.
Second: proponents of metaphysical grounding sometimes distinguish “conceptual”
and “worldly” views of facts; these views disagree over whether, e.g., x’s being water and
x’s being H2O are distinct facts.13 But this is a question about the fine-grainedness of the
metaphysical grounding relation, not a question about conceptual grounding.14 To claim
that there is conceptual grounding is not to claim that the metaphysical grounding relation
takes conceptual facts (or alternatively: sentences) as its relata.
5.2.3 Two distinct types of grounding
I’ve emphasized that metaphysical and conceptual grounding are two independent re-
lations. One concerns the metaphysical structure of the world while the other concerns
the meanings of our sentences. In addition, I’ve noted that these relations are posited to
perform different types of explanatory work.
Nonetheless, some philosophers might still be skeptical that there are two independent
relations underwriting non-causal in-virtue-of claims. To convince such skeptics, it will
suffice to give examples of such claims that clearly do not involve metaphysical grounding.
Here is the simplest example of this type:
12See Correia & Schnieder (2012, 3.1) for discussion. Rosen (2010) and Audi (2012b) endorse the predi-
cate view, while Correia (2010) and Fine (2012a) endorse the operator view.
13Proponents of worldly facts include Correia (2010, 258-259) and Audi (2012b, 3.5). Rosen (2010) and
Fine (2012a) seem to adopt a finer-grained conception of facts.
14For example, Rosen (2010, section 10) endorses a very fine-grained view of facts, but he emphasizes
that metaphysical grounding is not a semantic phenomenon.
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5′. x is a bachelor in virtue of the fact that x is an unmarried male.15
As it happens, [5′] is sometimes cited as a case of metaphysical grounding in the literature.16
But I think that, once conceptual grounding is recognized as a live option, this view no
longer seems attractive. Here is a simple argument to push this intuition.
Suppose a community is just like our community except that they do not possess the
expression ‘bachelor’: they always use the expression ‘unmarried male’. So these speak-
ers never form the belief that x is a bachelor.17 Do we think these speakers are missing
something about the world’s structure insofar as they lack this belief? Of course not: these
speakers have just as complete a metaphysical picture as we do. We just have another way
of speaking. This suggests that there is nothing metaphysical about [5′].18 (Of course, [5′]
isn’t a very interesting case. But for the present, my aim is just to make the weak point that
conceptual and metaphysical grounding are independent.)
Besides failing to respect our intuitions in the above thought experiment, anyone who
insists on viewing [5′] as involving metaphysical grounding must either reject (a) the claim
that ‘being a bachelor’ and ‘being an unmarried male’ are just two names for a single
property or (b) the claim that metaphysical grounding is irreflexive.19 But with conceptual
15I intend for [5′] to be distinguished from the following case of “conjunctive grounding”: [5∗] ≡ x is
unmarried and male in virtue of the fact that x is unmarried and the fact that x is male. [5∗] is explicitly
distinguished from [5′] in the literature (see, e.g., Chalmers (2012, 454)). This seems appropriate, since
[5∗] and [5′] have different explanatory force: in [5′] the explanatory emphasis is on ‘bachelor’, while in
[5∗] the emphasis is on ‘and’. I claim that, in order to accommodate this distinctive explanatory force, we
need to countenance conceptual grounding. This is true even if someone insists on viewing [5′] as a case of
conjunctive grounding.
16See, e.g., Rosen (2010, 124).
17Here, I am assuming a fine-grained categorization of beliefs on which the belief that x is a bachelor is
distinct from the belief that x is an unmarried male.
18Note: this argument stands even on a deflationary account of facts and of the metaphysical grounding
relation. See 5.4.4.
19For an example of the first response, see Rosen (2010, 124). For discussion of the second response, see
Jenkins (2011, 169).
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grounding on the table, there is no need to accept either of these consequences.20
Of course, there is nothing stopping us from using from using ‘metaphysical ground-
ing’ as a catch-all term that applies in any case of non-causal explanation (see, e.g., Fine
(2012b)). But why try to make room for [5′] under the banner of metaphysical grounding?
To insist on grouping these cases together doesn’t somehow unify them; it merely obscures
an important distinction between two very different phenomena.21
One might wonder: why not just say that conceptual grounding is a form of metaphysi-
cal grounding that relates facts about sentences? In response: if asked about the metaphys-
ical grounds of facts involving the sentence ‘x is a bachelor’, we might have pointed to
facts about its constituent expressions, or perhaps facts about our linguistic practices. But
we wouldn’t have said such facts are metaphysically grounded by facts about another sen-
tence (i.e., ‘x is an unmarried male’). This is because we don’t think that the sentence ‘x
is a bachelor’ is on a different ontological level then the sentence ‘x is an unmarried male’.
These sentences are certainly linked, but the link is semantic, not metaphysical.
(None of this is to say that sentences do not also stand in metaphysical grounding rela-
tions. As I mentioned, it’s plausible that facts about sentences are metaphysically grounded
by facts about sub-sentential expressions. Similarly, it is possible that facts about sentences
or linguistic practices metaphysically ground other types of facts.22 So it is best to say that
sentences can be involved in two different types of grounding relations.)
20This is not to deny that there may be independent reasons to deny (say) the irreflexivity of metaphysi-
cal grounding. But philosophers who endorse irreflexivity (e.g., Schaffer (2009, 364)) should welcome the
distinction between conceptual and metaphysical grounding.
21Could this be a verbal dispute? Might theorists who reject (a) or (b) be using the term ‘metaphysical
grounding’ to include cases of conceptual grounding? I think the answer is “no”. For example, Rosen (2010,
section 10) adopts a very fine-grained view of facts, but he explicitly denies that metaphysical grounding
involves semantic links.
22For example, perhaps facts about fictional characters are partially metaphysically grounded by facts
about the sentences in the relevant fictional works.
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5.3 The relation between metaphysical and conceptual grounding
In the last section, I argued that conceptual grounding is independent from metaphysi-
cal grounding. This shows that we need to carefully distinguish which type(s) of grounding
are relevant in a given case. In this section, I will consider whether we can establish any
general results about the relation between metaphysical and conceptual grounding. I’ll first
briefly consider a proposal from Chalmers (2012). I’ll then defend the view that metaphys-
ical and conceptual grounding are exclusive.
5.3.1 The Conceptual/Metaphysical Thesis
Chalmers (2012, 453) claims that metaphysical and conceptual grounding correspond
over a certain restricted range of cases:
Conceptual/Metaphysical (C/M) Thesis: Suppose an in-virtue-of claim V in-
volves only super-rigid expressions. Then V involves metaphysical grounding
iff it involves conceptual grounding.
Roughly, an expression is super-rigid when it takes the same extension across all epis-
temic and metaphysical possibilities. For example, Chalmers suggests that the expressions
‘zero’, ‘wise’, and ‘cause’ are super-rigid (366-369). In contrast, the expression ‘water’ is
clearly non-super-rigid (since, on the epistemic possibility that the water-like liquid in our
environment turned out to be XYZ, ‘water’ would have referred to XYZ).
Without the super-rigidity restriction, there would be a clear class of counterexamples
to C/M. For example, consider [4′]: ‘x is an electron in virtue of the fact that x has a
property with nomic role R’. Since ‘is an electron’ expresses whatever property happens
to fill a certain nomic role R, the fact x’s being an electron is plausibly identical to the
fact x’s being a property with nomic role R. So [4′] plausibly involves conceptual but not
metaphysical grounding (see 5.2.3). Speaking more generally: in-virtue-of claims with
non-super-rigid terms often involve two different ways of describing the same worldly fact
and so do not involve metaphysical grounding.
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Because metaphysical grounding is supposed to be independent of our language, many
theorists will immediately worry about counterexamples in the left-to-right direction: cases
of metaphysical grounding without conceptual grounding. For this reason, Chalmers’ de-
fense of C/M focuses on counterexamples of this sort. But upon reflection, we see that
there are clear counterexamples in the right-to-left direction: cases of conceptual ground-
ing without metaphysical grounding. For example, the bachelor example from 5.2.3 is one
such case.23
5.3.2 The Grounding Exclusion Thesis
To exclude cases like [5′], one might try to restrict C/M further. But I think that the
pressures against viewing [5′] as a case of metaphysical grounding actually extend much
more generally. In fact, I will defend the opposite view that conceptual and metaphysical
grounding are exclusive:
Grounding Exclusion (GE) Thesis: If an in-virtue-of claim V involves con-
ceptual grounding, then V does not involve metaphysical grounding.
Whereas C/M is most naturally paired with a deflationary approach to metaphysical ground-
ing, GE supports a “cautious” approach: before jumping to conclusions about metaphysical
structure, we should first check whether we can explain the phenomenon in semantic terms.
5.3.3 Preliminary notes
Here are three notes on the arguments for GE that I will present in the next section.
Substantive metaphysical grounding: On the standard view, there are substantive
truths to discover about what metaphysically grounds what. On an alternative deflation-
ary conception, truths about metaphysical grounding are merely conceptual truths (see
23This case falls within the scope of C/M because Chalmers (2012) considers ‘bachelor’, ‘unmarried’,
and ‘male’ to be super-rigid terms (453-454). I note that [5′] will be a counterexample to C/M even on a
deflationary conception of metaphysical grounding — see 5.3.3.
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Chalmers (2012, 458)). In the arguments ahead, I assume a non-deflationary conception
of metaphysical grounding since this is the most common view in the literature. I will
consider the alternative deflationary conception in 5.4.4.
Subject-predicate form: In my arguments, I’ll restrict attention to cases of conceptual
grounding with the form V ≡ ‘x is β in virtue of the fact that x is α’. In such cases, we can
call the property expressed by ‘is β’ a c-grounded property, and we can call the property
expressed by ‘is α’ a c-basic property.24 So, for example, being bald is c-grounded while
having 20 hairs is c-basic (n.b.: one should not read any implications about metaphysical
fundamentality into these terms). This restriction will simplify presentation since I will
only have to consider cases where, intuitively, the focus is on properties. But later, I’ll
explain why the arguments for GE are extendable to other cases.
Heavyweight status: In the arguments ahead, I will appeal to some implicit restric-
tions on how we must view the objects and properties involved in metaphysical grounding
claims. In this note, I will explain these restrictions. Focusing on properties first, consider
the following proposed case of metaphysical grounding:
3. x is roughly spherical in virtue of the fact that x has determinate shape R
We can distinguish four ways of thinking about the property being roughly spherical: elim-
inativism, (class or predicate) nominalism, deflationism, and “heavyweight” views (where
“heavyweight” is a catch-all term for any view not covered in the other categories). I’ll
now explain why the first three of these views are incompatible with viewing [3] as a case
of metaphysical grounding.
(i) Eliminativism: If the property being roughly spherical doesn’t exist, there are no
rough sphericality facts to be related by metaphysical grounding. So eliminativism is in-
compatible with viewing [3] as a case of metaphysical grounding.25
24I note that a property’s status as c-grounded will be relative to the in-virtue-of claim under consideration;
this complication won’t arise in the discussion ahead.
25For discussion, see Schaffer (2009, 356-363)
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(ii) Deflationism: According to deflationary theorists, properties are mere “shadows
of predicates”: there is nothing true of properties other than what is correctly assertible of
them in ordinary language.26 In particular, there is no room for metaphysical theorizing
to discover that a deflationary property is involved in certain metaphysical grounding rela-
tions. But this is in direct conflict with the stated goal of (non-deflationary) metaphysical
grounding theorists, who aim to discover substantive patterns of dependence. For this rea-
son, deflationary properties are incompatible with viewing [3] as a case of metaphysical
grounding (as the relation is standardly conceived).27 (For further discussion, see Schaf-
fer (2009, 360), who also claims that we should reject a deflationary view of the entities
involved in grounding relations.)
(iii) Class or predicate nominalism: Suppose we identify being roughly spherical with
a certain set of individuals {x1, x2, . . . , xn}.28 Then to say that [3] involves metaphysical
grounding is to say that x’s having a certain determinate shape R metaphysically grounds
x’s being a member of the set {x1, x2, . . . , xn}.29 But this seems wrong. It isn’t obvious
what metaphysically explains facts about x’s membership in sets, but it certainly isn’t ex-
plained by the fact that x has a certain shape. Of course, the class nominalist can accept
some instances of metaphysical grounding; my claim is merely that someone who views
the property being roughly spherical as a mere set will not view [3] itself as a case of meta-
physical grounding. Similar remarks apply to other “reductive” versions of nominalism.30
26Says Schiffer (1996, 159): “there’s nothing more to the nature of properties ... than is determined by our
[property-hypostatizing] linguistic practices. What we can learn about them is what our linguistic practices
license us to learn about them.”
27Some deflationists claim that there is a sense in which properties are derivative from our linguistic
practices (see Schiffer (1996, 161)). So one might adopt a view on which deflationary properties are meta-
physically grounded in our linguistic practices. But even if this is correct, the deflationist will still deny that
x’s being roughly spherical is metaphysically grounded by x’s having determinate shape R (which is what is
needed for [3] to involve metaphysical grounding).
28See, e.g., Lewis’ (1983) account of abundant properties.
29Since some nominalists do not countenance facts, we should perhaps view the metaphysical grounding
relata in some other way for present purposes. This technicality does not affect the current point.
30For example, suppose properties reduce to predicates. We wouldn’t say that x’s falling under a certain
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The above discussion suggests that the properties involved in metaphysical grounding
claims must be “heavyweight” entities. I use this label as a catch-all term for any view not
covered above. It is only on a heavyweight conception that it makes sense to try to discover
relations of metaphysical dependence.
Analogous remarks apply to objects. There are eliminativist and deflationist views
of objects, and these views are incompatible with metaphysical grounding for the same
reasons given above. In summary: the properties and objects involved in cases like [3] must
be heavyweight if we are to view such cases as involving metaphysical grounding.31 I’ll
appeal to this result in the arguments that follow.
5.4 Arguments for Grounding Exclusion
Schaffer (2009, 357-358) claims that metaphysics should focus on fundamentality
questions because existence questions are trivial. For example, the following “pleonastic
argument” is said to trivially establish the existence of the property knowing that p:
1*. John knows that p.
2*. John has the property knowing that p. (“pleonastic inference” from 1)
3*. Therefore: the property knowing that p exists. (generalization from 2)
While this style of argument is controversial, I agree with Schaffer that it successfully es-
tablishes the existence of a certain property. But I disagree with Schaffer that the above
argument specifically establishes the existence of a heavyweight property (see Schaffer
(2009, 357-358)). Indeed, the standard view in the literature on properties is that the ex-
istence of heavyweight properties is not trivial.32 So in order to decide whether a given
predicate metaphysically explains the fact that x falls under some other predicate.
31Audi (2012a, 708-709) similarly claims that grounded facts must be something “over and above”
grounding facts. While Audi’s focus is on showing that eliminativism is incompatible with metaphysical
grounding, I’ve argued that deflationism and (class and predicate) nominalism are likewise incompatible.
32See Swoyer (1999) for discussion.
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property is involved in metaphysical grounding relations, further work is required to deter-
mine whether it should be viewed as heavyweight.
As it happens, deflationary theorists have claimed that pleonastic inferences them-
selves tell against a heavyweight view of properties.33 It has been said, for example, that
we can make sense of the trivial inference from (1*) to (2*) if ‘knowing that p’ refers to a
deflationary entity. But how could this inference be trivial if ‘knowing that p’ referred to a
heavyweight entity?
If it is true that pleonastic arguments for an item x support a deflationary view of x,
this might threaten the entire project of metaphysical grounding. This is because pleonas-
tic arguments are available for many types of items in our ontology, and deflationism is
incompatible with metaphysical grounding (see 5.3.3).
But in fact, I think this deflationary argument is too quick. This is because certain
linguistic expressions may themselves carry heavyweight ontological commitments. For
example, it is at least plausible that ‘x has spin 1/2’ is only true if x has a certain heavy-
weight microphysical property. If this is right, then the pleonastic inference from this
sentence does not threaten the heavyweight status of having spin 1/2.
Still: even if we set pleonastic inferences aside, I think that there are specific reasons
for doubting the heavyweight status of c-grounded properties. In the next two sub-sections,
I give two arguments for this claim. The first is a semantic argument: I claim that names
for c-grounded properties do not have the semantic role of referring to heavyweight proper-
ties. The second is more metaphysical: I argue against heavyweight c-grounded properties
directly.
5.4.1 The triviality argument
I’ll illustrate the triviality argument by considering the case of [6′]. I’ll assume that [6′]
involves conceptual grounding, since there is almost certainly a conceptual link between
33See, e.g., Thomasson (2001, 320) and Schiffer (2003, ch. 2).
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the sentence F ≡ ‘x has the property having a mass of 2g’ and the sentence F ′ ≡ ‘x has
the property having a mass’.
6′. x has a mass in virtue of the fact that x has a mass of 2g.
Let’s grant, as is plausible enough, that x’s property having a mass of 2g is heavyweight
(as is required to view [6′] as a case of metaphysical grounding). Does x also instantiate a
heavyweight property having a mass? As explained above, establishing that a heavyweight
property is instantiated is something that requires argument. But here is the puzzle: within
ordinary language, it is trivial to infer that x has the property having a mass from the fact
that x has the property having a mass of 2g.
This raises an epistemic tension for the theorist who would view [6′] as a case of
metaphysical grounding. Given the triviality of the inference from F to F ′, why would
we think that the term ‘having a mass’ even purports to refer to a heavyweight entity?
This semantic role is in direct tension with the epistemology of F ′ (since establishing the
instantiation of a heavyweight property requires substantive argument). We can give all the
arguments for heavyweight determinables we want, but there is no reason to think that a
heavyweight property is what we are actually talking about when we use the term ‘having
a mass’ in ordinary discourse.34
In contrast, suppose having a mass is identified with (say) the set of things falling
under the predicate ‘has a mass’. Then there is no tension: it is trivial in ordinary language
for a subject who knows that x has a mass of 2g to infer that x is a member of the set of
things falling under the predicate ‘has a mass’. Similar remarks apply on a deflationary
view where having a mass is a mere shadow of a predicate. Given their compatibility with
ordinary epistemology, it is most plausible to say that ‘having a mass’ refers to one of these
types of “lightweight” properties. And given the discussion of 5.3.3, this in turn suggests
34Of course, if we had a faculty for intuiting connections between heavyweight properties, this argument
would be unsuccessful. But it is doubtful we have such a faculty; this is why establishing the instantiation of
heavyweight properties is thought to require substantive argument. (Of course, I allow that we can trivially
infer that lightweight properties are instantiated, as I discuss in the next paragraph).
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that [6′] does not involve metaphysical grounding. Of course, the same form of argument
would apply with any other c-grounded property.
Someone might object: “Even if the triviality argument is successful, it merely yields
a conclusion about our concepts. It could still be true that heavyweight c-grounded prop-
erties exist and stand in metaphysical grounding relations.” This objection fails because,
in [6′], the predicate ‘has a mass’ is a predicate from ordinary langauge. Accordingly the
intuitions of priority we associate with [6′] are intuitions tied to the use of this predicate.
So metaphysical grounding is not relevant to accomodating the non-causal explanation in
[6′].
5.4.2 The explanatory work argument
The second argument also challenges the heavyweight status of c-grounded proper-
ties. But the emphasis is different: while the triviality argument focused on the semantics
of property terms, the explanatory work argument focuses on c-grounded properties them-
selves.
As discussed above, establishing the existence of heavyweight properties requires sub-
stantive argument. The typical arguments for positing these properties is that they are
needed to perform important explanatory work. In this section, I’ll argue that heavyweight
c-grounded properties are either unnecessary or unable to perform this explanatory work.
The upshot will be that there are no reasons to posit heavyweight c-grounded properties,
which will in turn support GE.
Of course, it is outside the scope of this chapter to address every argument for positing
heavyweight properties. For this reason, I have tried to select examples that are represen-
tative of the arguments typically given in the literature.
Truthmaking: Heavyweight properties are often posited to serve in accounts of the
truthmakers for our sentences.35 For example, it has been claimed that we need to posit the
35See, e.g., Armstrong (1997).
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property of negative charge in order to explain the truth of sentences like ‘X is negatively
charged’. But whatever the status of this argument in general, heavyweight c-grounded
properties are not needed for truthmaking. Since sentences expressing c-grounded proper-
ties are conceptually entailed by sentences expressing c-basic properties, we only need the
corresponding c-basic properties to account for the truth of our sentences.
Scientific practice: Theorists sometimes argue that heavyweight c-grounded proper-
ties are needed to account for various aspects of scientific practice. For example, Wilson
(2012, 5) notes that determinable properties like being in a low entropy state figure cru-
cially in scientific explanations.36 Scientists explain the final state of a system by noting
that systems naturally proceed from low entropy to high entropy states. Wilson argues that
we can only make sense of this practice if we posit properties like being in a low entropy
state to serve as the “ontological ground” of this explanation.37
While Wilson’s argument may support the existence of the property being in a low
entropy state, it doesn’t support the claim that this property is heavyweight. In fact, there
is reason to think this property can’t be heavyweight. In her argument, the reason Wilson
posits heavyweight determinables is so that they can serve as the denotations of certain
property terms used in scientific theories and explanations. But here’s the problem: within
scientific discourse, ‘being in a low entropy state’ is a c-grounded property term. And
the discussion of 5.4.1 shows that such terms do not have the semantic role of referring
to heavyweight entities. For this reason, the heavyweight property Wilson posits cannot
perform the explanatory work intended for it.
Of course, Wilson’s argument is just one example of a scientific argument for positing
c-grounded properties. But the response given above will be applicable to any argument
36While Wilson’s argument is directed at determinables in general, I have chosen a specific example of
such a property (being in a low entropy state) to make her argument concrete.
37Note that, because the sentence ‘X is in a low entropy state’ is arguably conceptually grounded by
sentences describing the positions of the system’s particles, being in a low entropy state is plausibly a c-
grounded property.
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in which c-grounded properties are posited in order to serve as the denotation of property
terms used in scientific theories and explanations.
Resemblance: Heavyweight properties are often invoked to explain similarity.38 But
even if these arguments are successful in certain cases, we don’t need heavyweight c-
grounded properties to explain resemblance. To illustrate this, I’ll continue with the en-
tropy example from before. Suppose that X and Y are both in a low entropy state. How
do we best explain this similarity between them? One possible explanation is that X and
Y both instantiate some sui generis heavyweight property, and this heavyweight property
explains their similarity. But with conceptual grounding, we have a better explanation.
Conceptual grounding suggests that the similarity in virtue of which we apply the predicate
‘is in a low entropy state’ to both X and Y is a similarity that is “already present” in the
facts described by the more basic sentences (i.e., the facts about the relative positions of
the particles, etc.). In other words, it is because of a similarity in the c-basic properties of
X and Y that we are able to judge to apply ‘is in a low entropy state’ to both X and Y on
the basis of the basic sentences. So we don’t need to appeal to a heavyweight c-grounded
property to explain this similarity.
Causal powers: Suppose Sophie the pigeon is trained to peck at anything red. Now
suppose Sophie pecks at something scarlet. What causes Sophie’s pecking: the instance
of scarlet or the instance of red? The intuitive answer is supposed to be: the instance of
red (since Sophie would have picked at anything red). This suggests that redness, which is
plausibly c-grounded, has causal powers.39 And since it is often thought that heavyweight
properties are needed to serve as the bearers of causal powers40, this may seem to generate
an argument for heavyweight c-grounded properties.
38See Swoyer (1999, 107)
39This argument is from Shoemaker (2001, 78-81).
40See Swoyer (1999, 107).
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The response to this argument should be the same as the response to Wilson’s argu-
ment above. Notice that the Sophie example relies on our ordinary intuitions about the
cause of the pecking in the described case. In other words: when we judge that redness
causes the pecking, we are employing the ordinary expression ‘redness’. But if redness
is a c-grounded property, then term ‘redness’ does not have the semantic role of referring
to a heavyweight entity (see 5.4.1). So even if the Sophie case supports the claim that
c-grounded properties have causal powers, it does not support the claim that c-grounded
properties are heavyweight.41
To sum up: the standard arguments for positing heavyweight properties seem to fail in
the case of c-grounded properties. While the above arguments do not definitively establish
this result, they at least put the burden of proof on the metaphysical grounding theorists
invoking such properties to show that they are heavyweight.
5.4.3 Summary
I have given two arguments suggesting that c-grounded properties are not heavy-
weight. Given the implicit restrictions on properties involved in metaphysical grounding
relations (see 5.3.3), this supports the GE thesis.
For ease of presentation, I’ve focused on in-virtue-of claims with the form ‘x is β in
virtue of the fact that x is α’. But analogous arguments should apply to other cases as
well. For example, Thomasson (2007, 164-165) claims that the sentence ‘There is a chair’
is conceptually entailed by the sentence ‘There are particles arranged chairwise’. If she is
right, then [7] will be a case of conceptual grounding:
7. There is a chair in virtue of the fact that there are particles arranged chair-
wise.
Does [7] also involve metaphysical grounding? Thomasson (2009, 467) appeals to the
41This might seem puzzling: how can we make sense of redness having causal powers if it isn’t heavy-
weight? I suspect the answer is that the causal powers in question are plausibly deflationary causal powers.
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triviality of the above inference to argue that items like chairs have no “real metaphysical
nature” for metaphysics to discover (this is just a version of the triviality argument given
in 5.4.1). But if chairs have no real metaphysical nature to discover, then debates about
whether parts metaphysically ground wholes or wholes metaphysically ground parts are
misguided. So if [7] involves conceptual grounding, then it is not a case of metaphysical
grounding.
5.4.4 Objections
I’ll now consider two ways a theorist might resist GE. It is possible to adopt a defla-
tionary stance where truths about metaphysical grounding are mere conceptual truths (see
Chalmers (2012, 458)). So in arguing for GE, a deflationist may object that I’m trying
to deny conceptual truths. My response to this worry is that I intend to use ‘metaphysical
grounding’ in the standard, non-deflationary way it is used in the literature. Typically, theo-
rists who study metaphysical grounding are not deflationists: their stated goal is to discover
substantive truths about metaphysical dependence.
A second way to resist GE would be to insist that, in fact, it is trivial to establish that
heavyweight c-grounded properties are instantiated. For example, Schaffer (2009, 360)
says: “I take entities [involved in grounding claims] to be full-blown “heavyweight” entries
on the roster of entities, and merely add that their existence is obvious”.
But in response, I want to re-emphasize that there is nothing in the arguments given for
the trivial existence of (say) properties that suggests that these items are heavyweight. The
existence of heavyweight properties isn’t considered trivial in the literature42, and theorists
like Schaffer (2009) have not provided any arguments to the contrary. So anyone who wants
to reject GE has the burden of showing that c-grounded property terms refer to heavyweight
properties instead of deflationary properties, sets, etc.. Similar remarks apply to other items
in our ontology.
42See, e.g., Swoyer (1999).
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5.5 Heuristics
If GE is true, it becomes important to distinguish metaphysical and conceptual ground-
ing. Conflating these relations may lead to mistaken conclusions about metaphysical struc-
ture and mistaken conclusions about the metaphysical grounding relation itself. In this
section, I will consider two heuristics for distinguishing each type of case.
5.5.1 The Scrutability Heuristic
I’ll illustrate the scrutability heuristic by considering the following alleged case of
metaphysical grounding:
8. x knows that p in virtue of facts about the causes, evidence, truth, etc. of x’s
belief that p (Fine 2012a, 53)43
In 5.2.2, I made the following observation: when we are told sufficient information about
a subject’s belief state, we are (across a variety of ordinary cases) able to trivially judge
whether or not that subject has knowledge. With this epistemic result in hand, we can use
inference to the best explanation to support conceptual grounding in the case of [8]. What
explains the fact that we can often trivially judge whether x knows that p when given a
description of x’s belief state? If [8] involves conceptual grounding, we have an elegant
explanation: it is constitutive of competence with the term ‘knows’ that one is disposed to
make these judgments. This motivates the following heuristic:
Scrutability heuristic: Consider a (genuinely explanatory) in-virtue-of claim
V ≡ ‘S1 in virtue of the fact that S2’. If sentences involving the same fam-
ily of vocabulary44 as S1 are trivially inferable from sentences involving the
same family of vocabulary as S2, this is evidence that V involves conceptual
grounding.
43For ease of presentation, I’ve adjusted the form of this example.
44The intuitive distinctions between “families of vocabulary” will directly mirror the distinctions drawn
between domains of facts in the literature on metaphysical grounding.
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So, for example, since ‘knowledge’ sentences are trivially inferable from sentences de-
scribing belief states, the scrutability heuristic suggests that, in fact, [8] involves conceptual
grounding.
It is worth noting that not all trivial inferences suggest conceptual grounding. For
example, ‘2+2=4’ is trivially inferable from ‘John is tall’, but this is only because ‘2+2=4’
is trivial simpliciter. The restriction to “genuinely explanatory” in-virtue-of claims helps to
exclude such cases. More generally, scrutability evidence should be viewed as defeasible;
conceptual grounding may not not provide the best explanation of scrutability in all cases.45
I call this the “scrutability heuristic” because of recent work from Chalmers (2012)
on scrutability theses. A scrutability thesis is a claim that sentences of a certain family of
vocabulary are trivially inferable from sentences of another family of vocabulary: exactly
the type of result relevant to the scrutability heuristic.
5.5.2 The Vagueness Heuristic
I will illustrate the second heuristic by considering the following alleged case of meta-
physical grounding:
3. x is roughly spherical in virtue of the fact that x has determinate shape R
I will argue that the vagueness of the predicate ‘is roughly spherical’ supports the view that,
in fact, [3] involves conceptual grounding.
Suppose that it is indeterminate whether x is roughly spherical when x has particular
shape Ri. On the standard linguistic theory of vagueness, this indeterminacy is attributable
to linguistic imprecision. So to eliminate the indeterminacy, we stipulate whether or not
45One interesting case to consider is ‘∃xFx in virtue of the fact that Fa’. While ‘∃xFx’ is trivially
inferable from ‘Fa’, it is not obvious that conceptual grounding provides the best explanation of scrutability
in this case; for example, some theorists have argued that logical inferences are instead justified by rational
intuitions (see, e.g., Dogramaci (2013)). So this may be a case where the support provided by the scrutability
heuristic is defeated. (On the other hand, we might also say that ‘∃xFx’ and ‘Fa’ involve the same family
of vocabulary, so perhaps the scrutability heuristic doesn’t apply to this case anyway.)
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the predicate ‘is roughly spherical’ applies to shape Ri. But if whether Ri is roughly spher-
ical merely depends on whether we decide to call Ri roughly spherical, this suggests that
‘rough-sphericality’-sentences are conceptually linked to ‘determinate shape’-sentences.
This in turn supports viewing [3] as a case of conceptual grounding, since [3] employs
terms from these two families of vocabulary.
The above argument does not show that all vagueness indicates conceptual grounding.
For example, consider [6] ≡ ‘x is in pain in virtue of the fact that x is in brain state P ’. In
both [6] and [3], we have a claim of the form ‘S1 in virtue of the fact that S2’, with a vague
expression in S1. In both cases, we would precisify S1 by stipulating its truth value in an
indeterminate case meeting description C. What separates [6] and [3] is the vocabulary
employed by C. In [3], C (i.e., ‘x has determinate shape Ri’) employs the same family of
vocabulary that S2 employs. This is why our ability to stipulatively settle S1 in the case
described by C is relevant to whether [3] involves conceptual grounding.
Contrast this with [6]. The normal way to precisify ‘pain’ would not be to stipulate
which specific brain states count as painful. Instead, we would stipulate which specific
phenomenal states count as painful.46 In other words, in case [6], C would employ phe-
nomenal vocabulary: terms that pick out conscious states directly in terms of their intrinsic
phenomenal character. But if this is right, then our ability to stipulate the truth of S2 given
description C has no bearing on whether [6] involves conceptual grounding, since the right
side of [6] doesn’t employ phenomenal vocabulary.
Of course, if we know that subjects in a certain borderline pain state are in brain state
Pi, we could precisify ‘is in pain’ by stipulating that Pi is a case of pain. But this stipulation
is only possible if we possess empirical knowledge about the connections between brain
states and conscious states. For this reason, the possibility of such stipulations doesn’t
suggest conceptual grounding in [6].
46Here, I remain neutral whether physical and phenomenal states are identical. If they are identical, the
present point is that, on the normal way of precisifying ‘is in pain’, we would refer to these states using
phenomenal descriptions, not neuroscientific descriptions.
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The above discussion motivates the following heuristic:
Vagueness heuristic: Consider a (genuinely explanatory) in-virtue-of claim V
≡ ‘S1 in virtue of the fact that S2’. If:
(a) S1 is indeterminate in some situation L due to a vague expression
in S1 and
(b) a subject with no further empirical information could precisify S1
by stipulating its truth when given a description of L that only
employs vocabulary from the same family as in S2, then this is evi-
dence that V involves conceptual grounding.
For example, in [3], S1 is indeterminate in the situation described byC ≡ ‘x has determinate
shapeRi’. Since a subject can simply stipulate thatRi is roughly spherical without needing
any further empirical information, the vagueness heuristic suggests that [3] involves con-
ceptual grounding. In contrast, the vagueness in [6] does not suggest conceptual grounding
because of condition (b).
5.5.3 A test case
I’ll illustrate the heuristics with the following case:
9. x causes y in virtue of facts about the Humean mosaic and laws of nature.47
There have been many attempts to analyze the term ‘cause’. But every proposal seems to
face counterexamples. These failures have led certain philosophers to suggest that we reori-
ent our approach to theorizing about causation. Instead of focusing on the term ‘cause’, we
should instead focus on the causal relation itself, investigating its patterns of metaphysical
dependence. Here is a representative quotation from Schaffer (2007):
I suspect that many philosophers have really been interested in a conceptual
analysis of causation because they thought the issue was of ontological mo-
ment. ... [But the] conceptual order the order of definitions in our minds need
not match the ontological order the order of dependencies in nature. (873)
47Schaffer (2007, 873-874) considers this possible example of metaphysical grounding (although he
doesn’t endorse it).
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But the move from the failure of conceptual analysis to the study of the metaphysical
grounds of causation may be premature. This is because, even if ‘cause’ cannot be given a
definition, there is still strong support for the claim that causal sentences are conceptually
grounded. I will support this claim with the scrutability and vagueness heuristics.
Scrutability heuristic: The very counterexamples that tell against the analyzability of
the term ‘cause’ actually support the claim that ‘cause’ stands in trivial inferential connec-
tions to more basic terms. For example, let E be the sentence ‘Suzie’s throw caused the
bottle to shatter’. Let F be the conjunction of the following sentences:
“Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a bottle. Suzy throws first, or maybe she throws
harder. Her rock arrives first. The bottle shatters. When Billy’s rock gets to
where the bottle used to be, there is nothing there but flying shards of glass.
Without Suzy’s throw, the impact of Billy’s rock on the intact bottle would
have [shattered the bottle]. But, thanks to Suzy’s preempting throw, that impact
never happens.” (Lewis (2004, 82))
It seems that competent speakers can trivially judge that E is true when presented with
F . The same goes for other cases in the literature on causation (e.g., preemption cases,
overdetermination cases, etc.). The entire progress of this literature depended on our ability
to make trivial judgments about what causes what when presented with descriptions of
cases. Taken together, these cases suggest that: when we are told sufficient information
about a situation without using the term ‘cause’, we can often trivially judge whether x
causes y.
What explains our ability to make these trivial judgments? With conceptual ground-
ing, we have an elegant explanation: it is constitutive of competence with the term ‘cause’
that one is disposed to make these judgments. In contrast, with metaphysical grounding,
one must say that speakers intuit a connection between heavyweight facts. Conceptual
grounding seems to provide the much better explanation.
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Vagueness heuristic: There are many cases where we lack firm intuitions about whether
x causes y. For example, let G be the conjunction of the following sentences: ‘Two assas-
sins, Captain and Assistant, are on a mission to kill Victim. Upon spotting Victim, Captain
yells “Fire!”, and Assistant fires. Overhearing the order, Victim ducks and survives un-
scathed.’48 In the case described by G, we lack firm intuitions about P ≡ ‘The captain’s
yelling “Fire!” caused Victim to survive’.
One might think that there is still an objective fact about the truth of P in this case.
But this can be resisted with a thought experiment. Imagine two communities A and B that
agree with us on almost all of our ordinary causal judgments. But, while we are undecided
about P , A-speakers have robust intuitions that P is true while B-speakers have robust
intuitions that P is false. What should we say about the dispute between A-speakers and
B-speakers over P ? It seems most plausible to say that this dispute is merely verbal: A-
speakers and B-speakers simply use the term ‘cause’ in slightly different ways, such that
P is true for A-speakers and false for B-speakers. But if this is right, it suggests that P is
indeterminate on our use of the term ‘cause’. So condition (a) of the vagueness heuristic is
met.
To precisify P , we would simply stipulate its truth given the description G of the case;
no further empirical information would be required. So it is plausible that condition (b)
is also met and that the vagueness heuristic supports viewing [9] as a case of conceptual
grounding.
Summary: Both heuristics suggest that, if [9] involves grounding at all, the ground-
ing in question is conceptual. So metaphysical grounding isn’t the proper methodological
approach for theorizing about causation.
48This example is from Hitchcock (2003, 10), who discusses many similar cases.
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5.5.4 How widespread is conceptual grounding?
It is outside the scope of this chapter to apply the heuristics to further cases. But my
own view is that many other alleged cases of metaphysical grounding are better interpreted
as involving conceptual grounding. Examples I’ve discussed in this chapter include [3], [8],
and [9]. From the original list of examples, I’m inclined to say that [4] and [5] involve con-
ceptual grounding as well. In contrast, the best candidates for metaphysical grounding are
[1], [6], and perhaps [2]. But these examples are controversial and deserve fuller discussion.
5.6 Conclusion: philosophical payoffs
In this chapter, I have argued that metaphysical and conceptual grounding are exclu-
sive and have offered two heuristics to identify which type of grounding is operative in a
given case. I’ll now mention some payoffs of the above discussion.
First, and most importantly, I’ve argued that metaphysical grounding is not the only
way to make sense of non-causal in-virtue-of claims. Deflationist and reductionist views
can equally well account for cases of non-causal explanation by appealing to conceptual
grounding. Of course, as I mentioned before, there is nothing stopping us from using ‘meta-
physical grounding’ as a catch-all term that applies in any case of non-causal explanation.
But to group these views together doesn’t somehow unify them; it merely obscures the
important distinctions between them.49
Second, the above discussion shows that before we ask questions of the form ‘Does
X ground Y ?’, we first need to ask: ‘Is there a semantic link between the expressions
‘X’ and ‘Y ’? In answering this question, we find that many alleged cases of metaphysical
grounding actually involve conceptual grounding.
Finally, the above discussion should be of interest to theorists who are skeptical of
49For related discussion see Wilson (2014), who claims that talk of metaphysical grounding obscures
distinctions between relations like functional realization, the determinate-determinable relation, etc. This
chapter has instead focused on the distinction between metaphysical and conceptual versions of non-causal
explanation.
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metaphysical grounding. One way to object to metaphysical grounding is to challenge pro-
posed examples of it.50 And with the GE thesis, we have a general strategy for challenging
such cases: use the heuristics to show that a given in-virtue-of claim actually involves con-
ceptual grounding. In this chapter, I’ve used these heuristics to challenge several alleged
cases of metaphysical grounding. It has been outside the scope of this chapter to apply these
heuristics to further cases. But my own view is that most proposed cases of metaphysical
grounding are actually cases of conceptual grounding. If this is correct, the heuristics may
help justify skepticism about the notion of metaphysical grounding itself.
50See Hofweber (2009) for an example of this strategy. Raven (2012) defends certain alleged examples of
metaphysical grounding.
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6 EDENIC IDEALISM
6.1 Introduction
In our experience, we seem to be directly acquainted with objects located in a three-
dimensional spatial arena. These objects seem to instantiate primitive, vivid colors and
seem to be perfectly solid. We can call the world of objects presented to us in experience
the world of the manifest image.1
Of course, the world presented in experience does not perfectly align with the external
world: the mind-independent reality that gives rise to those experiences. For example, there
are strong reasons for denying that external objects actually have primitive, vivid colors or
are perfectly solid. Perhaps more surprisingly, there are also reasons to doubt that external
space resembles the space presented to us in experience.
The discrepancies between the manifest world and the external world pose a challenge:
how do these two worlds fit together? One common proposal is to identify these worlds
through a strategy called functional identification. The basic idea of functional identifica-
tion is that, even if the external world does not contain primitive redness, it does contain a
physical property that fills the “redness role”; by identifying redness with this property, we
can preserve the truth of our ordinary color judgments. Similarly, we can identify solidity
with whatever physical property fills the solidity role in order to preserve the truth of our
ordinary solidity judgments.
In this chapter, I will present a series of puzzles for functional identification. The
puzzles are cases where it is very difficult to match the objects and properties presented in
experience with corresponding items in the external world.
1The term “manifest image” is from Sellars (1963b, 6).
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One possible response to these puzzles would be to reject the manifest world as an
illusion or a fiction. A second possible response would be to reject the puzzles’ implicit
assumption that there is a mind-independent external world. But in this chapter, I defend a
middle view edenic idealism on which the external and manifest worlds are both real and
on which each is metaphysically independent of the other. In contrast to many traditional
idealists, the edenic idealist acknowledges the existence of a mind-independent external
world. But in contrast to the realist, she maintains that our ordinary object judgments are
about the manifest world: the world of primitive objects and properties presented to us in
experience.
6.2 Threats to the manifest image
To provide background for the puzzles, I will first review the reasons why the external
world probably does not qualitatively resemble the world presented in experience, starting
with the familiar case of colors.2
6.2.1 Color properties
In ordinary visual experience, we seem to be directly acquainted with simple, intrinsic,
vivid color properties. Following Chalmers (2006, 49-50), we can call these properties
edenic color properties.3 Many of us naively assume that external objects instantiate edenic
colors. But there are powerful arguments against this view.4
2Throughout this chapter, I use the term “presented” because our experience has a presentational phe-
nomenology: we seem to be directly acquainted with objects and their properties. In using this term, I do not
mean to deny the possibility of falsidical experiences.
3This term derives from the following fable: in the Garden of Eden, objects instantiated primitive colors.
But then we ate from the “tree of the knowledge of science” and the “tree of illusion.”
4See Cohen (2009, 65-67) and Maund (2012, section 6.2) for overviews of arguments against edenic (i.e.,
“primitive”) colors. Note that edenic colors should be distinguished from other properties we might identify
with colors, such as dispositional, microphysical, or relational properties. The arguments below only threaten
the claim that external objects instantiate edenic colors; they do not threaten realist views on which colors are
identified with something other than edenic properties.
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Initial doubts are raised by the fact that objects sometimes seem to have different
colors at different times, even though we do not think the object itself has changed. In
addition, we learn from science that our color experience is the result of a long, complex
causal chain. Both these facts suggest that edenic colors may not be the real cause of our
color experiences.
But the strongest reasons to doubt edenic colors are (i) the argument from incompatible
experiences and (ii) the argument from science. As for (i): it seems that subjects could have
incompatible color experiences of the same object without there being reason to think that
anyone is suffering an illusion. For example, suppose roses look red to humans but green
to Martians. There would be no reason to think that either party was mistaken in their
perceptions. One could insist that there is a fact about which color is really instantiated, but
it is more plausible to say that there are no edenic colors at all.5 As for (ii): we know from
physics that different properties cause our color experiences in different circumstances. So,
contrary to how it seems in experience, there is not a single intrinsic property of redness
common to all red things.
6.2.2 Spatial properties
Next consider spatial experience. Just as objects seem to instantiate primitive colors,
so too objects seem to instantiate primitive spatial properties. For example, some objects
appear primitively square-like or primitively spherical. Objects seem to stand in primi-
tive (relative) distance relations. More generally, objects seem to populate a vast three-
dimensional Euclidean spatial arena. We can say that objects appear to have edenic spatial
properties and appear to populate a three-dimensional edenic space.6
The same reasons for skepticism about edenic colors also apply to edenic space. Initial
5In fact, we don’t even need thought experiments. According to Neitz & Jacobs (1986), there are
experimentally-detectable differences between the color experiences of males and females.
6For discussion, see Chalmers (2012, 7.5).
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doubts are raised by spatial illusions and by the recognition that our spatial experience is
the result of a complex causal chain. These facts suggest that edenic spatial properties may
not be the actual cause of our spatial experiences.
And just as with colors, doubts about edenic space are supported by (i) the argument
from incompatible experiences and (ii) the argument from science. As for (i): it seems that
an object could cause incompatible spatial experiences without there being reason to think
that anyone suffers an illusion. For example, suppose objects causing a square experience
for humans systematically cause a 2:1 rectangle experience for Martians. Just as before,
one could insist that there is a fact about which shape is really instantiated, but it seems
more reasonable to say that no edenic spatial properties are instantiated at all.7
As for (ii): edenic space is incompatible with results from fundamental physics.8 For
example, we experience space and time as independent dimensions of reality, each with its
own qualitative nature. But from special relativity, we know that the division of spacetime
into spatial and temporal dimensions depends on the observer’s state of motion. For a
second example: the space presented in our experience seems Euclidean. But we learn
from general relativity that external space has a Riemannian geometry.9 Together, (i) and
(ii) lend support to the following claim: external space probably does not qualitatively
resemble the space presented to us in experience.10
The arguments ahead will not require the reader to accept this last claim; they only
require that it be epistemically possible that external and manifest space diverge. Nonethe-
less, it is useful to mention the actual discrepancy between external and manifest space
7For further discussion of this type of case, see Thompson (2011, 176-181).
8See Thompson (2013, 170) for discussion.
9Some philosophers, such as Ney (2012), think that quantum mechanics also challenges our ordinary
conception of space. But since this point is contested, I’ll not discuss this issue here.
10Note: this claim is very different from the claim that space is not metaphysically fundamental. Recently,
some philosophers of physics (such as Ney (2012, 546)) have discussed the possibility that 3D space is (in
some sense) derivative from the state of an underlying infinite-dimensional configuration space. But this
issue about fundamentality is independent of the issue of whether external space is edenic. To say that edenic
space exists non-fundamentally would be just as wrong as saying that edenic colors exist non-fundamentally.
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because it helps make the possibility of such divergence seem less strange.
6.2.3 Functional identification
Given these threats to the manifest image, what is the status of our ordinary judgments
like ‘The chair is red’? One option would be to conclude that such judgments are simply
false. But few philosophers today adopt this line. This is because, even if the world does not
contain edenic properties, it does contain properties with a similar enough role to uphold
our ordinary judgments. For example, we might functionally identify redness with what-
ever microphysical property normally causes our red experiences. Or we might instead
functionally identify redness with a dispositional property (e.g., the disposition to cause
red experiences in normal human subjects in certain circumstances). Similar proposals are
available for our ordinary judgments about solidity, spatial properties, etc.11
Functional identification has obvious advantages; it offers us a way to uphold our
ordinary object judgments using a standard, compositional semantics. But in section 6.3,
I will raise a series of puzzles for this proposal. The puzzles are cases where it is very
difficult to match the objects and properties from our experience with corresponding items
in the external world.
6.3 The puzzles
Each puzzle will describe a different hypothesis H about what the external world is
like “in itself.” I’ll then ask a simple question: if the external world is like H , what would
our ordinary object terms refer to? To provide an intuitive grip on the form of the puzzles,
consider the following test case:
The Newtonian world: Suppose that the external world WN is a classical,
atomistic Newtonian world. More precisely: there is a 3D edenic spatial
11For example, see Chalmers (2012, ch. 7) for a functionalist view of spatial properties.
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arena12 populated by a set of n particles. Roughly speaking, when these par-
ticles densely populate certain regions, an appropriately located subject has an
experience of an object occupying that region, as in Fig. 6.1:
Figure 6.1: The Newtonian World (WN )
What would our ordinary object terms refer to if the external world turns out to be like
WN? In this particular case, this question doesn’t raise any serious puzzles. For example, it
is natural to say that if a subject with the experience in Fig. 6.1 asserted ‘The cube is white’,
her term ‘the cube’ would refer to a certain system or arrangement of particles populating
the corresponding cube-shaped region in WN .
The puzzles below have the same form as the case just given. But these puzzles are
cases where there is no easy answer to the question of what our object terms refer to. Here
are two final preliminary notes on the puzzles:
Puzzles about language: Throughout this section, the question “What would our ordi-
nary object terms refer to?” should be taken in its ordinary, intuitive sense. In other words,
it is supposed to be a question that any ordinary speaker can answer just by consulting her
intuitions about the cases. In contrast, it isn’t a question about the “metaphysical nature”
of ordinary objects, such as whether they perdure or endure.
12In other words, space in WN is like the space presented to us in experience.
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One might worry about drawing metaphysical conclusions from ordinary intuitions.
But for the present, my goal is not to draw any conclusions about the metaphysics of ordi-
nary objects per se; instead, my goal is to investigate the content of our thought and talk
about ordinary objects.
Epistemic possibilities: For this same reason, we need not assume that the hypotheses
presented below are physically or even metaphysically possible. It is enough to assume that
the hypotheses below are epistemically possible in the very weak sense of not being ruled
out a priori. It is very plausible that epistemic possibilities, in addition to metaphysical
possibilities, are relevant to some component of the content of our linguistic utterances.13
6.3.1 Puzzle 1: the dust world WD
Description of WD: Just like the Newtonian world WN , the dust world WD
has a 3D edenic space. And for every particle in WN , there is a corresponding
particle in WD. But while the spatial positions of the particles in WN evolve in
orderly ways according to the laws of motion, the particles inWD are randomly
distributed throughout space like a giant dust cloud:
Figure 6.2: The dust world (WD)
Despite this random configuration, WD causes “normal” experiences like the
one on the right side of Fig. 6.2. This is because each particle in WD has a
13For example, we can explain the intuitive difference in content between the expressions ‘water’ and
‘H2O’ by noting that these terms refer to different things in certain epistemic possibilities. For example, if
the actual world turned out to be like Twin Earth, ‘water’ would have referred to XYZ (while ‘H2O’ would
still have referred to H2O). For discussion, see Chalmers (2012, E11).
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certain trio of “hidden” properties whose magnitudes directly mirror the spa-
tial positions of the corresponding particle in WN . The magnitudes of these
hidden properties have no bearing on the particles’ movement through external
space, but they have the same role in the physical and psychophysical laws that
external spatial properties have in WN .
Analysis: What does the expression ‘the cube’ refer to if the external world is like
WD? The puzzle is that there is nothing remotely cube-shaped in WD when we consider it
in itself.14 Probably, it is most plausible to say that ‘the cube’ refers to the fusion of those
particles in WD that correspond to particles in WN that constitute a cube. On this proposal,
when speakers use the term ‘the cube’, they will be referring to a fusion of particles that are
widely and randomly distributed through external space (i.e., particles that may be millions
of kilometers apart).
Perhaps this result is palatable, but it is also puzzling. It is commonly thought that
ordinary speakers do not work on an ontological framework on which widely-scattered
particles compose a further object; after all, ordinary speakers explicitly deny the existence
of such items.15 But on the current proposal, it would turn out that ordinary speakers
actually are referring to scattered fusions merely as a result of contingent empirical facts
about the external world. This would suggest that we cannot determine the ontological
commitments of ordinary speakers merely by considering ordinary usage.16
14Since there is also nothing “body-shaped” in WD, one might worry that this example controversially
presupposes the possibility of disembodied experiences. But this is no serious problem. As discussed above,
it is enough for the hypotheses in this section to not be ruled out a priori, and WD plausibly meet this weak
condition.
If any worry remains, we could modify the example so that WD exactly matches WN in the regions cor-
responding to the bodies of conscious subjects and is a giant dust cloud everywhere else. This modification
would require certain adjustments in the physical laws; for example, particles leaving the body-shaped re-
gions would instantaneously move to distant spatial locations, and so on. (Similar remarks will apply to the
examples in 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.)
15For discussion, see Hirsch (2005).
16Of course, on the current proposal, the sentence ‘Widely-scattered fusions do not exist’ might still be
true in ordinary language, since the extension of the predicate ‘is a widely-scattered fusion’ might be different
from what we commonly suppose.
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6.3.2 Puzzle 2: the single particle world WS
Description of WS: The external world WS has a 3D edenic space, but this
time, the only thing relevant to the psychophysical laws is a single particle
instantiating a certain property P. At any time t, P takes a certain real number
rt as its magnitude. rt encodes the entire state of the Newtonian world WN (at
the corresponding time t* in WN ) as follows. We enumerate the magnitudes
of the (assumed to be finite) fundamental properties had by the (assumed to be
finite) particles of WN at time t*. rt is the real obtained by interleaving the
digits of these reals. The psychophysical laws act on P in such a way as to
generate the same experiences as in WN (see Fig. 6.3):17
Figure 6.3: The single particle world (WS)
Analysis: What do our ordinary object terms refer to if the external world is like WS?
The puzzle in this case is that, since our experiences are generated by a single property of a
single particle, it doesn’t seem as if we could be referring to concrete entities of any kind.
Later on, I’ll consider whether there might be some other entities we could be referring to
with terms like ‘the cube’ and so on. But for now, suffice to say that, if the external world
is like WS , there are no obvious candidates to serve as the denotations for our object terms.
17Note that, while only one particle in WS is relevant to the psychophysical laws, we can imagine WS
containing other particles or objects as well. In this way, the example avoids any controversial commitment
to an absolute conception of space.
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6.3.3 Puzzle 3: the frozen world WF
Description of WF : From t=0 minutes to t=5 minutes, the external world WF
is exactly like the Newtonian world WN . At t=5, all physical matter in WF
freezes in place for 5 minutes.18 At t=10, all this matter is instantaneously
relocated so that WF is just like WN at t=10. This cycle continues throughout
the history of WF . But due to certain adjustments in the psychophysical laws,
our conscious experience is always exactly like inWN , even during those times
when the matter inWF is frozen.19 This situation is represented by the cloud in
Fig. 6.4, which moves in WM but remains stationary in WF during the “frozen
intervals”:
Figure 6.4: The frozen world (WF )
18If one is worried that this presupposes a substantival view of time, one can suppose that the objects in
some distant corner of the universe do not freeze in this way.
19Ordinarily, we view the psychophysical laws as a function from physical states (at a time) to phenomenal
states (at that time). But during the frozen intervals in WF , the physical state of WF remains constant while
its phenomenal state changes. So during the frozen intervals, this phenomenal state will be a function of two
variables: (i) the physical state of WF at the beginning of the interval and (ii) the time elapsed since the start
of the interval.
We can represent this formally as follows. Let t0 be a time when WF freezes and let s be the time elapsed
during the frozen interval since t0. Let SF (t) and SN (t) be the physical states of WF and WN at time t, and
let PF (t) and PN (t) be the phenomenal states of WF and WN at time t.
For the phenomenal states of WF and WN to match, PF (t0 + s)) must be identical to PN (t0 + s). Since
the physical laws of WN are deterministic, SN (t0 + s) can be expressed as D(SN (t0), s), where D is a
function mapping the “initial conditions” of WN at t0 to WN ’s physical state after time s. Since SN (t0) is
identical to SF (t0), we can stipulate that PF (t0 + s) is identical to PN (D(SF (t0), s)) in order to ensure that
the phenomenal states of WF and WN match. Note that, as described above, PF (t0 + s)) is a function of (i)
SF (t0) and (ii) s.
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Analysis: What do our ordinary object terms refer to if the external world is like WF ?
Specifically, what would our term ‘the cloud’ refer to if our experiences were like in Fig.
6.4? On the interval from t=0 to t=5, the natural response is that ‘the cloud’ refers to a
cloud-shaped arrangement of particles, just as in the Newtonian world WN . The frozen
intervals are more puzzling. From t=5 to t=10, we would continue to make assertions about
the cloud and its changing properties, but during this interval, WF doesn’t undergo any
change at all.
One possibility would be to identify the temporal parts of the moving cloud in WM
with the corresponding temporal parts of the stationary cloud in WF . On this proposal, we
would need to give an alternative semantic treatment of predicates so that sentences like
‘The cloud is moving to the right’ come out true in the frozen intervals.
Perhaps this is a palatable result. But to make the puzzle sharper, we can modify the
case so that this proposal is unavailable. Suppose we adjust the deterministic physical laws
of WN so that new objects are sometimes spontaneously generated (while making corre-
sponding adjustments to the physical and psychophysical laws of WF as well). During a
frozen interval, we can imagine a subject making the assertion ‘That object just sponta-
neously generated’ on the basis of her visual experience. But such a subject could not be
referring to any concrete item in WF , since the object in question would not exist in WF
until the end of the frozen interval.20
Again, while there may be responses worth considering, it is at least not obvious how
functional identification would work in this case.
20One might try to say that, during the frozen interval, ‘that object’ refers to a future existent in WF (i.e.,
the object created when WF aligns with WN at the end of the interval). But we can rule out this proposal
by supposing that objects in WN sometimes spontaneously annhilate as well, and the object in question
spontaneously annhilates before the end of the frozen interval. In this case, there will be no future existent in
WF to serve as a denotation.
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6.4 Possible responses
There is no need to consider further cases; once you’ve seen the basic form of the
puzzles, it is easy to generate additional examples. In each case, the puzzle arises because
of the tension between the following two claims:
(A) Our experience is such that we would (presumably) justifiedly make asser-
tions about the existence and properties of ordinary objects.
(B) There are no clear candidates in the external world to serve as the denota-
tions for ordinary object terms.
In this section, I will consider some possible responses to the puzzles. While some
are stronger than others, I show that each faces serious problems. I’ll present the edenic
idealist’s solution to the puzzles in section 6.5.
6.4.1 Simple error theory
The simplest response to the puzzles is to say that, in each case, our ordinary object
judgments are simply mistaken. One might think: these cases are just exotic hypotheses
about the external world. If these strange hypotheses were to obtain, then terms like ‘the
chair’ would not refer and our judgments about chairs would be false.
In fact, I don’t think these hypotheses are any more exotic than some of the hypotheses
offered by physicists and philosophers of physics. For example, the single-particle world is
reminiscent of the “world particle” postulated by a certain version of Bohmian mechanics.21
But even putting this issue aside, I think a simple error theory is a difficult position to
maintain.
To see why, consider how ordinary speakers would act if they learned that any of
the above hypotheses accurately described the external world. Suppose the all-knowing,
perfectly-trustworthy Oracle tells us that, in fact, the external world is just like the single-
particle world. We would probably find this surprising. Indeed, upon hearing this result,
21See Ney (2012, 534) for discussion.
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we might react by saying things like ‘Tables and chairs don’t actually exist!’ and ‘We don’t
have bodies after all!’. But this initial shock would pass. And after several minutes, we
would go back to saying things like ‘There are five chairs in the kitchen’ or ‘The bus arrives
soon’ just as we always had.
This thought experiment sharpens the puzzles of section 6.3. It isn’t merely that there
is a tension between the justification of our object judgments and the apparent lack of
objects in the external world. In addition, it seems that our object judgments would continue
to be correctly assertible even after we learned about the apparent lack of objects in the
external world. This motivates the following desideratum for solutions to the puzzles:
(1) Correct assertibility: A response to the puzzles should explain why sen-
tences about objects would continue to be correctly assertible even after sub-
jects learn what WE is like “in itself.”
Unlike a simple error theory, the responses considered below each satisfy this condition.
Before describing these responses, here are two other desiderata for solutions to the puz-
zles:
(2) Compatibility with linguistic evidence: A response to the puzzles should
not conflict with any independent linguistic evidence related to our object dis-
course.
(3) Respect for semantic self-understanding: It is desirable that a response
to the puzzles not radically undermine our self-understanding of the semantic
role of our object discourse.22
I will appeal to these desiderata while assessing the remaining responses.
6.4.2 Paraphrases
On the proposal of 6.4.1, our ordinary object judgments are simply mistaken in the
puzzle cases. But it is also possible to be an eliminativist about objects while granting that
22Of course, our semantic self-understanding is not infallible. But in cases where linguistic evidence does
not conflict with it, it is desirable to respect our semantic self-understanding as much as possible.
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object judgments are correctly assertible. The challenge for such a theorist is to account
for the standards of correctness for object discourse on the supposition that object terms do
not refer.
The eliminativist might try to paraphrase object discourse into sentences that do not
mention objects.23 For example, the eliminativist might use plural quantification to para-
phrase sentences like ‘There is a chair’ as ‘There are particles arranged chair-wise’, thereby
eliminating apparent reference to chairs. But there are two shortcomings with this proposal.
As for desideratum (2): paraphrase accounts seem to conflict with the linguistic evi-
dence. For example, there are object judgments that themselves involve plural quantifica-
tion (e.g., ‘There are some chairs in the kitchen’). But according to Uzquiano (2004), there
is no way to systematically paraphrase such sentences using the device of plural quantifi-
cation. Insofar as it cannot account for this type of object judgment, a paraphrase account
conflicts with the linguistic evidence.
I think a second, more basic worry is that the current proposal seriously undermines
our semantic self-understanding of our object discourse. When we make assertions like
‘The chair is brown’, we clearly intend to refer to something when we use expressions like
‘the chair’. Indeed, ordinary speakers consider ‘the chair’ to be a paradigmatic example of
an expression with a referential semantic role.
The eliminativist might reply: “It would be nice to have a referential semantics, but
the fact remains that no ordinary objects exist in puzzles 1-3. So non-standard semantics
are our only option.” I’ll grant for the sake of argument that we should adopt a paraphrase
semantics if no alternative account can be found. But even so, we should view this proposal
as a solution of last resort.
23See, e.g., van Inwagen (1990, ch. 2). I discuss a second possible strategy, fictionalism, in 6.4.3.
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6.4.3 Fictionalism
In the puzzle cases, we would continue to make assertions about ordinary objects
even though it is difficult to identify referents for our ordinary object terms. One way to
explain this result is fictionalism. As I will use the term in this chapter, fictionalism broadly
encompasses views on which the claims made within a certain area of discourse do not aim
at the literal truth but instead involve fiction, pretense, or non-literal speech.24
I think fictionalism provides a nice solution to the puzzles. But I also think that fic-
tionalism faces independent objections as a semantic treatment of our object discourse. As
for desideratum (2): the standard types of linguistic evidence indicative of non-literal or
fictional discourse are absent from ordinary object discourse. For example, if a speaker
says “She has butterflies in her stomach,” and a child asks “Did she eat the butterflies?”,
the original speaker will immediately explain that her assertion is not literally true.25 Simi-
larly, in all clear cases of non-literal or fictional discourse, a competent speaker will retract
her assertion when prompted. But ordinary speakers have no inclination to retract their
assertions about chairs in response to queries like “Is there really a chair?”. This is one
example of a disanalogy between our object discourse and ordinary cases of non-literal or
fictional discourse.
As for desideratum (3): fictionalism seriously conflicts with our self-conception of the
distinction between fictional and non-fictional discourse. As the terms ‘fictional’ and ‘non-
fictional’ are actually used in our linguistic community, they mark a clear and important
distinction between assertions like ‘Sherlock Holmes lives on Baker Street’ and assertions
like ‘There is a chair’ (when, e.g., one is looking at a chair). So any theory on which all
24To be more precise: this is hermeneutic fictionalism; I will focus on this type of fictionalism because I
think it provides the best response to the puzzles of section 6.3. See Stanley (2001, 36) for discussion.
25This example is from Burgess & Rosen (2005, 532-534).
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ordinary sentences about objects count as fictional fails to respect the distinction as it is ac-
tually used by ordinary speakers.26 Says Hirsch (2005, 90): “distinctions themselves must
be based on a charitable interpretation of what people say. ... If you simply set yourself
the task of interpreting in the most charitable way possible the language of our community,
you cannot avoid the conclusion that the ontological sentences typically accepted by the
community are true in that language, in the strictest and most literal sense.”
While fictionalism deserves much fuller discussion, it is outside the scope of this chap-
ter to consider it in any greater depth. So for now, I will set fictionalism aside.
6.4.4 Deflationism
On the traditional view, we begin with an expression like ‘the chair’ that purports to
refer to a certain entity. The truth of a sentence like S ≡ ‘The chair is brown’ is then ex-
plained by the fact that ‘the chair’ successfully refers and its referent satisfies the predicate
‘is brown’. But deflationists claim that the order of priority should be reversed: what it is
for S to be true just is for it to be correctly assertible within ordinary discourse.27 And what
it is for the term ‘the chair’ to refer just is for this term to have a certain syntactic role in
correctly assertible sentences.
Here’s how a deflationist might diagnose the puzzles from section 6.3. In each case,
the puzzle arose when trying to identify the referents of ordinary terms in the external
world. But the deflationist will say that it is a mistake to “look for” the referent of our
term ‘the chair’. Instead, we should start with the fact that sentences like S are correctly
assertible in the described empirical situations. For this reason, it is trivial that there is chair
and that the expression ‘the chair’ refers to it.
Let’s grant the deflationist the claim that, if ordinary speakers are inclined to assert
26Analogous criticisms apply to versions of fictionalism that view ordinary object assertions as involving
pretense or non-literal discourse.
27See, e.g., Hirsch (2009, 248).
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‘There is a chair’ in a certain empirical situation, then it is trivial that a chair exists. Even
with this assumption, I think deflationism has shortcomings as a response to the puzzles.
This is because deflationism is in tension with the linguistic evidence represented by the
puzzle cases themselves.
When ordinary speakers consider the dust world or the single-particle world, they
immediately judge that these are hypotheses on which there are no tables and chairs. They
do not form this judgment because some clever philosophical argument has drawn them
away from the ordinary use of their terms. Rather, they make these judgments simply by
consulting their ordinary intuitions. It is plausible that competence with ordinary object
terms involves the ability to make intuitive judgments about whether objects exist across
various possible cases. When ordinary speakers judge, e.g., that the single-particle world
contains no objects, it is plausible that they are exercising these conceptual capacities.
So the puzzles are not the result of ignoring the ordinary use of object terms. Instead,
the puzzles arise because of an apparent discrepancy within ordinary use: our intuitive
judgments when we consider the external world in itself do not line up with the judgments
we make on the basis of our experiences. Since this tension arises within ordinary language,
these cases should be just as puzzling for the deflationist. To simply discount our intuitive
judgments about the external world in itself is to ignore an important part of our linguistic
behavior.
6.4.5 Non-standard functional identification
The problem for functional identification is that, in the puzzle cases, it doesn’t seem
as if there are any suitable concrete entities for our ordinary object terms to refer to. In
this section, I’ll consider whether we might identify ordinary objects with abstract items
instead. I will call this strategy “non-standard functional identification.”
I think the most promising and widely-applicable version of this strategy is to identify
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ordinary objects with dispositions. For example, consider the single particle world. Sup-
pose the psychophysical laws are such that the particle would cause experiences presenting
a chair in spatiotemporal region R in suitably-located normal subjects. Then we might say
that ‘the chair’ denotes the following disposition: being an x such that x would cause expe-
riences presenting a chair in spatiotemporal region R in suitably-located normal subjects.
Or perhaps, if we identify the parts of the chair with dispositions, we might identify the
chair with the set of dispositions corresponding to its parts.28
These examples are rough illustrations. But the advantage of the general idea is clear:
dispositions are cheap. For any item x in the manifest ontology, we can simply define a
corresponding disposition that mentions x. I think non-standard functional identification is
perhaps the strongest solution considered so far. But I still think it faces certain difficulties.
For one thing, there are a variety of technical problems to address. For example, the
proposal would need a systematic account of how predicates are reinterpreted when they
apply to ordinary objects. Suppose that ‘This chair is broken and has five parts’ is correctly
assertible. Since the corresponding disposition is not broken and does not have five parts,
these predicates must have different interpretations in this context.
Discussing these technical issues would take us too far afield. So in fairness to the
current proposal, let’s assume that the above problems can be overcome. Still, there is a
more basic concern. As with some of the previous responses, non-standard functional iden-
tification seriously conflicts with our semantic self-understanding of our object discourse.
When we use the expression ‘the chair’, we clearly do not intend to refer to a disposition
(or a set of such dispositions). We mean to refer to items that are concrete, that are located
in space and time, that have colors and shapes, and so on. But dispositions meet few of
these conditions. Indeed, dispositions aren’t even the right ontological category! This is
why, whatever its plausibility in the color case from 6.2.3, functional identification doesn’t
28In some of the puzzles, other functional identifications might be available. But for simplicity, I will
restrict attention to the disposition proposal, since other proposals are not applicable in all cases.
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seem nearly as attractive in the current case.
A proponent of functional identification might reply that, whatever their shortcomings,
dispositions are our best option for solving the puzzles. I’m willing to grant that, if disposi-
tions really are the best option, then we should adopt non-standard functional identification.
But in the next section, I’ll present an attractive alternative.
6.5 Edenic idealism
The puzzles arise because of the tension between the following two statements:
(A) Our experience is such that we would (presumably) justifiedly make asser-
tions about the existence and properties of ordinary objects.
(B) There are no clear candidates in the external world to serve as the denota-
tions for ordinary object terms.
But this tension only arises if we tacitly assume that ordinary object terms purport to
refer to items in the external world. I think the best response to the puzzles is to reject this
assumption by endorsing the following thesis:
Edenic Idealism (EI): Ordinary object terms refer to items in the manifest
world: the edenic world WM presented by our experiences.
For example, suppose you have an experience of an apple. The realist wants to identify
this apple with some item in the external world. But for the edenic idealist, the apple
is a denizen of the edenic world presented by your experience. The situation is depicted
diagrammatically below:
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Figure 6.5: The edenic idealist’s system
As shown in Fig. 6.5, the edenic idealist claims that two worlds are relevant to our
assertions about ordinary objects. WE is what I have been calling the external world. While
I’ve depicted WE as the dust world in Fig. 6.5, this is just for illustration; it could be the
single particle world, or the frozen world, or ... . As for WM : it is a world with a 3D edenic
space populated by edenic objects instantiating edenic properties. The central claim of EI
is that our ordinary object terms refer to items in WM , not WE .
Importantly, WM and WE are not spatially, temporally, or causally related to one an-
other.29 Nor does WE constitute or “metaphysically ground” WM . Instead, WE and WM
should be viewed as two completely distinct possible worlds. But these worlds stand in the
following indirect relation: WM is the edenic world collectively presented by the experi-
ences counterfactually supported by WE .
29Except, perhaps, in a deflationary sense- I discuss this issue in 8.4.8.
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For example, suppose there are 30 people in a room all looking at an apple. Let e1-e30
be the experiences of these subjects at time t. These experiences aren’t completely unre-
lated to each other. On the contrary: taken together, they seem to present a single edenic
object from a variety of different perspectives. Intuitively, WM is the world presented by e1
from perspective p1, presented by e2 from perspective p2, and so on. So WM will contain
an edenic object with the same edenic properties that are presented to the subjects in e1-e30.
Of course, all actual experiences taken together do not collectively present anything close
to an entire world. This is why the experiences counterfactually supported by WE are also
relevant. For example, there is no one in my kitchen right now. But if someone were in
my kitchen, they would have an experience of a toaster. So WM will contain the relevant
toaster-shaped object.
We can summarize the general picture as follows. There is a vast set of possible edenic
worlds. Within this vast set, there is a certain world WM that agrees with the multitude of
possible experiences counterfactually supported by WE (i.e., it contains an edenically red
cube when WE counterfactually supports experiences of a red cube, etc.). According to
EI, this possible world is the one our ordinary object assertions are about. By contrast,
WM is not “metaphysically grounded” by WE or by the experiences WE counterfactually
supports. To avoid any misleading metaphysical overtones with the word “determine”, it is
perhaps best to say that our experiences select WM .30
(One might worry that the possible experiences supported by WE will be insufficient
to select a complete world. For example: what about truths about the insides of stars? One
might also worry about the distinction between illusory and non-illusory experiences. For
example, must the edenic idealist say that sticks become crooked when they are partially-
submerged in water? I think the edenic idealist has the resources to respond to both of these
worries. But in order to get a working picture of EI on the table, I will postpone discussing
30Perhaps better: our experiences select a certain equivalence class of worlds that exactly resemble one
another with respect to objects and their manifest properties, and our object terms are referentially indetermi-
nate over corresponding items in these worlds.
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these issues.31 For now, I will simply assume as a working hypotheses that the actual and
possible experiences supported by WE suffice to select a complete world WM and that the
edenic idealist has some way of respecting the ordinary distinction between illusory and
non-illusory experiences.)
6.5.1 Two worlds
The puzzles of section 6.3 are cases where it is very difficult to identify the objects
and properties presented in experience with corresponding items in the external world. In
the introduction, I mentioned two possible responses to these puzzles. The first response
was to reject the manifest world as an illusion or a fiction. The second response was to
reject the puzzle’s implicit assumption that there is a mind-independent external world.
Many historical proponents of idealism would adopt this second response. For example,
Berkeley (1948, 201-202) would reject the puzzles because he thought the notion of a
mind-independent substance was unintelligible.
Because few contemporary philosophers are idealists, I did not discuss this “idealist
response” in section 6.4.32 That being said, it is useful to mention this response in the cur-
rent context to help situate edenic idealism in the dialectic. Like the traditional idealist, the
edenic idealist responds to discrepancies between WM and WE by rejecting a presupposi-
tion about WE . But whereas the traditional idealist rejects the existence of WE , the edenic
idealist rejects the assumption that ordinary object assertions are about WE . By granting
that object assertions concern WM , the edenic idealist secures the epistemic and semantic
31Briefly: the edenic idealist will appeal to nomologically impossible experiences to determinately settle
truths about the insides of stars. To account for illusions, the edenic idealist will claim that the distinction
between illusions and non-illusions is internal to our ordinary epistemic practices and so is equally available to
the idealist as to the realist (cf. Berkeley (1948, 235)). I discuss these issues in chapters 9 and 8, respectively.
32In contrast, I discussed the view that WM is an illusion or a fiction in 6.4.1 and 6.4.3. The other
proposals of section 6.4 (such as deflationism and non-standard functional identification) can be viewed as
more sophisticated attempts to identify the manifest and external worlds.
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advantages sought by idealists (which I will discuss in 6.5.4). But because she acknowl-
edges the existence of an external world counterfactually supporting our experiences, the
edenic idealist avoids many of the traditional objections facing idealist views.
For example, there is a worry that idealist views cannot explain the coherence between
the experiences of different subjects.33 But the edenic idealist can give the same explana-
tion as the realist: subjects’ experiences are coherent because they are counterfactually
supported by the same mind-independent external world. Similarly, there is a worry that
idealist views cannot respect the truism that the world outstrips our experience of it.34 But
the edenic idealist can grant that WM extends beyond our actual experiences because of
the multitude of possible experiences counterfactually supported by WE . Similarly, one
might worry that idealist views are incompatible with results from fundamental physics.
But the distinction between WE and WM allows the edenic idealist to fully endorse the
deliverances of science. For example, the edenic idealist can say that fundamental physics
describes WE while ordinary object discourse describes WM .35
6.5.2 Which world is actual?
If there are two worlds relevant to EI, which is the actual world? Since philosophers
typically regardWE as actual, I think it may be initially helpful to think ofWE as the actual
world and to think of WM as a merely possible world. On this reading, the main idea of EI
is to locate ordinary objects in a merely possible world.
But I do not think this is the most attractive interpretation of EI. Consider: even if the
Oracle told us that WE is the single-particle world, we would continue to say things like
‘That chair actually exists’. After all, we would still need to distinguish things like tables
from things like unicorns. To acknowledge this aspect of ordinary usage, it is best for the
33Cf. Berkeley (1948, 247).
34Cf. Berkeley (1948, 253-257).
35What about scientific assertions about ordinary objects, such as ‘The table is in a curved space’? There
are a variety of stances the edenic idealist can take towards such assertions; I discuss this issue in chapter 8.
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edenic idealist to say that there are two actual worlds. In almost any ordinary context, the
sentence ‘Tables actually exist’ is true. But if we are in a context involving reflection on the
Oracle’s testimony, there will also be a perfectly good sense in which ‘The single particle
actually exists’ is true. The truth value of such sentences will depend on whether we intend
to make an assertion about WE or about WM .
In 10.4.3, I argue that the edenic idealist will adopt a similar stance to various other
types of ordinary judgments about objects, such as judgments about the self and about
causation.
6.5.3 Unique features of edenic idealism
In this section, I will summarize some of the features of edenic idealism that distin-
guish it from other idealist views. This discussion will also provide a preliminary sketch of
how the edenic idealist avoids certain traditional objects to idealism. I develop the details
of the edenic idealist’s system in chapters 7-10.
-A semantic form of idealism: On edenic idealism, the link between our experiences
and ordinary objects is semantic, not metaphysical. Our experiences do not create or con-
stitute WM ; they merely select a certain possible world as the one relevant to our ordinary
object assertions.36 As a semantic thesis, edenic idealism avoids many of the objections
traditionally lodged against its metaphysical counterparts, such as the subjective idealisms
of Berkeley (1948) or Foster (2008). For example, unlike subjective idealists, the edenic
idealist has no difficulties in acknowledging the truism that ordinary objects are metaphys-
ically independent of our experiences of them.
-Two worlds: EI’s most important feature is the distinction between WE and WM ; as
discussed in 6.5.1, this distinction allows the edenic idealist to avoid worries about the co-
herence between the experiences of different subjects, the ways in which the world outstrips
36While EI is a semantic thesis, it should be contrasted with the “linguistic idealist” views discussed by
Hofweber (forthcoming). A linguistic idealist claims that all truths are in principle representable by human
language. In contrast, edenic idealism concerns the semantic role of ordinary object terms.
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our experiences, etc.
This feature is reminiscent of Kant’s (1998) distinction between the noumenal and
phenomenal worlds, but there are also important differences. One difference concerns the
status of the noumenal world. According the Kant, our knowledge of the noumenal world
is limited to negative truths (e.g., things-in-themselves are not in space and time), analytic
truths, and very general synthetic truths (e.g., some thing-in-itself exists and grounds ap-
pearances).37 In contrast, it is consistent with EI to say that we can have more substantial
knowledge of the external world, such as structural knowledge provided by fundamental
physics. A second difference is that transcendental idealism, like subjective idealism, is a
metaphysical form of idealism rather than a semantic form.
Edenic idealism should also be distinguished from the ontological pluralism of Carnap
(1950). According to ontological pluralists, there are no objective facts about what exists:
we can carve up the world in different ways by adopting different linguistic frameworks.
By contrast, WE and WM are not two ways of carving up a world; they are two distinct
(and incompatible38) worlds.
-Standard referential semantics: Phenomenalists (e.g., Russell (1985)) viewed objects
as logical constructions from sense data. On this view, reference to ordinary objects is
merely apparent; ordinary object sentences are analyzable into sentences that only refer
to sense data. In contrast, EI treats expressions like ‘the chair’ as genuinely referential
expressions. This is a major advantage, since phenomenalism faces the same types of
semantic worries lodged against paraphrase accounts in 6.4.2. (It is also worth emphasizing
that, in contrast to the fictionalist, the edenic idealist views assertions like ‘There is a chair’
as true in the most literal sense.)
37See Chignell (2014, 577-578).
38By “incompatible,” I mean that the truths of WE are not compossible with the truths of WM . For
example, objects in WM have edenic properties but no edenic properties are instantiated in WE .
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-Object-directed experience: The edenic idealist adopts a robust conception of expe-
rience on which our experiences directly present objects. Besides being more phenomeno-
logically adequate than a conception on which experiences involve raw feels, this feature
helps the edenic idealist avoid a famous circularity objection to phenomenalism raised by
Sellars (1963a). I explain this objection and the edenic idealist’s response to it in chapter 9.
Summary: The purpose of this section has been to summarize the unique features of
EI and to sketch how they help the edenic idealist avoid certain traditional objections to
idealism. But to see why we should even care about these details, it is useful to ask: why
would we ever want to accept edenic idealism in the first place? With a basic working grip
of the view on the table, we are now in a position to address this question.
6.5.4 Why accept edenic idealism?
One common reaction to Lewis’s (1986) modal realism is the “incredulous stare.”
One might have the same response to edenic idealism. Indeed, the view’s provocative label
probably encourages this type of reaction.
But I do not consider EI to be a position that is amusing to think about but which
cannot be taken seriously. Nor do I consider EI to be a “theory of last resort”: a theory we
must accept because there are no viable alternatives. On the contrary: I think that, when
we sufficiently appreciate the fact that WE (probably) doesn’t at all resemble the manifest
image (see 6.2.1-6.2.2), we see that EI is by far the most intuitive view of what we are
actually talking about when we use ordinary object terms. It is the common sense position
any ordinary speaker would accept if sufficiently apprised of the empirical facts.39 To show
this, I will consider various features of our ordinary object discourse.
Speakers’ intentions: One factor often thought relevant to reference determination is
the referential intention of the speaker. So what do we intend to refer to when we use terms
like ‘the chair’? We don’t mean to refer to a randomly-scattered dust cloud or a complex of
39Cf. Berkeley’s (1948, 172-173) notorious claim that immaterialism is the position of common sense.
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dispositions. We mean to refer to the kind of thing we are acquainted with in experience:
objects that exist in 3D space, that have certain vivid colors, and so on. Edenic idealism
vindicates this completely: we are referring to exactly the kinds of things we thought we
were referring to all along. Edenic idealism is the view most closely aligned with our
semantic self-understanding of our object discourse.40
Usage: In section 6.4, I discussed some of the challenges of accommodating the truth
values of our ordinary utterances when we adopt eliminativism or non-standard functional
identification. Stepping back, I think that whenever a theorist talks of “accommodating”
ordinary usage, it should raise a red flag. The very idea of “accommodating” or “preserv-
ing” ordinary language seems to suggest that ordinary speakers are actually talking about
something else. But if a theory doesn’t describe what is actually guiding our usage, why
should we care whether it ends up assigning the right truth values to our assertions?
With edenic idealism, there is no need to accommodate anything. Our ordinary object
judgments are made with the items of the manifest world directly in mind, and edenic
idealism says that those items are exactly the things we are talking about. Instead of forcing
our language on a world it was never meant to describe anyway, EI takes our language
completely at face value and says that we are referring to the items that actually guide our
use.
Epistemology: It is often thought that the epistemology of a discourse is a good guide
to determining the referents of its linguistic expressions. Berkeley (1948, 227-230) and
Russell (1985, 160-161) thought the epistemology of ordinary object assertions supported
subjective idealism and phenomenalism, respectively. Ordinary object epistemology also
makes edenic idealism attractive. In ordinary language, it seems trivial to judge ‘There is
an apple’ when one has various kinds of experiences of an apple (visual, tactile, and so on).
With edenic idealism, it is easy to explain the triviality of this inference. WM just is the
40But don’t ordinary speakers intend to refer to items in the external world? Perhaps. But as I will discuss
in 10.4.3, the edenic idealist will say that, in ordinary contexts, the expression ‘the external world’ refers to
WM .
148
world presented by our ordinary experiences, so if we are having ordinary experiences of
an apple, it is trivial that there will be an apple in WM .41
In contrast, for the realist, the truth of assertions about ordinary objects is hostage
to empirical fortune. Perhaps the external world contains suitable items to functionally
identify with the items of the manifest world, or perhaps it does not. Either way, it doesn’t
seem trivial that a functional identification will be available. So there is a worry that realism
undermines the triviality of inferences from experience to ordinary objects. But then why
would we think that ordinary objects terms have the semantic role of referring to items in
the external world?
Of course, there is a large literature attempting to show that ordinary objects assertions
are justified (under the assumption of realism).42 So perhaps the realist can respond to this
epistemic challenge. But suffice to say that one attractive feature of EI is that it provides a
very straightforward way of accommodating the epistemology of ordinary object discourse.
Pragmatics: I think the correct lesson to learn from the Oracle argument in 6.4.1 is
that, in any ordinary context, speakers do not care what the world is like “in itself.” If they
did care, they wouldn’t continue to go on in the same way even after the Oracle’s testimony.
But if this is right, why think ordinary object terms have the semantic role of referring to
items in WE? What ordinary speakers do care about is the world presented in experience,
the world they think of themselves as inhabiting all the time and every day.43 And it is
because we think of ourselves as living in WM that it becomes most plausible to say that
object terms refer to items in WM . This conclusion supports Goodman’s (1978, 20) cryptic
remark that “[the] world, indeed, is the one most often taken as real; for reality in a world,
like realism in a picture, is largely a matter of habit.”
41One caveat: the edenic idealist will allow for the possibility of ordinary illusions (e.g., a stick appearing
crooked when partially submerged in water). I discuss this feature of edenic idealism in chapter 10.
42See, for example, Pryor’s (2000) dogmatism.
43But don’t speakers think of themselves as inhabiting the external world? But as I will discuss in section
10.4.3, the edenic idealist will say that, in ordinary contexts, the expression ‘the external world’ refers to
WM .
149
6.5.5 Summary
I originally motivated edenic idealism as a solution to the puzzles in section 6.3.
Sometimes, philosophers appeal to puzzles in order to support surprising or revisionary
metaphysical conclusions. But this hasn’t been my intention. Instead, my interest in the
puzzles stems from what they reveal about our linguistic practices: they reveal that what
matters to us when talking about ordinary objects is the world presented to us in experience.
In this way, the puzzles of section 6.3 help bring us back to common sense.
Ultimately, the fundamental reason to endorse EI is that it is the most plausible ac-
count of what we are actually talking about in ordinary object discourse. In my estimation,
everything hangs on this one point. Admittedly, EI may not seem intuitive on first glance.
But this is because most of us ordinarily naively assume that the external world resembles
the world presented in experience. Once we appreciate the fact that WE does not resemble
the world of our acquaintance, we realize that we never meant to be talking about WE at
all.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the external world and the manifest world are both
real and that each is metaphysically independent of the other. In claiming that ordinary ob-
ject assertions concern WM , edenic idealism has major epistemic and semantic advantages
over realism: it is the most intuitive view of what ordinary speakers are actually talking
about when they use object terms. But by acknowledging the existence of WE , edenic
idealism avoids many of the traditional objections facing idealist views.
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7 THE DEFERENCE PRINCIPLE
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I defended the following thesis about the semantic role of our
ordinary object terms:
Edenic Idealism (EI): Ordinary object terms refer to items in the manifest
world: the edenic world WM presented by our experiences.
According to EI, the counterfactual experiences supported by WE “select” a certain edenic
worldWM as the world relevant to the truth of our ordinary object judgments. But this brief
characterization raises many questions. For example, which counterfactual experiences
supported by WE are the ones relevant to selecting the manifest world WM? And how
exactly do these experiences determine what is true in WM? To answer these questions,
the edenic idealist will appeal to a guiding precept I call the “Deference Principle”. The
purpose of this chapter is to clarify this principle.1
7.2 The Deference Principle
The following principle describes the edenic idealist’s view on how the actual and
counterfactual experiences supported by WE determine (or “select”) a certain possible
world WM as the one relevant to the truth of our judgments about objects:
Deference Principle: Let Si be a sentence concerning ordinary objects and
their manifest properties. Let si be the set of (contextualized) experiences
ordinary subjects would (ideally) consider relevant to assessing the truth of Si.
Then a (counterfactual) experience e contributes to determining the truth of Si
1This chapter draws from and expands on the material in Smithson (forthcoming).
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just in case e is a member of si. In particular, Si is true just in case ordinary
subjects would (ideally) judge that Si is true when presented with all of the
experiences in si.
Before clarifying the terminology of the Deference Principle itself, it will be useful to
provide an intuitive grip on the principle by considering some examples:
Case 1: S1 ≡ The opposite side of the book is blue.
Which experiences do ordinary subjects consider relevant to assessing the truth of S1?
One set are the visual experiences I would have if I were to rotate or flip the book around.
Another set are the experiences I would have if I were to walk around to the other side of
the book, looking at it from the opposite direction. Another set are the experiences other
subjects would have when looking at the book from the opposite direction. Another set are
the experiences I would have if I were looking into a mirror placed behind the book. All
of these experiences will be members of s1. And this merely scratches the surface: any
competent subject can imagine (and recognize) countless other examples.2
The Deference Principle describes how all of the experiences just described determine
the truth of S1. In particular, the Deference Principle stipulates that S1 is true just in case
ordinary subjects presented with all of the above experiences would judge that S1 is true.
Here is a second example:
Case 2: S2 ≡ There is a chair in room D.
2In general, there is no harm if si including “redundant” experiences (i.e., experiences whose relevance
to Si is screened off by the inclusion of other experiences). Still, there are a few types of experiences that,
for ease of presentation, I will not mention in the discussion ahead. These include: experiences of memories,
experiences involving testimony (either from people, or encyclopedias, or other sources), and experiences
that are only relevant to Si insofar as they support an inductive generalization that subsumes Si. Since these
experiences are plausibly redundant, there will be no need to mention them in the cases ahead.
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Figure 7.1: Hallway example
s2 will include the visual experiences X would have if she were to open door 1, walk
through the hallway, and then open door 2. It will also include the visual experiences X
would have if X were in room D right now. It will include the experience of using a laser-
range finder to image room D, the experience of pushing the apparent chair-shaped object
around the room, and so on. If a subject presented with all of these experiences would
judge that there is a chair in room D, then S2 will be true in WM .
Case 3: S3 ≡ The bicycle is blue.
(Assumption: It is night and nothing is visible.)
Since it is too dark to see the bicycle, s3 will not include ordinary visual experiences
of the bicycle. But s3 will include: the experience we would have if we were to shine
a flashlight on the bicycle, the experience we would have if the Sun were overhead, the
experiences we would have if we scraped some paint off the bicycle and brought it to
a well-lit area, and so on. According to the Deference Principle, S3 is true just in case
ordinary subjects presented with the set of these experiences would judge that S3 is true.
Case 4: S4 ≡ There is a rock on planet L’s surface.
(Assumption: L is outside our lightcone.)
The unique feature of S4 is that it is not nomically possible for us to travel to L to assess
whether there is a heavy rock. But there are still experiences relevant to the truth of S4
in WM , since counterfactual experiences do not require us to travel to L. For example, s4
includes the experiences we would have if we were on L right now and tried to pick up the
rock, if we were on L right now and looked at the rock under a microscope, etc.
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Case 5: S5 ≡ The stick is straight.
(Assumption: The stick is partially submerged in water.)
It is useful to think of this as a case where the experiences in si do not form a mutually
coherent set. s5 will include many experiences that indicate that S5 is true: the tactile
experiences of the stick, the experiences of the stick when it is taken out of water, and so
on. But s5 will also include many experiences that indicate that S5 is false, such as the
visual experiences of the stick when it is halfway submerged in water. So what is the truth
value of S5, given that s5 is not a mutually coherent set?
The answer is built into the Deference Principle: S5 is true just in case ordinary sub-
jects would judge that S5 is true when presented with all of these experiences. In this case,
subjects clearly would judge that the stick is straight. After all, we make this judgment
on the basis of similar evidence in ordinary contexts all the time. So the idealist will say
that S5 is true and that sticks partially submerged in water remain straight.3 Here is a final
example:
Case 6: S6 ≡ X is killer-yellow.4
(Assumption: Killer yellow is a color that kills any human who looks at
it)
Since any human who looks at X dies, s6 will not include ordinary visual experiences of
X . Instead, s6 will include: experiences involving tests of X’s surface reflectance proper-
ties, experiences I would have if my neurophysiology was different such that I could look
3With this example, I’ve gestured at how the idealist should distinguish illusions from non-illusions. Or-
dinary subjects are able to draw this distinction on the basis of the normal types of experiential evidence
available to them. Even if they are unable to make a judgment about veridicality on the basis of their actual
evidence, subjects recognize how further possible evidence would bear on such judgments. But if ordinary
subjects can distinguish illusions from non-illusions, so can the idealist. This is because ordinary epistemol-
ogy is directly built into the Deference Principle: whatever criteria ordinary subjects use to identify illusions,
the idealist uses the same criteria (cf. Berkeley (1948, 235)). I discuss this issue in greater depth in chapter 8.
4For discussion of this example, see Lewis (1999, 344ff).
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at X without dying5, experiences where X is viewed with color-inverting goggles, and
experiences of photographs where the color of X has been adjusted.6
7.3 The Deference Principle and ordinary epistemology
As we see from the above examples, the Deference Principle does not offer an analysis
of which specific types of experiences are included in si. For example, I did not try to give
an exhaustive list of the specific types of experiences relevant to S1. Instead the strategy
is to defer to ordinary epistemology. This feature ensures that the Deference Principle will
not conflict with our ordinary intuitions about cases, and will therefore not be subject to
counterexamples.
This alignment with ordinary intuitions is important because one of the main advan-
tages I have claimed for EI is its compatibility with the epistemology of our object discourse
(see 6.5.4). For the realist, the truth of judgments about ordinary objects is hostage to for-
tune. Perhaps the external world contains suitable items to functionally identify with the
items of the manifest world, or perhaps it does not. Either way, it doesn’t seem trivial that
functional identification will be available. So there is a worry that realism undermines the
5It is important to use the Deference Principle when trying to interpret this and other contexts. For
example, one way to interpret this counterfactual would be to imagine that we are not killed by killer yel-
low because our sensory faculties are completely different from how they actually are. But this would be a
mistake, since ordinary speakers would not consider such experiences relevant to S5. Instead, the counterfac-
tual modification of our sensory faculties would probably have to preserve how we experience other colors,
shapes, etc.
6Since EI is a thesis about ordinary object terms, I have thus far restricted attention to sentences about
ordinary objects. But what about smaller items, such as pollen grains, red blood cells, bacteria, and proteins?
These items are just as much a part of the manifest world as ordinary objects. So the edenic idealist should
say that these items are a part of WM . For example, consider S7 ≡ ‘There is a pollen grain in region T ’.
Applying the Deference Principle, s7 will include, e.g., experiences involving magnifying glasses and various
types of microscopes. Similar remarks will apply for sentences about any other item that can be viewed as
part of the world of the manifest image.
What about microphysical entities: electrons, quarks, gluons, and superstrings? On Sellars’ (1963b, 19)
use of the term, what is distinctive of the scientific image is that it posits entities that are unobservable in
principle. So, unlike pollen grains and bacteria, these items do not count as part of the manifest world. I
discuss how the edenic idealist should view such items in chapter 8.
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triviality of inferences from experience to ordinary objects.7
In contrast, because ordinary epistemology is directly built into the Deference Princi-
ple, it is guaranteed that the edenic idealist will respect ordinary epistemology. Facts about
our epistemic practices help select WM as the specific edenic world relevant to our object
judgments; this ensures that our ordinary epistemic practices are capable of providing us
with knowledge of truths about WM .
There is one further feature of the principle worth emphasizing: with the Deference
Principle, truths about objects are determined by the counterfactual experiences included in
si (as well as, perhaps, facts about our epistemic practices). In contrast, the principle never
invokes truths about an external reality independent of the human minds. In this sense, the
Deference Principle is incompatible with realism.
7.4 Clarificatory notes
In this sub-section, I provide a few clarificatory notes on the Deference Principle.
(i) Contextualized experiences: The experiences relevant to the principle must be con-
textualized — that is, presented to a subject with a description of what types of experiences
they are. Each experience in si should be paired with a description that includes (at min-
imum): (a) the subject in question and (b) a description of the counterfactual situation
relevant to the experience. Without this information, a subject would be unable to interpret
how the experiences in si bear on the truth of Si.8
(iii) The Cosmoscope: There are various ways to explicate the idea of a subject being
7Of course, as I mentioned in 6.5.4, there have been many attempts to show that ordinary objects judg-
ments are justified under the assumption of realism. See, e.g., Vogel (1990), DeRose (1999) and Pryor
(2000).
8When describing the contexts for the experiences in s1-s6, I directly referred to ordinary objects (e.g.,
the book, the bicycle). This may seem puzzling, since the experiences in si are supposed to determine truths
about objects. This worry is closely related to a famous circularity objection to phenomenalism raised by
Sellars (1963a). I discuss how the idealist should respond to this objection in chapter 9.
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“presented with the experiences in si”. One option is to invoke Chalmers’ (2012, 114-
116) notion of a “Cosmoscope”. The Cosmoscope is a hypothetical virtual reality device
that allows a user to select a certain counterfactual experience and which then induces that
experience in the user.9 For example, a user might select: the experience I would have if I
were in position p at time t and were to look towards the book. After appropriate warning,
the Cosmoscope would induce this experience in the user. We can think of the subjects
in the Deference Principle as using a Cosmoscope to learn about all of the counterfactual
experiences relevant to Si.
(iv) Idealizations: The Deference Principle appeals to the experiences ordinary sub-
jects “ideally” consider evidentially relevant to a given judgment Si. To see why this
idealization is needed, consider S3 ≡ ‘The bicycle is blue’. s3 cannot be viewed as the
experiences considered relevant to S3 given our actual evidence; after all, our actual ev-
idence may suggest that the bike is in the closet when, in fact, it is outside. Instead, s3
should include the experiences considered relevant to S3 after a certain process of idealized
evidence-gathering. I describe how the idealist should understand this process in chapter
9.
The Deference Principle also requires an idealization for the judgment about Si that
abstracts away from our contingent cognitive limitations. For example, the idealization
should give subjects the ability to remember an infinite number of experiences, should
allow subjects to entertain thoughts of infinite complexity, and should give subjects com-
petence with any concept it is possible to possess.10
(v) Manifest sentences: The scope of the Deference Principle is restricted to “mani-
fest sentences”: sentences involving the properties directly presented to us in experience.
Examples of such sentences include: ‘X is blue’, ‘X is cube-shaped’, ‘X and Y are twice
9In fact, the Cosmoscope described by Chalmers is more complex. But these additional features will not
be relevant to this chapter.
10For an example of an idealization that would work in the current context, see Chalmers (2012, 63-71).
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as far apart as X and Z’, etc. In contrast, I will not consider “theoretical” sentences such
as ‘X has a charge of 3e’ or sentences involving “higher-level” properties such as: ‘X is a
zebra’, ‘X is loved by John’, and ‘X has a palindromic name’.11
To capture the above restriction, I stipulate that a sentence Si relevant to the Defer-
ence Principle must employ only manifest vocabulary, where manifest vocabulary excludes
theoretical terms and higher-level terms.12 With this restriction in place, the term ‘book’
in S1 should be replaced by the more neutral term ‘book-shaped object’ (although I will
sometimes continue to use higher-level terms like ‘book’ as abbreviations in the discussion
ahead).13
(vi) Type of analysis: The Deference Principle should not be viewed as a conceptual
analysis of statements about ordinary objects. Traditional conceptual analyses must meet
various criteria of adequacy; common criteria include that that the definition be a priori,
that the definition be analytic, and that the terms in the definiendum be semantically prior to
the terms in the definiens. But the Deference Principle does not meet any of these criteria.
Furthermore, one could not use the Deference Principle to teach the meanings of ordinary
object terms to someone who did not already understand them.
Nor should the Deference Principle be viewed as an attempt to give a metaphysical
analysis of ordinary objects. For example, the Deference Principle does not assert that
facts about ordinary objects are constituted by, metaphysically grounded in, made true by,
11Some theorists, such as Siegel (2010), claim that higher-level properties are directly presented in expe-
rience. Whether or not this correct, I am excluding higher-level sentences from the scope of the Deference
Principle.
12In contrast, manifest vocabulary will include (at the very least): predicates expressing edenic properties
(‘is blue’, ‘is square’), singular terms based off edenic properties (‘the cube-shaped object’), indexical terms
(‘I’, ‘this’, ‘now’), and mathematical and logical terms (‘2’, ‘or’).
13I have excluded theoretical and higher-level judgments because it is not clear that subjects will always
be able to know such judgments solely on the basis of si. For example, for X to count as a zebra, X must
have certain genetic properties. But subjects may not be able to judge whether X has these properties solely
on the basis of si. The scope restriction rules out such complications.
I discuss how the edenic idealist should view theoretical truths in chapter 9. As for “higher-level” truths:
these truths plausibly supervene on theoretical and manifest truths (in addition to certain other classes of
truths).
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or reducible to facts about the epistemic practices of ordinary speakers.
Instead, the Deference Principle describes how the counterfactual experiences sup-
ported by WE , in conjunction with facts about our epistemic practices, select a certain
possible edenic worldWM as the one relevant to the truth of our ordinary object judgments.
7.5 Correspondence between truth and judgment
With the Deference Principle, the idealist assumes that truths about ordinary objects
correspond to subjects’ (fully-informed, idealized) judgments about objects. In this sense,
the idealist assumes that judgments about objects are similar to judgments about games.
Suppose we were told all of the relevant details about the rules, aims, history, etc. of a
practice X . Suppose that, on the basis of all of this information, we judge that X is a game.
It is implausible that, nonetheless, X could fail to be a game. For example, when told all
of the details about the rules, aims, history, etc. of chess, we judge that chess is a game. It
is not coherent to suppose that, nonetheless, chess might not really be a game after all. So
we can motivate the following principle:
Deference Principle for Games: Let Gi be a sentence of the form ‘X is a
game’. Gi is true just in case ordinary speakers would (ideally) judge that Gi
is true when given a full description of the rules, aims, history, etc. of the
practice X in question.
Similarly, the idealist’s Deference Principle asserts that, if subjects were presented with all
of the experiences ordinarily considered relevant to assessing Si, and thereby judged that
Si is true, it could not be the case that, nonetheless, Si turns out to be false.
That there is such a correspondence between truth and judgment is the main lesson of
the Oracle thought experiment (see 6.4.1). This thought experiment shows that, when mak-
ing judgments about ordinary objects, we do not care about whatever mind-independent
external reality gives rise to our experiences; instead, we care about the world as it ap-
pears to us. For this reason, we should not expect truths about ordinary objects to outstrip
judgments about objects made on the basis of all of the counterfactual experiences in si.
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Of course, the Deference Principle does not guarantee that all of our actual judgments
about objects are correct. This is for two reasons.
One reason is that ordinary speakers are not fully-informed of all the relevant evidence.
For example, suppose that I have observed a blue bike outside my apartment an hour ago
and on that basis judge ‘There is a blue bike outside my apartment’. This judgment may
be mistaken; perhaps the bike has been moved since then. To account for such cases,
the Deference Principle appeals to subjects who are fully-informed14 of all the evidence
ordinarily considered relevant to assessing the truth of Si. This evidence would include,
e.g., the visual experiences I would have if I were outside my apartment right now: visual
experiences that show my judgment about the bike is mistaken.
Even when assuming full information, we can still imagine truths about objects out-
stripping our actual judgments about them. For example, subjects may make mistaken
judgments due to careless reflection on the evidence. Similarly, the total set of evidence
may be too complex for any human to fully process. This is why the Deference Princi-
ple appeals to an idealization on the cognitive capacities of subjects making the judgments
relevant to the principle, as discussed in note (iv) of section 7.4.15
7.6 Objections
Given the close link between truth and judgment discussed in the last section, one
might worry that the Deference Principle makes truths about ordinary objects too subjec-
tive. In this section, I will consider some objections of this form.
Objection 1: “Why should we suppose that it is the judgments of actual hu-
man subjects that determine the truth of ordinary object judgments? Why not
14While it is fine for present purposes to leave the notion intuitive, I will clarify how to understand this
assumption about “full information” in chapter 9.
15There are further reasons for challenging the alleged correspondence between truth and judgment de-
scribed by the Deference Principle. For example, what about truths about objects in environments where
experiences are not nomically possible? I consider these types of cases, and other challenges to the Defer-
ence Principle, in chapter 9.
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subjects of some other possible community?”16
Response: To respond to this objection, it is useful to reconsider the deference principle
for games. The parallel objection in this case would be: why is it the case that the game
judgments of actual human subjects determine which practices count as games?
The response is that the deference principle for games is a principle about how we use
the term ‘game’, not how some other community uses the term. Similarly, the reason the
edenic idealist’s Deference Principle invokes actual human subjects is because it is a thesis
about how we use ordinary object terms, not some other community.17
Objection 2: “It seems that subjects from other cultures or subjects from dif-
ferent time periods might consider different types of experiences relevant to
assessing the truth of a manifest judgment Si. The Deference Principle implies
that such subjects do not even share our concepts of objects.”
Response: To begin, I note that the Deference Principle does not imply that anytime two
communities disagree on the experiences relevant to assessing Si, those communities pos-
sess different concepts. This is because of the cognitive idealization in the Deference Prin-
ciple (see section 7.4): the experiences included in si are those that subjects would ideally
consider relevant to assessing the truth of Si. For example, speakers in ancient Greece
would not consider flashlights relevant to judgments in dark environments since they would
never have encountered flashlights before. But the cognitive idealization allows subjects to
possess any concept it is possible to possess. And if ancient Greeks knew about flashlights,
they would immediately recognize them as relevant to judgments in dark environments.
Might it be possible for there to be a community who assess evidence in radically
different ways than we do? It is difficult to imagine a human community of this sort.
But perhaps there could be an alien community of this sort; for example, an alien com-
munity whose phenomenology is very different than our own might employ very different
16Cf. Carroll’s (1994, 53) objection to Lewis’ (1973, 73) account of laws of nature.
17Of course, this objection would be a much greater concern if the Deference Principle was an attempt at
either conceptual or metaphysical analysis—see section 7.4.
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epistemic practices than we do. On the assumption that these aliens make different fully-
informed object judgments than we do, the Deference Principle will claim that the two
communities are using terms in different ways. But this is exactly what we should say
about such a case. If two communities have completely different standards for assessing
the truth of a sentence Si, then it is not plausible to interpret a dispute over Si as substantive.
It is much more plausible to say that the aliens are simply employing different terms.
Objection 3: “On the assumption of realism, we have an explanation of why
we follow certain epistemic practices when making judgments about ordinary
objects: we have these practices because they help us form true beliefs about
a mind-independent external world. In contrast, the edenic idealist cannot ex-
plain why we have the epistemic practices we have.”
Response: There are various types of explanations we might give for why we have the epis-
temic practices that we actually have. We might give an evolutionary explanation: these
practices have helped contribute to evolutionary fitness. Or we might give a historical ex-
planation, tracing the origins of these practices. Or we might give a pragmatic explanation:
these practices help us form various types of useful beliefs. All of these types of explana-
tions are just as available to the edenic idealist as they are to the realist.
7.6.1 Is the deference principle dispensable?
In this chapter, I have offered the Deference Principle as a way of precisifying the
relation between WE and WM . But one might wonder whether the edenic idealist really
needs the Deference Principle in order to specify this relation. To respond, I will consider
whether there are any “easier” ways to select WM . In particular, I will consider whether it
is possible to directly read off WM from a description of WE .
For an example of how this “direct strategy” would work, suppose the external world
was like the Newtonian worldWN .18 The psychophysical laws on this epistemic possibility
18See 6.3 for a precise description of WN .
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dictate that, roughly speaking, we experience an object in region J just in case particles
densely populate the corresponding region in WN . So, roughly speaking, an object in
region J will exist in WM just in case particles densely populate the corresponding region
in WN . But then, given this direct link between WN and WM , why should the edenic
idealist bother with the Deference Principle and its attendant complexities?
I am willing to grant that, in certain cases, it may be possible to “read off”WM directly
fromWE . But there are two reasons why this “direct method” cannot and should not replace
the Deference Principle.
First: it will not always be possible to directly read off WM from WE . For one kind
of case, we can consider examples where we are not able to positively conceive what WE
is like “in itself” at all. In such cases, we could not read off WM from WE because we
could not even positively describe WE . For a second kind of case, we can consider ex-
amples where there is no clear link between WE and WM . For example, suppose WE
involves a wave function in an infinite-dimensional configuration space.19 Even given the
psychophysical laws, it seems doubtful that we could read off WM from WE . More likely,
the only way to identify WM would be to consider the various counterfactual experiences
that WE supports, which is just what the Deference Principle recommends.
This last example suggests that, instead of viewing them as rivals, it is better to think
of the direct strategy as a shortcut form of the Deference Principle that is available in
certain simple cases. If the link between WM from WE is simple and uniform, we can use
this uniformity to read off what WM is like. But in more complex cases, there is no other
recourse than to consider the experiences that WE supports themselves.20 (Of course, this
19For discussion, see Ney (2012).
20Here is an example to illustrate this point. Suppose thatWE is a world where objects have edenic colors,
but these colors change drastically as the objects are moved through space. For example, an edenically red
object in region r1 becomes edenically blue in r2, edenically green in r3, and so on. Now further suppose
that the psychophysical laws compensate for these changes in the following way: edenic redness causes red
experiences in r1, edenic blueness causes red experiences in r2, and so on, so that if an object were moved
from r1 to r2 to r3, it would seem to us to be red the entire time. On this scenario, the edenic idealist will say
that an object X’s color remains edenically red as it is moved through these spatial regions.
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talk of “shortcuts” is metaphorical; it isn’t as if the edenic idealist is actually making the
judgments relevant to world selection. The question concerning us is only whether there
might be a simpler way for the edenic idealist to describe the relation between WM and
WE .)
Second: the Deference Principle provides the most “conceptually basic” way of think-
ing about world selection. The guiding idea behind edenic idealism is to link the seman-
tics of ordinary object discourse to the actual epistemology of that discourse. The edenic
idealist accomplishes this by directly building ordinary epistemology into the Deference
Principle. For this reason, any legitimate proposal to read off WM from WE must endorse
the results of this principle. If a proposal conflicts wih the Deference Principle, it should
be rejected as conflicting with our ordinary epistemology.21
7.7 A taxonomy of objections
The purpose of this chapter and the last has been to provide the reader with a work-
ing grip on edenic idealism. I’ve also explained the epistemic and semantic attractions of
such a view. But of course, there are many reasons why idealist views are not popular in
contemporary metaphysics. So far, I have said little about how the edenic idealist might
respond to such objections.
Now, suppose we try to read off X’s color in WM directly from WE . Since the laws vary so widely, we
would have to look directly to the experiences WE supports in r1, r2, etc. in order to determine X’s color.
But this is just what we would do when following the Deference Principle. Because of its complexity, this is
a case where the direct strategy and the Deference Principle collapse together.
21The present discussion is also relevant to the question of what vocabulary should be used to specify
the contexts in si. On the approach that I will defend in 9.3, these contexts employ vocabulary that directly
refer to the items of WM . An alternative approach would be to employ vocabulary that describes WE . For
example, suppose WE is the Newtonian world. Instead of using the context: “the experience I would have if
I were to rotate the book”, we might instead use the description: “the experience I would have if the particles
in WN evolved in such-and-such way”. (Obviously, the description would depend on what WE is like.)
This alternative may be acceptable in certain cases, but it should not replace the “manifest approach”. For
one thing, this alternative will not be available when we cannot conceive what WE is like in itself or when
the link between WE and WM is unclear. Furthermore, the manifest approach ensures that there is a tight
connection between the Deference Principle and our ordinary epistemology. This is because, when speakers
engage in ordinary object discourse, they are working under the manifest image. I will discuss this issue in
9.3.
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Within this dissertation, I have divided objections to idealism into three main groups.
Under each general heading, I mention several specific questions confronting the edenic
idealist.
1. The discrepancy objection: In many cases, we think our experiences do not accu-
rately present the world. The idealist cannot accommodate the discrepancies between the
world and our experience of it.
• How will the edenic idealist account for the distinction between veridical and falsidi-
cal experiences?
• What will the edenic idealist say about cases where different subjects have incom-
patible experiences of a single object?
• Can the edenic idealist account for the ways in which we think that science corrects
our manifest understanding of the world? Is edenic idealist consistent with the deliv-
erances of fundamental physics?
2. The incompleteness objection: Our experience does not present an entire world; at best,
it presents a limited perspective on a small part of a world. The idealist cannot accommo-
date the sense in which the world outstrips our experiences of it.
• How will the edenic idealist account for truths about objects in environments where
human phenomenal experiences are not nomically possible?
• Can the edenic idealist appeal to counterfactual experiences without falling into cir-
cularity or regress?
• Why should we think that WE determinately supports all of the counterfactual expe-
riences needed to settle the truths of manifest sentences in WM?
3. Objections related to subjectivity and ordinary language:
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• The Subjectivity Objection: There is strong reason to think that ordinary objects
would exist even if humans did not exist. By countenancing a close link between
ordinary objects and our experiences of them, the idealist makes ordinary objects too
subjective.
• The Intersubjectivity Objection: The idealist cannot account for the sense in which
different subjects are all part of the same world.
• The Ordinary Language Objection: Idealism conflicts with common sense and the
ordinary use of our language. For example, ordinary subjects would immediately
deny that there are two worlds relevant to the truth of our ordinary object judgments.
• The Battle Cry Objection: Given that they agree on the truth value of most of our
ordinary judgments, there is no substantive disagreement between the idealist and
the realist.
In the next three chapters, I will show that the edenic idealist can respond to each of these
families of objections.
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8 THE DISCREPANCY OBJECTION
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will defend edenic idealism from the following family of objections:
Discrepancy Objection: In many cases, we think that the world does not align
with our phenomenal experiences. The idealist cannot accommodate these dis-
crepancies between the world and our experience of it.
In particular, I will discuss the following three questions in the next three sections:
• How will the edenic idealist account for the distinction between veridical and falsidi-
cal experiences?
• What will the edenic idealist say about cases where different subjects have incom-
patible experiences of a single object?
• Can the edenic idealist account for the ways in which we think that science corrects
our manifest understanding of the world? Is edenic idealist consistent with the deliv-
erances of fundamental physics?
8.2 Cases of illusion
I will begin by considering cases involving illusions, dreams, and improperly-functioning
sensory faculties. For example, suppose a stick is halfway submerged in water. Our visual
experiences present the stick as crooked. Does this mean that sticks inWM become crooked
whenever they are submerged in water? If so, then edenic idealism fails to account for our
ordinary distinction between illusory and non-illusory experiences.
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In this section, I will describe how the edenic idealist should respond to such cases.
The edenic idealist’s general strategy will be to claim that the distinction between illusions
and non-illusions is internal to our ordinary epistemic practices and so is equally available
to the idealist as to the realist.1
8.2.1 Illusions and the deference principle
First, consider ordinary cases of illusion, such as the case of the stick halfway sub-
merged in water. To respond to such cases, the edenic idealist will appeal to the Deference
Principle (see chapter 7):
Deference Principle: Let Si be a sentence concerning ordinary objects and
their manifest properties. Let si be the set of (contextualized) experiences
ordinary subjects would (ideally) consider relevant to assessing the truth of Si.
Then a (possible) experience e contributes to determining the truth of Si just in
case e is a member of si. In particular, Si is true just in case ordinary subjects
would (ideally) judge that Si is true when presented with all of the experiences
in si.
It is useful to think of cases of illusion as examples where the (contextualized2) experiences
in si do not form a mutually coherent set. For example, in chapter 7 I considered the
sentence S5 ≡ ‘The stick is straight’. s5 will include many experiences that suggest that
S5 is true: the tactile experiences of the stick, the experiences of the stick when it is taken
out of water, and so on. But s5 will also include many experiences that present S5 as false,
such as the visual experiences of the stick when it is halfway submerged in water. So what
is the truth value of S5 in WM , given that s5 is not a mutually coherent set?
The answer is built into the Deference Principle: S5 is true inWM just in case ordinary
subjects would judge that S7 is true when presented with all of the above experiences. In
1Cf. Berkeley (1948, 235).
2As discussed in 7.4, a contextualized experience is an experience paired with a description that includes,
at minimum: (a) the subject in question and (b) a description of the counterfactual situation relevant to the
experience. I will drop the adjective “contextualized” for the remainder of this chapter.
168
this case, ordinary subjects presented with all of the tactile and visual experiences described
above clearly would judge that the stick is straight. After all, we make this judgment on
the basis of similar types of experiences in ordinary contexts all the time. So WM will
be a world where the stick remains straight when submerged in water. Speaking more
generally: the edenic idealist takes our ordinary judgments as the guide for deciding which
experiences in si should be discarded as irrelevant to the selection of WM .3
For a second example, consider S8 ≡ ‘In the image of Fig. 8.2, square B is a lighter
shade than square A’4:
Figure 8.1: The checker-shadow illusion
Our visual experience of the left copy of the image suggests that S8 is true. But our
visual experience of the right copy of the image — where grey columns have been added
— suggests that A and B are the same color. Both of these (contextualized) experiences
are members of s8 (along with countless other experiences). If presented with these expe-
riences, ordinary subjects would judge that S8 is false. After all, this is the judgment we
actually make when presented with the copies of the image in Fig. 8.2. So the squares in
the image will be the same shade in WM .5
3I note that Berkeley (1948, 235) offers a similar strategy for distinguishing illusions from non-illusions.
4Image copyright owned by Adelson (1995). Used with permission
5“But what if the experiences that suggest S8 is false turn out to be misleading as well?” Then there will
be further experiences within s8 that reveal this to be the case; this is because s8 is stipulated to include all
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The edenic idealist will give a similar response to cases involving improperly-functioning
sensory faculties. Suppose that one’s occurrent visual experience E1 is of a tiger in the
kitchen. Does this mean that S9 ≡ ‘There is a tiger in the kitchen’ is true? Or is the experi-
ence instead a hallucination? With just this information, we cannot yet say; this is because
the truth of S9 is determined by the set of all experiences ordinary subjects consider rel-
evant to assessing its truth. For example, s9 will include the visual experiences of other
subjects in the kitchen. If these experiences failed to present a tiger, this would suggest
that S9 is false (and that E1 is a hallucination). Similar remarks apply to cases involving
dreaming.6
8.2.2 The ordinary epistemology of veridicality judgments
Ordinary subjects know how to distinguish illlusions from non-illusions, dreams from
non-dreams, and so on. And they are able to draw these distinctions on the basis of the
ordinary types of experiential evidence available to them. Even if they are unable to make
a judgment about veridicality on the basis of their actual evidence, subjects recognize how
further possible evidence would bear on such judgments. In this sense, the ability to distin-
guish between illusory and non-illusory experiences is part of the ordinary epistemology
of our object discourse.
But if ordinary subjects can distinguish illusory and non-illusory experiences, so can
the edenic idealist. This is because ordinary epistemology is directly built into the Defer-
ence Principle: whatever criteria ordinary subjects use to distinguish veridical experiences,
the edenic idealist appeals to the exact same criteria. This close link to ordinary episte-
mology reinforces one of the main semantic advantages of EI. In 6.5, I claimed that EI
experiences that ordinary subjects would consider relevant to the truth of S5 (I discuss this issue further in
9.5.1). What about illusions that are in principle impossible to detect? I consider this possibility in 8.2.3.
6It is plausible that there are purely phenomenological means of distinguishing dreams from non-dreams
(see, e.g., Noe¨ (2004, 213)). If so, it will be very simple for the edenic idealist to distinguish dreams from
non-dreams using the Deference Principle.
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best accounts the epistemology of our object discourse. Because of her reliance on the
Deference Principle, the edenic idealist also respects the epistemology of judgments about
illusions.
8.2.3 Indetectable illusions?
Realists — that is, theorists who believe that ordinary objects are denizens of the exter-
nal worldWE — typically accept the possibility of illusions that are in principle impossible
to detect. For example, consider a Cartesian demon scenario. According to typical realists,
this is a scenario where all ordinary experiences — both actual and counterfactual — are
just as we take them to be, but truths about objects are radically different.7
In contrast, the Deference Principle rules out the possibility of (in principle) inde-
tectable illusions. If subjects presented with all of the ordinary experiences in si would
judge that Si is true, it is not possible that, nonetheless, Si is false. Similarly, the ide-
alist will deny that it is possible that we are always dreaming. On these points, EI may
seem to be at odds with common sense. But in fact, I think the rejection of (in principle)
indetectable illusions is a point in favor of idealism.
This can be seen by reconsidering the Oracle thought experiment.8 Suppose that the
Oracle provides a description of WE that — by the typical realist’s lights — describes
a possibility in which all of our experiences are illusory. For example, perhaps WE is
an evil demon scenario. Upon hearing this testimony, we might initially react by saying
things like: “My experiences have always been illusions!” But this shock would pass. And
after several minutes, we would revert to saying things like: ‘I thought the two squares
in Fig. 8.2 were different colors, but now I realize that it was just an illusion’ and ‘The
7 Of course, certain types of “non-standard” realists deny the coherence of this particular skeptical sce-
nario (see Putnam (1981) for discussion). Nonetheless, in Smithson (forthcoming, 3.6), I argue that even
non-standard realists will accept certain cases of indetectable illusions. So the discussion of this section
should apply to most forms of realism.
8See 6.4.1 for the Oracle argument originally used to motivate EI.
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stick appears crooked, but really it is straight’. In other words, we would soon return to
classifying experiences as illusory and non-illusory just as we always had.
Just as with the original Oracle thought experiment, there are a variety of ways the
realist might try to account for this behavior. For example, the realist might try to para-
phrase our discourse about illusions, or she might say that such discourse involves fiction,
pretense, or non-literal speech. It is outside the scope of this chapter to carefully assess
these proposals. But I suspect that such proposals will encounter the same shortcomings
that arose for analogous proposals about our ordinary object discourse in general.9
In contrast, the idealist will explain this behavior by saying that the distinction between
veridical and falsidical experiences does not ultimately hinge on facts about whatever mind-
independent external reality gives rise to our experiences. Our reaction to the Oracle’s
testimony shows that, in fact, this is a distinction that subjects are (in principle) able to
make on the basis of the types of experiential evidence that are ordinarily available to
them. Stepping back, perhaps this is not surprising; a distinction on which every experience
counts as falsidical would be of little use to us.
By rejecting the possibility that we are always suffering an illusion or always dream-
ing, the edenic idealist respects the distinction between illusory and non-illusory experi-
ences (or between dreaming and waking experiences) as it is actually drawn by ordinary
subjects.10 By contrast, because she claims that the veridicality of an hinges on facts in
some external reality to which we do not have direct epistemic access, the realist fails to
draw this distinction in the ordinary way.
9I discuss the problems with these proposals in the ordinary object case in 6.4.
10It should be said, however, that the edenic idealist can acknowledge the possibility of illusions that are
not technologically or even nomically possible to detect. I discuss this issue in 9.2.
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8.3 Cases of incompatible experiences
Illusions can be seen as cases where there are discrepancies between the world and
certain specific experiences we have. But there are also reasons for thinking that there are
discrepancies between the world and our experiences in general. Our experiences seem
to present a world of edenic objects instantiating edenic properties. But many theorists
believe that this “manifest image” of the world does not survive critical scrutiny.11
In effect, the edenic idealist claims that we should return to the manifest image; she
claims that ordinary objects really do have the primitive properties they seem to have in
experience. If this view is to be defended, the edenic idealist must respond to the consider-
ations that have persuaded theorists to abandon the manifest image in the first place. If this
is not possible, the edenic idealist will be jumping from the frying pan into the fire.
In 6.2, I identified two major threats to our manifest conception of objects: (i) the
argument from incompatible experiences and (ii) arguments from science. I will consider
(i) in this section and (ii) in section 8.4.
8.3.1 Splitting the world
As discussed in 6.2.1, there are cases where subjects have incompatible experiences
of the same object without there being reason to think that anyone is suffering an illusion.
For example, Neitz & Jacobs (1986) provide evidence that the color properties presented
in the visual experiences of female subjects are slightly different from the color properties
presented in the color experiences of male subjects. Since there is no reason to think that
either group of subjects are systematically suffering color illusions, a natural conclusion is
that ordinary objects do not instantiate edenic colors at all.
Cases of incompatible experiences threaten our manifest conception of ordinary ob-
jects, and thereby threaten the identification of objects with items in WM . But in this
11For discussion, see 6.2.1-6.2.2.
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section, I will show that the edenic idealist has resources to respond to such cases that are
unavailable to the realist.
Just as with illusions, it is useful to think of cases of incompatible experiences as
examples where the experiences in si do not form a mutually coherent set. For example,
consider S10 ≡ ‘The cube is green’. Let’s suppose that there are two communities B and
C such that subjects in B and C experience the cube as edenically green and edenically
red, respectively. Assuming that s10 includes the red experiences as well as the green
experiences12, what color is the cube in WM?
One response would be to follow the realist and say that there are no edenic colors
in WM . But this would be a disappointing concession; in moving away from the manifest
image, the edenic idealist would be giving up some of the semantic advantages that made
EI attractive in the first place.
I think a better response is to distinguish the judgments of S10 made by B-subjects
from those made by C-subjects. The edenic idealist can then say that B-experiences are
only relevant to B-judgments and that C-experiences are only relevant to C-judgments.13
Intuitively, this has the effect of “splitting the world”: B-subjects will refer to an edenically
green item in a certain world WBM , while C-subjects will refer to an edenically red item in
a certain world WCM . Note that this strategy is unavailable to the realist, since the realist
believes that our ordinary object terms refer to items in an external world that is common
to all subjects.
Because there is an isomorphism between the items of WBM and W
C
M , the current pro-
posal does not threaten intersubjective communication. The edenic idealist might say that
the cubes in WBM and W
C
M are (trans-world) identical, or she might say that they stand in a
counterpart relation. Either way, she will agree with the realist about the truth of ordinary
12For simplicity, I will assume that s10 only includes experiences of subjects in B and C.
13On this proposal, the edenic idealist is rejecting the earlier assumption that s10 includes both red and
green experiences.
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claims like ‘B-subjects and C-subjects are referring to the same cube’.
One might still worry that the distinction between WBM and W
C
M is itself at odds with
common sense. In response, the edenic idealist will say that our belief that B-judgments
and C-judgments are about numerically-identical worlds — call it Ψ — is closely linked to
our ordinary belief in realism. Once we recognize the problems with realism, Ψ itself no
longer seems compelling. The edenic idealist will view Ψ as a mistaken theoretical belief
about the semantics of our ordinary object terms.
The above discussion focused on a case of intersubjective disagreement involving col-
ors. But analogous remarks would apply in other cases as well. If B-subjects experience a
square in circumstances where C-subjects experience a 2:1 rectangle, then WBM will con-
tain an edenic square while WCM will contain an edenic rectangle. As long as there is an
appropriate mapping between B-experiences and C-experiences, there will be no barrier to
intersubjective communication.14
8.4 Scientific cases
The second major threat to the manifest image are arguments from science: arguments
that the image of the world we obtain from our ordinary experiences is in conflict with
scientific results.15 Since WM is supposed to agree with the manifest image, the edenic
idealist must give responses to these arguments. In this section, I will discuss results from
relativity theory, results from quantum theory, and results pertaining to scientific ontology.
14Of course, if no such mapping was available, there would indeed be barriers to intersubjective commu-
nication. For example, suppose that (somehow) B-subjects experience an object in the shape of a toy jack
in circumstances in which C-subjects experience a sphere. In this case, B-subjects and C-subjects will have
trouble communicating; after all, there are no items in WCM that correspond to the different jack legs in W
B
M .
But this is exactly what we should expect in cases without such a mapping anyway.
15For discussion, see 6.2.1-6.2.2.
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8.4.1 Special and general relativity
As discussed in 6.2.2, the central way in which special and generality relativity threaten
the manifest image is by challenging our intuitive conception of space.16 But I’ll now ar-
gue that, by distinguishing WE and WM , the edenic idealist has the resources to resist this
threat.
The edenic idealist can agree with the realist that various phenomena are best ex-
plained by saying that WE has a non-Euclidean spacetime.17 For example, the trajectory
of light in a vacuum is independent of the physical state of its source. The edenic ide-
alist can agree that this phenomenon can be explained (in part) by positing that, in small
enough regions, the geometry of WE’s spacetime is approximately Minkowskian. But
the edenic idealist disagrees with the realist about the relevance of this result for ordinary
object discourse. Since the edenic idealist’s ordinary objects are in WM , she can accept
these facts about WE’s spacetime while still maintaining that ordinary objects are in a
three-dimensional edenic space.18 Similar remarks apply to other ways in which relativity
challenges our manifest conception of space.19
Of course, this type of response raises an important question: if the results of relativity
do not apply to ordinary objects, what kinds of entities do they apply to? The same question
arises for quantum mechanics, so I will briefly postpone discussing this issue.
16See Maudlin (2012, chs. 4, 6) for relevant discussion.
17This is a rough first pass; in sections 8.4.4-8.4.7, it will be seen that there are a variety of stances
the edenic idealist can take towards the results of fundamental physics. But this won’t affect the present
discussion.
18Does this mean that judgments like ‘The table is in a curved space’, made in a scientific context, are
false? I will discuss this issue in 8.4.6-8.4.8.
19There is a second, indirect way in which relativity may seem to threaten EI. Suppose that, due to their
different inertial trajectories, subjectsA andB experience a rod as having different lengths. One might worry
that there will be no fact of the matter about the length of the rod in WM . But this is just an example of the
phenomenon of intersubjective disagreement discussed in section 8.3.
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8.4.2 Quantum mechanics
Many of the phenomena associated with quantum mechanics (e.g., single particle in-
terference, quantum tunneling) are unusual. But these phenomena are no threat to the
manifest image in and of themselves. For one thing, these phenomena almost always in-
volve microphysical entities, which are not a part of the manifest image anyway. But even
in their macroscopic forms, these phenomena present no threat. For example, Couder &
Fort (2006) have shown that vibrating macroscopic silica droplets exhibit single-particle in-
terference patterns, just as electrons do.20 While this behavior is unusual, our experiences
present these droplets as moving around in edenic space just like any other macroscopic
object.
But one major way in which quantum mechanics threatens the manifest image is by its
countenancing wavelike physical states. In classical physics, the state of a particle can be
expressed by giving determinate values for each of its properties. For example, the position
of a classical particle can be expressed as a single real number. But in quantum mechanics,
the position of a particle must instead be expressed as an infinite-dimensional vector with
a different magnitude for each possible location. One can think of a quantum position state
as a superposition of the basic position states from classical physics. Similar remarks apply
for systems of particles; in general, the state of a system is a superposition of the states of
its component particles.
We can represent the position state of a quantum system as a function from location
to amplitude: the wave function. The wave function evolves across time in accordance
with a differential equation called the Schro¨dinger Equation. One important feature of the
Schro¨dinger Equation is that states that begin as a superposition of states in a limited range
generally evolve into superpositions of states across a much larger range.
20The droplets also exhibit features like tunneling and quantized orbits (see Fort et al. (2010) and Eddi
et al. (2009), respectively). These features are not explained by any distinctly quantum effects; instead, they
result from the dynamics of the droplet interacting with the “pilot wave” it generates when bouncing on silica
gel.
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We are now in a position to describe how quantum mechanics threatens the manifest
image; for simplicity, I will illustrate the tension with an example involving position. If
we think of an ordinary object as constituted by a system of particles, then the Schro¨dinger
Equation predicts that the position state of any object will soon evolve into a superposition
of states across a wide spatial area. But there are two senses in which this does not square
with the manifest image. First, we never observe objects in massively superposed position
states. The second, more basic challenge is an intelligibility worry: it is not clear what it
would mean to experience objects in a superposed position state. (We might imagine them
as a “cloud” spread out in space. But of course, this is merely imagining a cloud with a
non-superposed position state.21)
The above considerations pressure the realist to say that objects must be very different
from how we experience them. But, just as before, EI has the flexibility to avoid this result.
The edenic idealist can agree that various quantum phenomena are best explained by saying
that items inWE have wavelike position states.22 But since ordinary objects live inWM , the
edenic idealist can maintain that tables and chairs do not have wavelike position states23;
instead, they will (typically) have non-superposed position states within the edenic space
of WM .24 (Just as before, this raises the question of what kinds of entities quantum physics
describes, if it does not describe ordinary objects. I will address this issue in 8.4.4.)
In the literature, there are other alleged threats to the manifest image from quantum
21See Wallace (2003, 88) for relevant discussion.
22Just as in footnote 17, this is a rough first pass; in fact, there are various stances the edenic idealist
can take towards the results of quantum mechanics (see 8.4.4-8.4.7 for discussion). But this won’t affect the
present discussion.
23Does this mean that judgments like ‘The cat is in a superposed position state’, made in scientific con-
texts, are false? I will discuss this issue in 8.4.6-8.4.8.
24I’ve introduced the qualifier “typically” because the edenic idealist need not say that any given judgment
S ≡ ‘x is in position p’ will have a determinate truth value. This is because there may be cases where WE
does not determinately support experiences that settle the truth of certain manifest judgments. In general,
such cases need not have anything to do with quantum mechanics. I discuss such cases in 9.4.
178
mechanics.25 But in each case, such threats presuppose that ordinary objects are items in
WE . For ease of presentation, I will consider just one more example from Ney (2012,
538-549). According to Ney, there is no way to functionally identify the three-dimensional
space presented to us in experience with anything in the world described by quantum me-
chanics. Because of this failure, she concludes that ordinary three-dimensional space does
not exist.26
Insofar as she endorses the claim that objects are located in three-dimensional space,
the edenic idealist must resist Ney’s argument. To respond, the edenic idealist will say
that Ney’s argument relies on a mistaken presupposition about the semantic roles of our
spatial terms. Ney assumes that, when we talk about space in ordinary life, we are referring
to something in WE . But this assumption is challenged by reflection on our linguistic
behavior. Consider: even if we found Ney’s arguments completely convincing, we would
continue to make spatial judgments like ‘The chair is two feet to the right of the table’ and
‘The book is closer to the apple than to the cat’ in ordinary contexts. In other words: our
spatial judgments would continue to be correctly assertible even if we were persuaded by
Ney’s argument that there is no three-dimensional space in the world described by quantum
mechanics.
But just as it is difficult to be an eliminativist about tables while granting that sentences
like ‘The table is brown’ are correctly assertible27, so too it is difficult to be an eliminativist
25For example: Ladyman & Ross (2007, ch. 3) claims that quantum mechanics undermines the basic idea
there are self-subsisting, space-filling entities like those presented in experience. Wallace (2003, 99) thinks
that quantum mechanics motivates an exotic view of ordinary objects where these items are identified with
“patterns in the properties of the quantum state.” Horgan & Potr (2000) claim that quantum mechanics shows
that ordinary objects do not exist at all.
26Ney’s argument requires wave function realism: the view that the wave function is a concretely existing
entity living in a concrete infinite-dimensional configuration space. Ney begins by noting that our ordinary
spatial dimensions cannot be identified with any of the dimensions of this configuration space (538-540). She
then argues, contra Albert & Loewer (1996), that three-dimensional space is not functionally enacted through
the behavior of the wavefunction in configuration space (545-549).
27See 6.4.1.
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about space while granting that our spatial judgments are correctly assertible. The elimi-
nativist might try to paraphrase away spatial discourse or might endorse fictionalism about
such discourse, but it is likely that these proposals will face the same types of problems
raised in 6.4.2-6.4.3. A much better explanation of our linguistic behavior is that our spa-
tial judgments describeWM , notWE . Just as in previous examples, the distinction between
WE and WM allows the edenic idealist to resist threats to the manifest image.
8.4.3 More semantic support for EI (and a critique of scientism)
As seen in 8.4.1 and 8.4.2, the edenic idealist resists scientific threats to the manifest
image by claiming that ordinary objects are not part of the world described by fundamental
physics. While this claim may initially seem difficult to accept, I think isolating ordinary
object discourse from fundamental physics is actually a major advantage of edenic ideal-
ism. To show this, I will consider several aspects of our ordinary object discourse. The
features below are the same features I discuss in 6.5 to provide the original motivation for
EI.28
Usage: Because the world described by fundamental physics is so different from the
manifest image, theorists have developed elaborate theories to accommodate the truth of
ordinary object judgments. For example, Wallace (2003, 99) identifies ordinary objects
with patterns in the properties of the quantum state. For a second example, Wilson (2011,
373-374) identifies objects with fusions of ordered pairs 〈b, a〉, where b is a branch of the
Everettian multiverse and a is a pointlike part of that branch. But such theories clearly
have little connection to what actually guides our use of ordinary object terms. So why
should we care whether these theories can be made to assign the right truth values to our
judgments? Even if these theories make the correct truth value assignments, they seem to
28In chapter 6, I defended the view that ordinary object terms do not refer to items in WE . Here, I
am defending a different claim: that ordinary object terms do not refer to items in the world described by
fundamental physics. As I discuss in 8.4.7, the edenic idealist may or may not view these two worlds as
identical.
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be merely forcing our language on a world it was never meant to describe in the first place.
By contrast, with EI, objects are identified with the things that actually guide our use: the
items directly presented to us in experience.
Referential intentions: When ordinary subjects use terms like ‘table’, they do not in-
tend to refer to exotic quantum items, such as patterns in the properties of the quantum
state. Indeed, such items are not even of the right ontological category! In contrast, with
EI, we are talking about exactly the type of things we thought we were talking about all
along.
Epistemology: If the truth of ordinary object judgments depends on whether we can
identify objects with items in the world described by fundamental physics, such judgments
will be hostage to empirical fortune. After all, it is not trivial that quantum mechanics will
end up yielding items that can be functionally identified with ordinary objects.29 But with
EI, we can explain why it seems trivial to infer the sentence ‘There is an apple’ when one
has various kinds of experiences of an apple (visual, tactile, and so on).30
Pragmatics: In 6.5, I argued that subjects do not care about what WE is like “in itself”
when they make judgments about tables. Similarly, in any ordinary context, subjects do not
care about the results of fundamental physics. For example, after taking classes on quantum
mechanics, subjects have no inclination to rise their judgments about objects (at least upon
returning to ordinary contexts). But then why think that the truth of such judgments hinges
on the deliverances of fundamental physics?
Of course, we can imagine communities where subjects do care about the results of
fundamental physics when making judgments about objects. For example, we can imagine
a community where subjects permanently abandon such judgments after learning about
quantum mechanics. But this community is very different from our own community.
29See, e.g., Ladyman & Ross (2007, 254): “We take it to be an empirical question for any particular
common-sense object whether it [can be fit into the quantum world], and so eliminativism cannot be ruled
out a priori.”
30Of course, the edenic idealist allows that our experiences of an apple may be illusory (see 8.2.1).
181
The above considerations have implications for how we should conceive of the role
of science in philosophy. Many “naturalistic” philosophers believe that the natural sci-
ences are our only source of metaphysical knowledge. According to such theorists, there
is nothing distinctive for philosophy to discover about metaphysics; instead, the role of
metaphysics should be to clarify or unify the deliverances of science. One striking example
of this stance is Ladyman & Ross (2007, vii), who claim: “standard analytic metaphysics
contributes nothing to human knowledge.”
Whether or not Ladyman & Ross are correct about analytic metaphysics, I am sug-
gesting that there is also something amiss when philosophers claim that the question of
whether objects exist should be decided by looking to fundamental physics. Fundamental
physics has authority over our ordinary object discourse only if ordinary subjects pay fun-
damental physics allegiance. But they don’t: there is no indication that, in any ordinary
context, subjects care about the results of fundamental physics.
Of course, none of this should imply that edenic idealism privileges the epistemic
credentials of common sense over science. For one thing, the edenic idealist is not skeptical
of fundamental physics: she merely claims that these results do not directly threaten the
deliverances of our ordinary experiences. In addition, it is a mistake to think of EI as
attaching a special value to common sense per se. On edenic idealism, ordinary object
judgments aren’t special because they are common sense; they are special because, when
we have certain types of experiences, these judgments have the status of trivial truths.31
Looking to fundamental physics to determine whether tables exist is mistaken for the same
kind of reason that it would be a mistake to look to fundamental physics to determine
whether unmarried males are bachelors.
31That these judgments have the status of trivial truths is shown by the fact that we would continue to
make these judgments even after learning the scientific results that allegedly conflict with them.
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8.4.4 Microphysical ontology
I will now return to the question I put aside in 8.4.1 and 8.4.2: if fundamental physics
does not describe ordinary objects, what kinds of entities does it describe? The next several
subsections will discuss how the edenic idealist should approach scientific ontology.
To begin, we can consider microphysical entities: items like electrons, quarks, and so
on. Where are these items located in the edenic idealist’s system?
There are a few reasons why the edenic idealist should not view micro-entities as part
of WM . First, micro-entities do not have colors. In addition, it doesn’t seem possible for
an edenically colored item to be wholly composed from colorless parts.32 So if ordinary
objects were composed of micro-entities, they would not have edenic colors, contrary to
claims of edenic idealism. Second, micro-entities have wavelike physical states. If so, they
cannot exist in WM , since objects in WM do not have wavelike physical states (see 8.4.2).
If micro-entities are not in WM , where are they located? There are at least three
options available to the edenic idealist:
1) Microphysical antirealism (MA). The first option is to say that micro-entities are
located in no world at all. One way to endorse microphysical anti-realism would be to
adopt a general anti-realist stance towards micro-entities, such as van Fraassen’s (1980)
constructive empiricism. Another way would be to adopt a strong version of ontic structural
realism according to which, at the fundamental level, there are no ‘things’; instead, there is
nothing but structure.33
Of course, even if micro-entities do not exist, judgments involving micro-entity terms
still seem correctly assertible. So the anti-realist ought to give some semantic account of
32To see why, try to imagine continuously zooming in on a homogenously blue object until one gets to
colorless parts. This can’t be done: to imagine a shift in color, one either has to imagine (i) the color of
the expanse (or some region of it) changing as one zooms in or (ii) a non-blue region becoming visible only
after one has zoomed in to some degree. (i) contradicts the supposition that the object is not changing colors
while (ii) is incompatible with the claim that the item is entirely composed of colorless parts (at some level
of decomposition).
33See Ladyman (2014, section 4) for discussion.
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this discourse. The options here parallel the options discussed in 6.4: paraphrase accounts,
fictionalist accounts, and so on. Suffice to say that microphysical anti-realists have to
address the same types of worries facing parallel views of ordinary objects.34
2) Microphysical realism (MR). The second option is to locate micro-entities in WE .
This is probably the standard position among contemporary philosophers of science. But
interestingly, there may be problems for microphysical realism that parallel the problems
I have raised for realism about ordinary objects. Notice that some of the puzzles from
6.3 are puzzles for microphysical realism just as much as they are puzzles for ordinary
object realism. For example, in the single particle world WS35, it is just as difficult to find
denotations for an expression like ‘the electron’ as it is to find denotations for expressions
like ‘the chair’. Similar remarks apply to the frozen worldWF .36 So if the dialectic parallels
the case of ordinary objects, we can motivate a third view:
3) Microphysical idealism (MI). On the third option, micro-entities are located in some
other world WM∗ . Intuitively, our experiences do not merely suggest a world of ordinary
edenic objects. Our experiences also cohere with one another in a way that is suggestive
of an underlying microphysical world. According to microphysical idealism, microphys-
ical terms have the semantic role of referring to items in WM∗ , the microphysical world
suggested by our experiences.
To assess whether our experiences really have such an important role in scientists’
microphysical discourse, we have to decide whether microphysical discourse is relevantly
similar to ordinary object discourse. For example, suppose the Oracle says that WE is
like the single-particle world. Would scientists continue to speak about electrons just as
34See 6.4 for discussion.
35I discuss the single-particle world in 6.3.2. I note that both WS and the frozen world WF were based
off a classical Newtonian world. But with suitable adjustments, we could have equally described worlds W ∗S
and W ∗F that are based off the world described by our current best theories.
36I discuss the frozen world in 6.3.3.
184
before? I suspect they would; I doubt scientists care about possibilities like the single-
particle world when working in scientific contexts. If this is right, pragmatic considerations
may support microphysical idealism.37 Other features of scientific discourse to consider
include referential intentions, epistemology, etc. Discussing MI is outside the scope of this
chapter; a proper defense would require engaging with the large literature on the aims and
linguistic practices of science.
In summary: there are several possible stances the edenic idealist can take towards
microphysical entities, but on any of the above views, our judgments about micro-entities
do not concern WM .38
8.4.5 Other scientific ontology
Fundamental physics may be committed to other types of entities, such as fields and
a concrete wave function. For each of these cases, the edenic idealist will have a choice
between anti-realism, realism, and idealism; generally speaking, the pros and cons of each
option should be the same as in 8.4.4.
If one accepts an idealist view towards any given item x, there is a further question
about which world contains x. This answer may vary from case to case. The idealist about
fields will probably locate them in WM∗ , the same world as micro-entities. In contrast,
if we think of the wave function as a concrete entity (see footnote 26), it may be located
in its own world; this is because the wave function is said to live an infinite-dimensional
configuration space, and it may be the case that none of the dimensions of this space can be
37One might object that science is particularly concerned with learning the true nature of the world. But
on MI, scientists would still be discovering truths; it is just that these truths concern WM∗ , not WE .
38Given that micro-entities are not located in WM , what are ordinary objects in WM like on the micro-
physical scale? The edenic idealist should probably say that this question has no determinate answer. One
option would be to say thatWM is metaphysically indeterminate at the microphysical level. A second option,
which I prefer, is to appeal to referential indeterminacy: the expression ‘the table’ is referentially indetermi-
nate over items from all those worlds which agree with our experiences at larger scales. (Of course, none
of this is to deny that there are determinate microphysical facts. The edenic idealist merely claims that such
facts concern some other world than WM .)
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functionally identified with ordinary spatiotemporal dimensions.39 Whenever two items in
scientific ontology are incompatible (due to, for example, their existing in different spaces),
the idealist can say that the items are located in different worlds.
8.4.6 Scientific macro-ontology
There is one further aspect of scientific ontology to consider: macroscopic objects.
Ordinary subjects aren’t the only ones who talk about tables; judgments about tables are
also plausibly a part of scientific discourse (e.g., ‘The table exists in a curved space’).40
Given the above discussion, must the edenic idealist say that scientists are wrong when
they make such claims?
One possible response is to say that judgments like ‘The table exists in a curved space’
are indeed false, while giving an explanation of why such judgments seem correct. I will
refer to this position as a scientific error theory (SE). The proponent of SE will claim that
such mistakes are the natural result of confusion about the semantic roles of ordinary object
terms. If we assume the single world of realism, and we learn from physics that space is
curved, then it is natural to conclude that tables must exist in a curved space. But once we
reject realism, we realize that it is a mistake to apply the results of fundamental physics to
tables in the first place.
This response has certain attractions, but it may face difficulties. Suppose physicists
were told the arguments for edenic idealism and became convinced that ordinary objects
are inWM . Even so, it is not obvious that such scientists would need to abandon judgments
like ‘The table is located in a curved space’ while in scientific contexts. After all, such
judgments are an established part of the linguistic framework of contemporary physics, a
39See Ney (2012, 538-549) for discussion.
40Thomasson (2007, 141-142) denies that judgments about tables are actually a part of the discourse of
fundamental physics. This view is shared by Stebbing (1958, 58), who says: “I venture to suggest that it is as
absurd to say that there is a scientific table as to say that there is a familiar electron or a familiar quantum.”
I do not agree with Thomasson or Stebbing, but if they are correct, there is no need for the edenic idealist to
address macroscopic scientific ontology.
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framework that does not seem to have held back scientific inquiry in any way. So why
change? Unless there is some reason internal to science for abandoning this way of speak-
ing, I doubt that there is any philosophical reason why scientists would alter their discourse.
Earlier in 8.4.3, I argued that scientific results do not threaten the truth of judgments
from ordinary language. I am now expressing sympathy towards the same point in the
opposite direction: “results” about ordinary language — such as edenic idealism — have
no power to discredit judgments in fundamental physics. EI could only discredit such
judgments if physicists cared about the manifest image when doing physics. But I doubt
this is the case: ordinary and scientific discourse seem very far removed.41
If this is correct, then instead of denying scientific judgments about macroscopic ob-
jects, we should instead distinguish ordinary and scientific uses of the term ‘the table’.42
The edenic idealist will then have to choose from the same three options as above. The
scientific anti-realist (SA) will say that macro-object terms in scientific discourse do not
have a referential semantic role.43 The scientific realist (SR) will say that scientific macro-
objects are located in WE . The scientific idealist (SI) will say that scientific macro-objects
are located in some other world. Anyone who accepts scientific idealism will probably also
accept microphysical idealism, so presumably such objects will be located in the “micro-
physical world” WM∗; of course, this world will now need a new label. Just as in previous
cases, the choice between these three options hinges on a careful study of the linguistic
practices of scientists.
41According to Carnap (1950, sections 2-3), we cannot show the judgments within a certain linguistic
practice are false from a standpoint external to the practice. At most, we can argue that our interests would
be better served by adopting some other framework. In the current context, it is difficult to see why science
would be better served be refraining from judgments like ‘The table exists in a curved space’.
42Of course, there is probably not a clear boundary between scientific and ordinary discourse. But since
there will be a mapping between the items on these frameworks anyway, this is no real concern. In border-
line cases, it may be the case that terms like ‘the table’ are referentially indeterminate over items in both
frameworks.
43On standard usage, error theories are considered a form of anti-realism. But in order to solidify the
analogy between microphysical anti-realism and scientific anti-realism, I am not including scientific error
theory under the anti-realist label.
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Note that the scientific macro-objects countenanced by scientific realists and scientific
idealists will not qualitatively resemble the ordinary objects of WM (i.e., they will not have
edenic properties and will not live in edenic space). While our grip on ordinary objects
involves our direct acquaintance with them in experience, our grip on scientific objects
involves no such acquaintance. The edenic idealist might instead adopt a deflationary view
of such entities on which the nature of scientific macro-objects is exhausted by what is
correctly assertible of them within scientific discourse.44
To sum up: ordinary and scientific discourse about macro-objects should probably
continue as they always have. Confusion only arises when we think of fundamental physics
as talking about edenic objects or when we think of ordinary language as talking about the
items described by fundamental physics.
8.4.7 What world does fundamental physics describe?
The last three subsections have discussed different aspects of scientific ontology. While
any combination of the above views will be logically consistent, some groupings are more
natural than others. Three obvious groupings are general anti-realism, general realism, and
general idealism across all items in scientific ontology. If one prefers scientific error theory
about macro-objects, then SE can be substituted into any of these views. Another interest-
ing option is realism about some “fundamental” item(s), such as a concrete wave function,
and idealism about everything else.
Returning to the original question from 8.4.1 and 8.4.2: if fundamental physics does
not describe ordinary objects, what kinds of entities does it describe? We now see that there
are many possible responses this question available to the edenic idealist. The anti-realist
about xs will say that scientific judgments do not (literally) describe xs at all. The realist
about xs will say that these judgments describe xs in WE . The idealist about xs will say
that these judgments describe xs in some other world, such as WM∗ . But no matter what
44See Thomasson (2007) for a deflationary account of ordinary objects.
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she says about scientific ontology, the edenic idealist will deny that fundamental physics
describes ordinary objects.
8.4.8 Relations between worlds
There is a final question to consider. Items from scientific ontology are typically
thought to stand in various relations to ordinary objects, such as causal, spatial, temporal,
and additive45 relations. But if the edenic idealist denies that these items are in the same
world, what should she say about these relations?46 For concreteness, I will focus atten-
tion on what the edenic idealist should say about the relations between micro-entities and
ordinary objects. But analogous remarks should apply to other cases.47
There are three stances the edenic idealist can take towards these relations. The first
stance is to give an error theory, claiming that we are mistaken when we assert that micro-
entities and ordinary objects stand in the above relations. This response encounters the
same worry as a scientific error theory. If, as seems plausible, sentences describing rela-
tions between micro-entities and ordinary objects would remain correctly assertible even
for subjects who accepted edenic idealism, an error theory may not be compatible with
our linguistic practices. The second stance is to adopt an anti-realist account of these rela-
tions, such as fictionalism or a paraphrase account. This will be the preferred response of
microphysical anti-realists.
The third stance, which I prefer, is to adopt some kind of lightweight view of these
45When I speak of “additive relations,” I have in mind the relations between the charges, masses, etc. of
macro-entities and the micro-entities composing them.
46Of course, certain relations, such as the relation being mentioned in the same paper as, do not raise any
puzzles. But the relations I’ve mentioned in this paragraph are typically thought to only relate items from the
same world.
47One might think that countenancing scientific objects (see 8.4.6) dissolves the puzzle, since scientific
objects are plausibly located in the same world as micro-entities. But there are two problems with this
response. First: we sometimes specifically predicate these relations of ordinary objects, such as in judgments
like: ‘I saw the brown table 20 minutes after the electron passed through the cloud chamber’. Second: the
proposed response does not generalize to all version of EI, since some versions countenance multiple worlds
relevant to scientific ontology (see 8.4.5).
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relations la Schiffer (2003, ch. 2).48 We may be accustomed to thinking of these relations
in a more heavyweight manner, but the edenic idealist will say that this is a false theoretical
belief derived from a mistaken assumption about realism.
I’ll illustrate this third stance with a few examples. First, consider the sentence ‘The
electron passed through the cloud chamber 20 minutes before the chair broke’. The edenic
idealist will deny that the events mentioned in this judgment are temporally related in the
same way that two events in WM are temporally related. But the proponent of microphysi-
cal idealism and microphysical realism will say that that there is a mapping between events
inWM∗/WE and events inWM . So such theorists can acknowledge that sentences like ‘The
electron passed through the cloud chamber 20 minutes before the chair broke’ are correctly
assertible and that the events in question are temporally related in a deflationary sense.
For a second example, consider the sentence ‘The chair is composed of electrons’.
The edenic idealist will deny that the chair is composed of electrons in the same sense
that the chair is composed of bits of wood. But proponents of microphysical idealism and
microphysical realism can still acknowledge that ‘The chair is composed of electrons’ is
correctly assertible and that the entities in question are mereologically related in a defla-
tionary sense.49
8.4.9 Summary
I have argued that EI is compatible with the deliverances of science. In general, the
edenic idealist preserves the manifest image by isolating ordinary discourse from funda-
mental physics. Far from being a shortcoming of the view, I argued that this isolation is
actually an advantage of EI. Beyond this general strategy, there are many options available
48I briefly discuss deflationary entities in 6.4.4.
49Note that, if one countenances scientific objects (see 8.4.6), these items will stand in a 1:1 correspon-
dence with ordinary objects. So we can think of ordinary objects as standing in deflationary versions of all
of the relations scientific objects stand in. It may also be advantageous to say that scientific objects stand in
deflationary versions of the relations relevant to ordinary objects.
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to the edenic idealist on how to interpret fundamental physics.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed three types of cases where it seems that the world is
different from how we experience it: cases of illusion, cases of incompatible experiences,
and scientific threats to the manifest image. To account for the distinction between illusory
and non-illusory experiences, the edenic idealist argues that this distinction is internal to
ordinary epistemic practices. In order to handle more general threats to the manifest im-
age (involving cases of intersubjective disagreement or scientific cases), the edenic idealist
appeals to the distinction between WE and WM .
Indeed, far from being a problem for the view, these types of discrepancy cases actu-
ally provide additional support for EI. I argued that, in rejecting the coherence of illusions
that are in principle undetectable, the edenic idealist provides a more plausible account of
the distinction between illusory and non-illusory experiences as it drawn by ordinary sub-
jects. Similarly, by recognizing that judgments about objects are not threatened by results
from fundamental physics, the edenic idealist provides a better explanation of facts about
the usage, epistemology, and pragmatics of ordinary object discourse.
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9 THE INCOMPLETENESS OBJECTION
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will consider a second family of objections to edenic idealism:
Incompleteness Objection: Our experience does not present an entire world;
at best, it presents a limited perspective on a small part of a world. The idealist
cannot accommodate the sense in which the world outstrips our experiences of
it.
As discussed in chapter 7, the edenic idealist’s basic response to the incompleteness objec-
tion is to appeal to the counterfactual experiences supported by the external world WE in
order to account for the completeness of the world. In particular, the truth of any manifest
sentence Si will be determined by the set of counterfactual experiences si that ordinary
speakers consider relevant to assessing the truth of Si, as outlined by the Deference Princi-
ple. But there are many difficult questions that still need to be addressed, such as:
• How will the edenic idealist account for truths about objects in environments where
phenomenal experiences are not nomically possible?
• Can the edenic idealist appeal to counterfactual experiences without falling into cir-
cularity or regress?
• Why should we think that WE determinately supports all of the counterfactual expe-
riences needed to settle the truths of manifest sentences in WM?
• Why should we think that the ordinary experiences relevant to the Deference Princi-
ple provide ordinary speakers with sufficient information to make judgments about
manifest sentences, as required by the Deference Principle?
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In this chapter, I will explain how the edenic idealist should respond to these difficult ques-
tions. In section 9.2, I will consider what the edenic idealist should say about cases where
human experiences are not nomically possible. In sections 9.3-9.5, I will consider the wor-
ries about circularity, determinateness, and insufficiency, respectively.
9.2 Difficult cases
In many cases, there do not seem to be any nomically possible human experiences
relevant to assessing the truth of manifest sentences. But I will argue that, even in these
difficult cases, the edenic idealist should still appeal to the Deference Principle (see chapter
7) to explain how the truths of WM are determined:
Deference Principle: Let Si be a sentence concerning ordinary objects and
their manifest properties. Let si be the set of (contextualized) experiences
ordinary subjects would (ideally) consider relevant to assessing the truth of Si.
Then a (possible) experience e contributes to determining the truth of Si just in
case e is a member of si. In particular, Si is true just in case ordinary subjects
would (ideally) judge that Si is true when presented with all of the experiences
in si.
9.2.1 Inaccessibility cases
Consider the following case:
Case 11: S11 ≡ There is a brown rock in region S.
(Assumption: S is inside of a star1; see Fig. 9.1)
The difficulty with S11 is that there is no nomically possible way to observe S due to the
extreme conditions inside stars. We can call cases that are similar to S11 in this regard
1Of course, there are no brown rocks inside of stars. I consider this case just because it provides a simple
illustration of the objection under consideration.
193
Figure 9.1: Star example
examples of inaccessibility.2 I claim that, even in such unfavorable conditions, WE still
supports experiences that settle the truth of sentences about ordinary objects. Here are a
few examples of the experiences I have in mind:
(a) The experience a subject would have if
(i) the matter in region R were instantaneously eliminated and
(ii) the subject were then to travel through R towards S.
(b) The experience a subject would have if she were to travel towards S in a
ship made of super heat-resistant and pressure-resistant material.
I will call (a) and (b) miracle experiences because their antecedents are nomically impossi-
ble. But despite this fact, ordinary speakers still consider (a) and (b) relevant to the truth of
S11. So the Deference Principle dictates that these experiences should be included in s11.
The Deference Principle also clarifies how we should interpret (a) and (b). When
considering (a), one might mistakenly reason as follows: “If there were no matter in R,
any cube in S would have been pulled by gravity elsewhere. So (a) will suggest that S11
is false.” This is a mistake because, on this interpretation, ordinary speakers would not
consider (a) relevant to assessing the truth of S11. Interpreted in the proper way, (a) involves
a genuine miracle where most of the matter of the star instantaneously disappears. This is
the interpretation that ordinary speakers would consider relevant to assessing the truth of
S11.
2Other examples of inaccessibility might include: ‘20 minutes after the Big Bang, there was a red glow in
region X ’ and ‘There is a cube near the event horizon of the black hole’. For related discussion, see Roberts
(2013), who refers to these examples as cases of “horrible conditions”.
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Here is a third type of nomically-impossible experience relevant to S11:
(c) The experience we would have if
(i) things in region R did not directly causally interact with our bodies
or sensory faculties (but both the things in R and our bodies and
sensory faculties continued to interact with everything else in the
normal way) and
(ii) we were to travel towards S
I will call (c) a ghost experience. Unlike miracle experiences, ghost experiences do not
involve changing the objective properties of items out in the world. Instead, portions of
WM are rendered so that they do not affect us in certain ways. For example, in (c), the
plasma in region R still exists, but it does not burn us, is not visible to us, and does not
impede our movement.3
Again, many of the details of how to interpret (c) have been left underspecified. But
just as in any other case, how these details are settled is decided by the Deference Principle:
on what interpretation would ordinary speakers consider (c) relevant to assessing the truth
of S11?
Given the present discussion, we see that si is even more broad than we may have orig-
inally thought. But this does not mean that any type of experience we can describe will be
included. For example, consider the experience I would have if the rock was God’s favorite
3Google Earth provides an intuitive illustration of ghost experiences. After loading Google Earth, zoom
in close to the Empire State Building such that one is looking at the building directly from its side. Next, move
forward so as to “collide” with the building. One will notice two things: buildings in Google Earth do not im-
pede motion and buildings become (mostly) invisible so that the user can see through them. These “building
interior” animations are similar to ghost experiences. The tower isn’t destroyed by the user approaching it;
instead, the tower is rendered so that it no longer interacts with the user. (Of course, there are also important
differences. For example, Google Earth animations only involve visual experiences and Google Earth does
not allow the user to render arbitrary regions of the world causally inefficacious to the subject.)
There are cases where ghost experiences may provide more flexibility than miracle experiences. For ex-
ample, suppose the rock in S11 is brown, but due to some chemical interaction, it would turn black if it were
not surrounded by the plasma inR (again, ignore the scientific implausibility of the example). (a) would mis-
leadingly present the rock as black instead of brown. But (c) would correctly present the rock as brown, since
the plasma in R is still causally interacting with the rock. Ordinary speakers would consider both (a) and (c)
relevant to S11, so both of these experiences will be included in s11. But if (a) and (c) were to conflict in the
way just described, ordinary speakers would presumably judge the rock to be brown. So by the Deference
Principle, S11 will be true in WM .
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color. It is unlikely that WE determinately supports this experience: even supposing God
exists, it is unlikely that God has a favorite color. So this experience cannot be included in
s11.4
9.2.2 A worry
By appealing to ghost and miracle experiences, it may seem that EI warrants another
“incredulous state” (see 6.5.4). But their labels notwithstanding, there is nothing spooky
about experiences like (a)-(c). These experiences may invoke nomically impossible coun-
terfactuals, but it is often the case that such counterfactuals are determinately supported.5
Still, the worry that WE does not determinately support these types of “non-standard”
experiences is a worry that the edenic idealist should take seriously. I will put this worry
aside for the time being, and will return to it in section 9.4.
9.2.3 Interference cases
Here is a second type of difficult case where ghost and miracle experiences are useful:
Case 12: S12 ≡ There is a dragonfly in region R.
Suppose there is a dragonfly inside an opaque metal box. The only way to look inside the
metal box is by opening its swinging door (depicted in light grey). Suppose further that the
dragonfly is very sensitive to movement: whenever the door starts to budge, the dragonfly
alights and buzzes around the box (see Fig. 9.2):
4To be precise, there may be cases where the fact that WE does not determinately support a specific
experience meeting description D is itself relevant to the truth of Si. So it is best to say that, in such
cases, the Cosmoscope (see 7.4) should return the (possibly open-ended) set of experiences over which D is
indeterminate. Nonetheless, the spirit of the point I am making stands. In most cases, an open-ended set of
experiences will not help subjects make a judgment about Si.
Related cases are ones whereWE determinately supports the absence of an experience meetingD (perhaps
due to the death of the subject). There will be cases where this result is itself relevant to the judgment that
Si; see fn. 17 for such a case. So in these cases, the Cosmoscope should return a null result (i.e., not induce
any experience in the subject).
5For discussion, see, e.g., Roberts (2008, ch. 6).
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Figure 9.2: Interference example
In order to assess the truth of S12, the first experiences that come to mind are the ones
we would have if we were to open the metal door. But this presents a puzzle: the dragonfly
moves when the door starts to open. Since the dragonfly has moved, the experiences we
would have upon opening the door seem irrelevant to assessing S12. This is an example
of a phenomenon I will call interference. In a case of interference, the way in which we
counterfactually modify WE so that it supports a certain experience affects the truth of the
sentence under consideration. So interfering experiences should be excluded from si.6
One option here would be to appeal to less intrusive experiences, such as experiences
involving some advanced kind of imaging technology. But to make the case as difficult
as possible, let’s suppose that there are no nomically possible means to assess S12 with-
out interference. To settle such cases, the edenic idealist will again appeal to nomically
impossible experiences, such as:
(a) The experience we would have if one of the walls were to (instantaneously)
disappear.
(b) The experience we would have if the walls did not causally interact with
our visual faculties (but both the walls and our visual faculties continued
to interact with everything else in the normal way)
6To be more precise: there may be some cases where interfering experiences can be included in si, such
as cases where we can use such experiences to retrodict the truth of Si. I will put such cases aside.
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The thought with miracle experience (a) is that, since this experience involves an instan-
taneous change, it would allow us to detect the truth of S12 before the dragonfly alights.7
With ghost experience (b), the world is kept exactly as it is except insofar as it affects us
visually. So with (b), we would inspect the dragonfly without any changes in its behavior.
With miracle and ghost experiences, S12 will be determinate even though it is nomically
impossible to assess S12 without interference. Analogous types of experiences will be
available in other case where interference is a concern.
Again, one might have the worry that WE will not determinately support these types
of non-standard experiences. But as I mentioned above, I will put this worry aside until
section 9.4.
9.3 The Sellarsian objection
I will now consider a second type of worry related to the edenic idealist’s appeal to
counterfactual experiences. The edenic idealist uses contextualized experiences to “select”
WM as the possible edenic world relevant to our judgments about objects (for an expla-
nation of the crucial notion of “world selection”, see 6.5). But in all of the examples
considered thus far, the relevant contexts directly refer to objects, places, and times in WM .
So it seems that the edenic idealist is faced with either circularity or regress.
The above objection is closely related to a famous objection lodged against early 20th-
century versions of phenomenalism. According to theorists like Russell (1985), reference
to ordinary objects is merely apparent; sentences involving singular terms for objects are
analyzable into sentences that only refer to actual and possible sense data.8 But Chisholm
(1948), Goodman (1951), Quine (1951), and Sellars (1963a) each argued that such a con-
ceptual reduction will be circular. Here is Sellars’ argument.
Consider a sentence like ‘There is a fire in the room next door’. Assuming that no one
7If the dragonfly is still too fast, s12 will also include experiences involving high-speed cameras.
8See 6.5.3 for discussion.
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is currently in the room next door, the phenomenalist will say that this sentence should be
analyzed as follows: ‘if such-and-such conditions were to obtain, then I would experience
toothy orange and yellow sense contents’. But what conditions? According to Sellars, the
only counterfactual we are justified in believing is one whose antecedent directly mentions
ordinary objects, i.e.: ‘if I were to go into the other room and look towards the fire, then I
would experience toothy orange and yellow sense contents’. So we have regress or circu-
larity: ordinary object sentences can only be analyzed into sentences that refer to ordinary
objects.9 Given its resemblance to Sellars’ challenge, I will refer to the circularity objection
to EI as the “Sellarsian objection”.
9.3.1 The basic response
There are two features of edenic idealism that allow it to escape the Sellarsian objec-
tion. First: unlike traditional phenomenalists, the edenic idealist is not trying to analyze
away talk of ordinary objects. Second: the edenic idealist adopts a robust conception of
experience on which our experiences directly present objects and their edenic properties.
To see how these features help the edenic idealist with the circularity objection, con-
sider again S1 ≡ ‘The opposite side of the book is blue’ (see 7.2). s1 includes experiences
such as: the visual experience I would have if I were located in the region opposite the book
and were looking back towards it. This counterfactual refers to various items in WM (the
book, a certain spatial region, etc.). But since EI isn’t concerned with conceptual reduction,
there is nothing problematic about such reference in and of itself. Nor is such reference il-
licitly circular, since the items invoked in this counterfactual are directly presented in actual
experience.
Of course, there are other counterfactual experiences whose inclusion in s1 would lead
to circularity, such as: the experience I would have if my shirt was the same color as the
9To be more precise, Sellars criticizes analyses that appealed to statistical generalizations, not counter-
factuals. But the same point applies in either case.
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opposite side of the book. This experience cannot be included in s1 because it directly
presupposes the truth of S1, the sentence whose truth s1 is supposed to determine. In
contrast, the previous example did not illicitly presuppose anything about WM since our
actual experience had already determined the relevant items in WM for us.10
9.3.2 World selection as an ordered process
One might worry that the above response is not generally applicable, since many con-
texts I’ve mentioned refer to items that are not directly presented in actual experience. For
example, consider S2 ≡ ‘There is a chair in room D’ (see Fig. 9.3).
Figure 9.3: Hallway example
s2 includes experiences such as: the visual experiences X would have if she were to
open door 1, walk through the hallway, and then open door 2. But given Fig. 9.3, door 2 is
not presented to X in experience.
The edenic idealist will handle such cases by determining the world in stages. X may
not be presented with door 2, but she is presented with door 1. So we can legitimately refer
to: the possible experience X would have if she were to walk over to door 1 and open it. If
X were to have this experience, she would be presented with new items from WM , such as
the spatial position B. With these new elements of WM now given, the edenic idealist can
10This is a simplification; objects in WM will actually be determined by a much larger set of experiences.
But our actual experiences at least determine objects to the extent that we can successfully refer to them in
the contexts used to pick out other counterfactual experiences.
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legitimately refer to: the possible experience X would have if she were to walk to B and
turn left. If X were to have this experience, she would be presented with position C. So
the edenic idealist can now legitimately refer to: the possible experience X would have if
she were to walk to C and turn left. By continuing in this way, we can ground the reference
of terms like ‘door 2’, ‘room D’, and ‘the chair’.11
This same kind of response will be available in any case. To see why, we can return to
the Deference Principle. In chapter 7, I illustrated this principle by starting with an sentence
Si and then determining which experiences are included in si. But for present purposes, it
is useful to think about the principle in the other direction: starting with our experiences
and considering how they settle what is true in WM .
Here is the intuitive picture. We start with our actual experiences. These experiences
only determine certain very narrow aspects of WM : those objects, properties, spatial re-
gions, etc. that we directly experience.12 But because these items are given to us, we
can directly refer to them and can invoke counterfactual experiences involving them. For
any object X , we can speak of the counterfactual experiences of lifting X up, pushing X
around, viewing X from different angles, and so on. For any location y, we can speak
of the possible experience of being at y or traveling to y. All of these counterfactual ex-
periences will present new objects and properties that were not originally presented to us,
thereby settling new truths about WM . In addition, our acquaintance with new items from
WM allows us to refer to a new set of counterfactual experiences involving those items.
And so the process of world selection moves outward from the center, step by step.
Whenever a possible experience presents a cupboard, we can appeal to the experience of
opening it. Whenever it presents a lake, we can appeal to the experience of diving into
11Of course, the specific details of the reference grounding in this paragraph are not important; there are
countless other ways to link subject X to door D as well.
12As mentioned in footnote 10, this is a simplification. But what is relevant for current purposes is that
our actual experiences at least determine objects to the extent that we can successfully refer to them in the
contexts used to pick out other counterfactual experiences.
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it. Whenever it presents something small, we can appeal to experiences of moving close
to it. At certain points, our counterfactual experiences will present environments where
interference or inaccessibility is a concern. No matter — we can appeal to nomically
impossible experiences which make those environments accessible. By continuing this
process indefinitely, our experiences select the whole world. And at every step, it is the
Deference Principle that describes how these counterfactual experiences determine what
is true in WM . For example, counterfactual experiences involving flashlights are relevant
in dark environments because ordinary speakers consider flashlight experiences relevant to
sentences about objects in the dark.
The above discussion shows that world selection is an ordered process.13 In addition
to establishing a single spatiotemporal framework for WM , this ordering ensures that refer-
ence to items in WM is ultimately grounded by our acquaintance with such items in actual
and counterfactual experiences. In contrast, if WM was selected by considering ordinary
object sentences at random, there would be a serious worry about circularity.
9.3.3 Merely possible objects
Some of the objects mentioned in the contexts of si are not actually parts of WM . For
example, s1 included the experience (call it E) of looking into a mirror located behind the
book. But, assuming that there is no mirror in the room, this mirror is a merely possible
item.
Roughly speaking, the edenic idealist will interpret E as: the experience WE would
cause in me if (i) WE were such as to cause experiences of a mirror-like object X and if
(ii) WE were such as to cause me to have an experience of looking towards X when it is
located behind the book. The first condition in this counterfactual establishes reference to
a (merely) possible object X . The second condition makes anaphoric reference back to
13Of course, world selection isn’t a temporally-ordered process. The sense in which our experiences
determine WM is referential, not causal or metaphysical. See 6.5.
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X . We should interpret counterfactuals referring to other kinds of objects (e.g., flashlights,
rulers, etc.) in a similar way.
Note the plural “experiences” in condition (i). I’ve expressed the context this way to
capture the fact that X must exhibit certain counterfactual behavior for it to be relevant to
the test mentioned in condition (ii). For example,WE must be such that, if I were to have an
experience of X being rotated clockwise, I would have an experience as of a reflection of
the room to my left. We can think of condition (i) as abbreviating an infinite description of
X’s behavior in various counterfactual situations like the one just mentioned. Intuitively,
condition (i) ensures that X isn’t a very realistic painting of a mirror (since a painting
wouldn’t be relevant to assessing S1).14 Similar remarks will apply to other possible objects
mentioned in the contexts of si.
9.3.4 Merely apparent objects
There are many cases where our experience merely seems to present us with an ob-
ject X . Examples include cases where we are experiencing an illusion, or where we are
perceiving a hologram, or where we are really perceiving more than one object, etc. One
might worry that, in such cases, the above story of reference grounding fails. If the objects
“given” to us in experience don’t actually exist, how can they help ground reference?
In such cases, the edenic idealist should respond by replacing reference to objects with
reference to apparent objects. For example, if our experience of a bike is an illusion, we
can still refer to: the visual experience we would have if we were to approach the apparent
bike. Similarly, if the apparent book is a hologram that cannot be lifted, we can still refer
14A few further observations. (1) When expressing the context of E, I intentionally used the term ‘mirror-
like object’ instead of the ordinary sortal term ‘mirror’. This is because, for the purposes of the Deference
Principle, the only thing that matters about X is that X exhibits certain counterfactual behavior. It may be
that additional conditions have to be met for x to count as a mirror in ordinary language, but these conditions
aren’t relevant in the current context. So I’m using the term ‘mirror-like’ in a stipulative sense: X is mirror-
like iff it exhibits appropriate “reflective” counterfactual behavior (see 9.5.2 for further discussion). (2) I want
to emphasize that the edenic idealist is not giving an analysis of ‘mirror’ or ‘mirror-like’ or any other term.
The description of E that I’ve provided is merely supposed to be a rough illustration of a content that fully
reflects the complexities of ordinary epistemic practices.
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to: the experience we would have if we were to attempt to lift the apparent book.
9.3.5 World exploration and world selection
The above picture of ordered world selection should seem familiar. This is because
it is closely related to our day-to-day practice of world exploration. In ordinary life, we
think of ourselves as located somewhere in the world of the manifest image. To explore
this world, we move around and manipulate it, walking its paths and opening its cupboards.
As we do so, new objects with new properties are revealed to us. Upon encountering these
objects, we recognize which new types of experiences will be needed to learn more about
them. Just as with world selection, exploration starts at the center and moves outward as
more and more of the world is revealed to us. This is by design: world selection is supposed
to mimic ordinary exploration.
Of course, there are differences as well. One difference is that, with nomically impos-
sible experiences, the edenic idealist can move through and manipulate the world in ways
that ordinary subjects cannot. The second difference is that, when exploring, we have to
rely on induction. I believe a certain bike is locked outside my apartment; it has been there
every day this week. But it is possible that the bike has moved. This would be a case
where, because I rely on induction, my working map of the world comes apart from the
world itself. In contrast, with world selection, counterfactual experiences always “keep an
eye” on the bike and no such discrepancy is possible.
We can think of world selection as corresponding to idealized exploration, where ide-
alized exploration differs from ordinary exploration insofar as it includes nomically im-
possible experiences and does not rely on induction. This provides a simple way to think
about WM : WM is the edenic world corresponding to the map of the world ordinary speak-
ers would develop through idealized exploration.15
15With the Cosmoscope (see 7.4), we can visualize the link between idealized exploration and world se-
lection in a particularly vivid way. Suppose we program the Cosmoscope so that, if the user moves her head
to orientation {θ,φ} (from some starting orientation), the Cosmoscope will induce: the experience a ghost
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This link between world selection and world exploration is important for three rea-
sons. Most importantly, it shows us that EI aligns with the ordinary epistemology of object
discourse. As discussed in 6.5.4 and 7.3, this is one of the main motivations for adopting
EI.
Second, it gives us reason to think that EI will not founder on technical objections. For
example, it is clear that circularity worries do not hinder ordinary exploration. But then,
since world selection mimics ordinary exploration, circularity is not a worry for world
selection either.
Third, it explains how we should interpret the idealization on evidence in the Def-
erence Principle (see 7.4). si should be viewed as including those experiences we would
consider relevant to Si if we were engaged in a process of idealized exploration. For exam-
ple, consider S3 ≡ ‘The bicycle is blue’. At some point in the process of idealized world
exploration, we would encounter the bicycle in question. Upon encountering it (wherever
it might be found, in whatever lighting conditions, etc.), there are certain experiences we
would consider relevant to ascertaining its color. It is those experiences that should be
included in s3.16
Indeed, in many cases, the experiences included in si will be (metaphorically) “cor-
rected” through the process of idealized exploration. For example, consider a sentence
about the color of an object located far down a hallway. Originally, we might consider the
subject would have if her head was positioned in orientation {θ,φ} (with respect to some initial orientation).
Further, suppose the Cosmoscope is programmed so that, if the user pushes forward on a joystick, the Cosmo-
scope induces the experience of a subject located forward in space in the direction of the current orientation
(and similarly for other directions). By programming the Cosmoscope in this way, world selection will be
akin to exploration using Google Earth. Just as Google Earth allows us to glide around a map of the Earth,
so too a subject can use the controls of the Cosmoscope to “glide around” WM . Also like Google Earth,
this “gliding” would not correspond to the experiences of a subject moving through time. Instead, gliding
corresponds to a set of counterfactual experiences all occurring at a single given time. (Of course, unlike
Google Earth, world selection also involves non-visual experiences and nomically impossible experiences.)
16One might worry that si will change across time. For example, speakers in ancient Greece would not
consider flashlights relevant to sentences in dark environments since they never encountered flashlights. In
response: the second idealization in the Deference Principle (see 7.4) ensures that subjects are aware of all
relevant technologies. If ancient Greeks knew about flashlights, they would immediately recognize them as
relevant to sentences about dark environments.
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experience of walking down the hallway to be relevant to assessing the truth of this sen-
tence. But perhaps, unbeknownst to us, we would fall through a trapdoor if we followed
this plan. When the Cosmoscope presents us with an experience of falling through the
trapdoor, we would revise our views on what experiences are in si. Now, si might include
the experience of side-stepping the trapdoor, etc.17
9.3.6 Summary
In summary: the use of manifest vocabulary to specify contexts should be considered
not a bug but a feature of the Deference Principle. This is because ordinary epistemology
is built into the Deference Principle, and ordinary speakers are working under the manifest
image when making judgments about objects. The close alignment between world selection
and world exploration is important because one of the main semantic motivations for EI is
its alignment with ordinary epistemology.
It is interesting to consider: could there be cases where speakers consider facts about
what WE is like in itself to be relevant to the truth of Si? I think we can imagine such
a community, but I do not think this is our community. The Oracle argument (see 6.4.1)
suggests that we do not consider what WE is like in itself to be relevant to our manifest
judgments. This is why the contexts in si can and should employ manifest vocabulary. I
discuss this issue further in 9.5.2.
17We could also say that the original experience remains in si, but doesn’t factor in to the subject’s
judgment about the color of the object; this is a terminological issue.
The present discussion shows why it is useful to include contexts with presupposition failures in si (see
footnote 4). Consider S11 ≡ ‘There is a brown rock in region S’. Originally, a subject ignorant about the
extreme conditions of stars might suppose that s11 includes the experience a subject would have if she were
to enter region S in a spaceship, moving towards region R. Plugging this context into the Cosmoscope would
yield a null result (since the subject would die). But being presented with this null result would cause the
subject to revise her judgments about the experiences relevant to S11.
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9.4 The determinacy objection
I’ll now consider a third challenge to the edenic idealist’s appeal to counterfactual
experiences: why should we think that WE determinately supports all of the experiences
relevant to the Deference Principle? If there is no fact of the matter about these experiences,
then the edenic idealist will be unable to say that the world is as complete as we normally
think it is.18 As discussed in 9.2.2, the determinacy objection arises with particular force
when we consider ghost and miracle experiences. Why think WE determinately supports
experiences that are not even nomically possible?
There are different reasons why WE might not determinately support the experience
described by a context C; not all such cases are genuine concerns for EI. For example, one
source of indeterminacy could be that C employs imprecise language. But this is no threat
to EI; it simply means that the contexts relevant to the Deference Principle should be more
precise than the contexts I’ve appealed to throughout this chapter.
A second source of indeterminacy is empirical ignorance. Suppose a certain context
refers to the book on the table but, unbeknownst to us, there are in fact two books on
the table. Due to presupposition failure, WE will not determinately support an experience
meeting this description. But again, this kind of indeterminacy is no real threat, since such
indeterminacies will be eliminated through the process of idealized exploration (see 9.3.5
for discussion).
Genuine threats to EI are cases where WE itself is the source of the indeterminacy.
For example, one might worry that no facts about WE determine what a ghost experience
20 minutes after the Big Bang would be like. I will discuss this third type of indeterminacy
in this section. The edenic idealist’s strategy for responding to the objection will be to flip
the objection back towards the realist.
18Speaking precisely, the possibility of indeterminate experiences is not any problem in and of itself.
Perhaps speakers could still make judgments about Si even if certain experiences in si are indeterminate.
The more precise objection is: why think that ordinary speakers will always be able to make a determinate
judgment about Si when presented with si?
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9.4.1 A general response
Consider what the realist should say about the experiences in si. It seems that, insofar
as she believes that WE contains ordinary objects, the realist should also accept that WE
determinately supports at least some kinds of experiences of these objects. For example,
suppose the realist thinks that WE contains the book mentioned in S1 ≡ ‘The opposite side
of the book is blue’ (see 7.2). Then it seems the realist should also accept that there is a
determinate fact about what I would experience if I were to rotate the book, if I were to flip
the book, if I were to look into a mirror on the opposite of the book, etc.
Similar remarks apply to more exotic cases. Let’s suppose the realist accepts that there
is a brown rock in the middle of a star (see 9.2.1). Then it seems the realist should equally
grant that there is a fact about what a subject would experience if the matter in region R
were instantaneously eliminated, or if the subject did not causally interact with the matter
in R. In other words, anyone who accepts the existence of the brown rock should also
accept that there are ghost and miracle experiences presenting it.
The point can be made in the opposite direction as well. Let’s suppose that WE does
not support any experiences of a rock in the star, including ghost and miracle experiences.
I don’t think we can make sense of the idea that, nonetheless, there really is such a rock.
If there is a rock, then there should be some kind of counterfactual manipulation, however
drastic or miraculous, that would yield an experience of it.
Let P be the claim thatWE contains an objectX . LetQ be the claim thatWE supports
experiences (broadly construed) ofX . The above cases suggest that P entailsQ. But if this
is the case, then whatever grounds the realist has for accepting P , the edenic idealist will
have at least as much grounds for accepting Q. For example: if the realist has grounds for
thinking there are determinate facts about rocks three miles beneath the Louvre, the edenic
idealist will have at least as much grounds for thinking that WE determinately supports ex-
periences (broadly construed) of rocks three miles beneath the Louvre. Since her epistemic
commitments are strictly weaker than the realist’s, the edenic idealist can respond to the
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determinacy objection by re-directing the question back to the realist.
9.4.2 Difficult cases
It is important not to overstate the point: it is certainly possible that WM is not as
complete as we ordinarily think it to be. Two types of cases come to mind. First, there are
certain traditional skeptical scenarios. Like the realist, the edenic idealist will allow that it
is possible that the universe does not extend beyond what we have actually observed. But
like the realist, the edenic idealist will view such a scenario as improbable.
There may also be more mundane cases of indeterminacy. For an example of what I
have in mind, consider again the case of S6 ≡ ‘X is killer yellow’. In 7.2, I said that s6
would includeE: the visual experience I would have if my neurophysiology was such that I
could look atX without dying. Now suppose that, as a matter of fact, there are two possible
ways m1 and m2 to counterfactually modify my brain so that I would not die when looking
at X . Suppose further that each method would generate an experience of a different edenic
color (call them c1 and c2).
We can imagine a case where one of the modifications strikes us as more relevant to
the truth of S6 than the other; for example, perhaps m1 strikes us as more relevant because
it is a less drastic modification to our brain. In this case, there will be no indeterminacy; E
will be the experience I would have if my brain were m1-modified.
But we can also imagine a case where m1 and m2 seem completely on a par. On
this possibility, we would have indeterminacy that is unrelated to any general skeptical
concerns.
While this type of case may be rare, I do not think it can be ruled out a priori. So
I think the edenic idealist should simply grant that such cases involve indeterminacy. For
example, in the above case, the edenic idealist should say that it is indeterminate which
specific edenic color is instantiated by X . While this may initially sound like a cost to the
view, there are two reasons why such cases are not genuine threats to edenic idealism.
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First, the indeterminacy in these cases is just run-of-the-mill linguistic indeterminacy.
If EI was a metaphysical version of idealism, then X’s color would be metaphysically
indeterminate. This would be a concern, since many theorists consider the notion of meta-
physical indeterminacy to be obscure or even unintelligible.19 But in fact, EI is a semantic
form of idealism (see 6.5.3). So on EI, to say that X’s color is indeterminate is just to say
that it is indeterminate whether we are referring to X in a possible world where it is c1
as opposed to referring to X in a possible world where it is c2. In other words, it will be
indeterminate which world WM is the one relevant to our ordinary object sentences.
Second, this type of case is just as much a “problem” for the realist as it is for the
edenic idealist.20 Ordinarily, realists think that X’s color is determined by what color ex-
periences X causes in certain normal situations. But in this case, these experiences are
unavailable. The realist might instead try to appeal to facts about counterfactual expe-
riences, but we are supposing that these also do not settle matters either. If actual and
counterfactual experiences do not help, the only other option is to say that what WE is like
in itself determines X’s color. But most realists agree with the edenic idealist that such
facts do not determine the truth of our color sentences.21
9.4.3 Summary
Since the edenic idealist’s claims about WE are strictly weaker than the realist’s, any
grounds the realist has for positing an object X will also be grounds for thinking that WE
determinately supports experiences of X . Of course, there may be cases where the world
actually isn’t as complete as we think that it is. But such cases are no threat to the edenic
idealist since (i) the indeterminacy in such cases is merely referential and (ii) such cases
19For discussion, see Dummett (1975).
20Indeed, the killer yellow case is often viewed as a challenge to standard functionalist views of color. See
Lewis (1997) for discussion.
21See 6.2 for discussion. Are there any cases in which the state of WE in itself is relevant to the truth of a
manifest sentence Si? As I discuss in 9.3.6, I think the answer is “no”. But I present the alternative view in
section 9.5.
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are just as problematic for the realist.
9.4.4 The direct strategy as backup
In 7.6.1, I considered whether any more direct account of world selection is available
to the edenic idealist. I argued that the strategy of directly reading off WM from WE
should not replace the Deference Principle. But if there are cases where WE does not
determinately support the counterfactual experiences relevant to the Deference Principle,
the direct strategy might serve as a useful backup approach to world selection.
For example, suppose I am mistaken that ghost and miracle experiences determinately
settle the truth of S11 ≡ ‘There is a brown rock in region S (inside the star)’. In this case,
the edenic idealist’s best option may be to revert to the direct strategy for this particular
sentence. To see how this would work, suppose that WE is the Newtonian world. Suppose
that, in normal circumstances, a certain cube-like arrangement of particles in WN causes
experiences of a brown rock. Finally, suppose that there is a cube-like arrangement of
particles in the region in WN corresponding to S. Under these suppositions, the edenic
idealist could say that S11 is true in WM on the following basis: the state of WE in the
region corresponding to S is relevantly similar to the state of WE in regions that normally
cause experiences of brown rocks.22
This backup response is not ad hoc. One guiding intuition behind EI is that facts about
whatWE is like in itself are not relevant to the ordinary epistemology of our ordinary object
sentences (see 6.5.4). But if there was an exotic case where WE doesn’t even support ghost
or miracle expriences, perhaps ordinary speakers would look to WE to settle the truth of Si.
After all, there would be nothing else to go on. If this is correct, then adopting this backup
strategy upholds the spirit of the Deference Principle: we are still deferring to ordinary
22Again, I think the present case is one where WE determinately supports ghost and miracle experiences.
But for present purposes, I am assuming the opposite.
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epistemology in order to determine what exists in WM .23
In summary: I do not think there are cases where we must read off WM from WE .
But if I am wrong, the edenic idealist could use the direct strategy as a backup approach to
world selection.
9.5 The insufficiency objection
I will now consider a final objection to the edenic idealist’s appeal to counterfactual
experiences. The Deference Principle presupposes that speakers presented with si are in a
position to make judgments about ordinary objects. But one might worry that this “epis-
temic base” is insufficient for making such judgments.24 I will discuss two forms of this
worry in this section.
9.5.1 Judgment defeasibility
One might think that, for any sentence Si we judge to be true, there is always some
further course of experience that would lead us to revise our judgment. For example, our
visual experiences might suggest a book on the table. But later on, we might learn that
we are actually experiencing a clever hologram. If all of our judgments are in principle
defeasible, one might doubt that any set si will be sufficient to allow us to make a conclusive
judgment about Si.
In response: any experiences that would lead us to revise our judgments will already be
included in si. Take the hologram case. There are various counterfactual experiences that
might lead ordinary speakers to deny that the book exists (e.g., attempted tactile experiences
23On a related note: I argued above that any proposal to read WM from WE that conflicts with the Def-
erence Principle must be rejected. But if the direct strategy is used as a backup approach to world selection,
there is no risk of conflict. This is because the direct strategy would only be used in cases where there are no
ordinary experiences to guide us.
24Cf. Quine (1951) and Goodman (1951), who argue that we cannot infer truths about ordinary objects
from truths about phenomenal experience. I think EI’s reliance on a rich conception of experience helps it to
avoid this particular version of the insufficiency objection. In the present section, I am considering whether
these richer experiences might still be insufficient for knowledge of manifest truths.
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of the apparent book, experiences of a projector shining towards the apparent book, etc.).
But all of these experiences are already included in si. The same goes for any other possible
experience we might imagine relavant to the sentence in question25; indeed si will probably
be an infinite set.26 For this reason, worries about judgment defeasibility do not threaten
the edenic idealist’s account of world selection.
9.5.2 Other types of truths
One might think that, to judge that Si, a subject requires more information than what
is provided in si. For example, one might think that such judgments also require that a
speaker know certain theoretical truths or higher-level truths about objects. If such truths
are not themselves knowable from si, the Deference Principle will not settle the truth of
Si. To assess this objection, I will consider several families of truths that might be thought
relevant to Si.27
Higher-level truths28: While knowledge of higher-level truths may allow a subject
to make judgments about manifest sentences, such knowledge doesn’t seem necessary for
such judgments. For example, my knowledge that X is a bird probably allows me to infer
that X is not chair-shaped, but I do not need to know that X is a bird in order to make
this judgment.29 In general, it seems like the relevance of higher-level properties to our
25See Chalmers’ (2012, 160-166) “frontloading” argument for related discussion.
26One might worry that the types of truths that could lead us to revise our judgments may not be truths
we learn from experience. If one is sympathetic to this objection, then one will probably also think that these
non-experiential truths are relevant to our initial judgments about Si as well. I will address this concern
immediately below.
27There are two ways to resist the objection. First, one can argue that a subject does not need to know the
truths in question in order to judge that Si. Second, one can argue that the truths in question are themselves
knowable from si. I think both types of arguments are available in the cases below, but for simplicity, I will
focus on the former.
28By “higher-level truths” I mean truths such as: ‘X is a zebra’, ‘X is loved by John’, ‘X has a palin-
dromic name’, etc. See 7.4.
29For further argument, see Chalmers (2012, chs. 3-4), who argues that higher-level truths are inferable
from a set of truths that includes manifest truths.
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judgments is screened off by the more direct evidence for manifest truths presented to us
in si.30
Truths involving instruments: Since I have often referred to instruments like flashlights
and mirrors when specifying contexts, one might think that subjects must at least know
higher-level truths about instruments in order to judge that Si. On the assumption that
properties like being a mirror or being a flashlight are not directly presented in experience,
this is a form of the insufficiency objection.
In response, the edenic idealist will say that the use of these sortal terms is eliminable
in principle. To repeat a point made earlier (see 9.3.3): for the purposes of the Deference
Principle, all that is required for an object X to count as a mirror is for X to exhibit
appropriate counterfactual behavior. Since this behavior can be described entirely using
manifest vocabulary, the use of terms like ‘mirror’ is eliminable in principle.31
Causal truths: Since I have used causal langauge when specifying contexts, one might
think that subjects require causal information to judge the truth of Si. There are at least two
possible responses. My own view is that, like instrument terms, such causal language is
eliminable in principle (which would show that causal truths aren’t necessary for judgments
about the truth of Si). This presupposes a Humean view where causal truths involving
ordinary objects can be inferred from a description of how such items are arranged in space
and time.32 Another possibility is to say that we are sometimes directly acquainted with
30Recently, many theorists (see, e.g., Siegel (2012, chs. 3-4), Macpherson (2012)) have discussed cogni-
tive penetration: the alleged influence of non-sensory mental states on our phenomenal experience. Siegel
(2012) offers the following example: Jill believes that Jack is angry at her, and this affects her experience of
his facial expression. One might worry that such examples undermine my claim that higher-level beliefs are
not necessary for a subject to judge that Si. In response: the higher-level beliefs in such cases causally affect
our judgments (insofar as they causally affect our experiences). But these beliefs are not necessary for the
justification of this judgment, which is what is relevant for the present discussion.
31To be clear: when I say that these terms are eliminable in principle, I am not claiming that the ordinary
concepts like ‘thermometer’ or ‘flashlight’ can be given a conceptual analysis. My claim is only that, when
specifying contexts relevant to the Deference Principle, the use of such terms is eliminable in principle.
32See Chalmers (2012, 336-340) for discussion of this point.
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causal relations in experience. On this view, endorsed by some non-Humean theorists33,
the contexts for experiences in si can employ causal language.
Truths about WE: The final family of truths to consider are truths about the state of
WE as it is in itself. For example, if WM is the single particle world34, then this family
would consist of truths about the evolution of the single particle.35
In 7.6.1, I granted that it may be possible (in certain cases) to infer manifest truths from
a description of WE and the psychophysical laws. But one of the guiding intuitions behind
EI is the idea that we do not need to know such information. This is because speakers do
not care about what WE is like in itself when making judgments about tables and chairs.
This is why, throughout this section, the vocabulary used to specify contexts has been the
vocabulary of the manifest image, not a vocabulary for describing WE (see 9.3.6). So the
edenic idealist will deny that truths about WE are needed for subjects to make judgments
about Si.
In 9.4.4, I discussed a potential exception: cases where our experiences fail to deter-
minately settle Si. I deny that there are such cases (see section 9.4). But if I am mistaken,
there will be times when si is insufficient for our ordinary object judgments. As discussed
in 9.4.4, the proper response to such a case is to use the “direct strategy” as a backup
approach to world selection.
33See, e.g., Armstrong (1997).
34See 6.3 for the description of this world.
35This family will perhaps also include fundamental physical truths, such as truths about microphysical
entities and the fundamental physical laws. Prima facie, these truths pose no serious threat. Perhaps we
are able to infer manifest truths from underlying microphysical truths (see Chalmers (2012, 290-298) for
discussion). But it is doubtful that we need to know such truths for these judgments.
Suppose we’ve learned that, whenever we measure that X has microphysical property y, X appears red.
Then we would consider the experience E of measuring y to be relevant to the truth of sentences like ‘X is
red’. This case may seem to challenge the above remarks, but I don’t think it is a genuine cause for concern.
This is because, as far as the Deference Principle is concerned, what matters is that E (counterfactually)
correlates with X’s appearing red (cf. Sellars’ (1963b, 19) remarks on the difference between correlational
and postulational conceptions of science). So this case is analogous to other cases involving instruments.
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9.6 Summary
The edenic idealist’s basic response to the Incompleteness Objection is to appeal to
counterfactual experiences supported by WE as specified by the Deference Principle. In
this chapter, I have considered a variety of worries that arise for this type of response. To
deal with cases where no human experiences are nomically possible, the edenic idealist
appeals to nomically impossible experiences. To respond to circularity worries, the edenic
idealist appeals to a robust conception of experiences where experiences directly involve
object. To respond to the determinacy objection, the edenic idealist flips the objection back
towards the realist.
Just as in the previous chapter, I have argued certain perceived problems for edenic
idealism are better regarded as advantages of the view. For example, it may have seemed
problematic that the contexts for counterfactual experiences referred to items in WM . But
upon reflection, we see that this feature forges a close connection between EI and ordinary
epistemology (see 9.3.6). Similarly, one might have worried that WE does not determi-
nately support all of the counterfactual experiences needed to select a complete world WM .
But upon reflection, we see that this is another case where the edenic idealist is in a stronger
epistemic position that the realist (see 9.4.1).
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10 FURTHER OBJECTIONS
10.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I have defended edenic idealism from the discrepancy
objection and the incompleteness objection. In this chapter, I will consider worries related
to subjectivity and ordinary language. In particular, I will discuss the following objections:
• The Mind-Dependence Objection: There is strong reason to think that ordinary ob-
jects would exist even if humans did not exist. By countenancing a close link between
ordinary objects and our experiences of them, the idealist makes ordinary objects too
subjective.
• The Intersubjectivity Objection: The idealist cannot account for the sense in which
different subjects are all part of the same world.
• The Ordinary Language Objection: Idealism conflicts with common sense and the
ordinary use of our language. For example, ordinary subjects would immediately
deny that there are two worlds relevant to the truth of our ordinary object judgments.
• The Battle Cry Objection: Given that they agree on the truth value of most of our
ordinary judgments, there is no substantive disagreement between the idealist and
the realist.
10.2 The mind-dependence objection
We think that objects would still exist even if humans did not exist. This claim is not
merely an artefact of common sense; it also seems to enjoy strong scientific support. Does
the idealist make the existence of ordinary objects too subjective?
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I think that mind-dependence is a serious worry for many versions of idealism, in-
cluding Berkeley’s immaterialism. According to Berkeley (1948a, 41), ordinary objects
are identified with “collections of ideas”.1 If these ideas are the ideas of human subjects,
it seems to follow immediately that counterfactual conditionals such as ‘If humans did not
exist, the earth would still exist’ are false.
To respond to this worry, the subjective idealist might appeal to a divine being. Indeed,
Berkeley (1948a, 212-215) leverages the mind-independence of objects into an argument
for God’s existence: since objects are mind-dependent, and since objects do not depend
on human minds, there must be a divine mind supporting their existence. By identifying
ordinary objects with collections of ideas in the divine mind, Berkeley can respect the fact
that ordinary objects would still exist even if humans did not.2
I suspect that any idealist view on which ordinary objects are (in some sense) con-
structed from phenomenal experience will similarly need to posit a divine being.3 But with
edenic idealism, there is no such need. This is because edenic idealism is a semantic, and
not a metaphysical, form of idealism.
According to edenic idealism, WM is just a certain possible edenic world. Humans
happen to be a part of it, but WM would still exist even if there were no humans. The
objects in WM are made of ordinary matter, not sensory experiences. And in general, there
is no metaphysical connection between WM and human experiences: human experiences
merely present WM .
For this reason, the edenic idealist will claim that sentences like ‘If humans did not
1In fact, there are competing interpretations of Berkeley’s view of ordinary objects. For example, Winkler
(1989, 191-203) defends a phenomenalist interpretation of Berkeley on which statements about objects can
be conceptually reduced into statements about minds and their ideas, statements which typically involve
counterfactual conditionals.
2Of course, the appeal to a divine being raises difficult questions of its own. For example, Pitcher (1977,
171-172) notes that a divine being would have ideas of all possible objects, not just the ones that we ordinarily
think exist. So it is not clear how Berkeley can account for the distinction between existent and non-existent
objects. See Winkler (1989, 207-224) for a possible solution to this difficulty.
3For example, Foster’s (2008) version of subjective idealism also appeals to a divine being. For further
discussion of this issue, see Hofweber (manuscript, 4.1).
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exist, the earth would still exist’ are literally true (at least in ordinary contexts). In ordinary
contexts, we are describing the world WM , and the objects in WM would (mostly) have the
same properties they actually have even if there were no humans.
Of course, the edenic idealist may allow that the sentence ‘If human phenomenal ex-
periences had been different, a different world would have been relevant to the truth of
our judgments about ordinary objects’ is true. This is because, if WE had supported dif-
ferent phenomenal experiences, the Deference Principle would have selected a different
world W ∗M . But again, this is no threat to the mind-independence of objects because the
sense in which our experiences determine truths about ordinary objects is semantic, not
metaphysical.
10.3 The intersubjectivity objection
Next, I will consider an objection that Hofweber (manuscript, 4.1) calls that the prob-
lem of intersubjectivity.
“If [an] object is a mental phenomenon then it seems to belong to a particular
mind. But then it is inaccessible to other minds, or so it would seem. Every
mind would see only their own private world. ... But even if everyone only
sees their own private objects and world, these worlds seem to be coordinated
in various ways. If someone sings a song then several others hear the same
tune. But each of them is immediately aware only of their own phenomena,
and so the problem arises how this coordination is to be explained.”
Put simply: how can the idealist make account for the sense in which different subjects are
all a part of the same world?
Just as with the mind-dependence objection, the problem of intersubjectivity is a se-
rious concern for metaphysical versions of idealism. For example, Hylas raises this worry
for Berkeley’s immaterialism: “But the same idea which is in my mind, cannot be in yours,
or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow from your principles, that no two can see
the same thing? And is not this highly absurd?” (Berkeley (1948a, 247)).
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Berkeley’s first response is that, when the word ‘same’ is taken in its ordinary sense,
it is obviously true that different persons perceive the same thing. Consider how ordinary
speakers use the term ‘same’: it is clear that they use apply this term to the objects per-
ceived by different subjects. As for whether the objects of perception are really identical in
some more precise philosophical sense: Berkeley does not think that this is a meaningful
question.4
I am sympathetic to Berkeley’s response, but an important question remains. Even
if he views sentences such as ‘Mary and John perceive the same table’ as true, Berkeley
still needs to explain why Mary and Johns’ experiences cohere. According to the realist,
these experiences cohere because John and Mary are causally affected by the same mind-
independent object. But this response is not available to the subjective idealist.
Berkeley explains this coherence by again appealing to a divine being.5 On this pro-
posal, God shares his ideas with human subjects so that there is a coherence in the phenom-
ena experienced by distinct subjects.
This proposal comes with a certain epistemological cost. As discussed in 6.5.4, one
of the main motivations for idealism is to explain the trivial inferential connection between
our phenomenal experiences and judgments about objects. But if the subjective idealist
explains intersubjectivity by identifying objects with items in the divine mind, it seems
that she has reintroduced an epistemic gap between human experiences and truths about
objects.6
4Cf. Thomasson’s (2007) claim that identity conditions for objects are relative to a linguistic practice.
5Says Berkeley (1948a, 248): “so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles; external, I
mean, to your own mind; though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that mind which comprehends all
things; but then this serves all the ends of identity, as well as if it existed out of a mind.”
6The idealist could argue that God is not a deceiver and that, as a result, our experiences are in general
correspond with divine ideas. But this proposal does not account for the seeming triviality of the inference
from experience to judgments about objects in ordinary contexts. Says Berkeley (1948a, 230): “What a jest is
it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity
of God; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration!”
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In contrast, the edenic idealist has no difficulties in accounting for intersubjectivity.
On the edenic idealist’s system, there are multiple senses in which subjects share the same
world. First: the edenic idealist will say that subjects are part of the same external world
WE . The fact that human subjects share a world in this external sense is what explains
the coordination between our experiences. Second: the edenic idealist will say that human
subjects are part of the same manifest world WM . The fact that human subjects share a
world in this sense is what explains the fact that judgments made by different subjects all
concern the common world WM . It is also worth re-emphasizing that, with the Deference
Principle, experiences from different subjects are relevant to selecting the manifest world.
In other words: it isn’t merely my experience of a book that determines the book’s color in
WM ; its color is also determined by the counterfactual experiences WE supports in other
subjects.7
10.4 The ordinary language objection
I will next consider the worry that idealism conflicts with common sense and the
ordinary use of our language. To respond to this objection, the edenic idealist will appeal
to a distinction between theoretical and ordinary judgments about objects. This response
is inspired by Berkeley, who used this distinction to defend subjective idealism from the
ordinary langauge objection. So I will begin by discussing Berkeley’s response.
10.4.1 Berkeley on common sense
Berkeley (1948a, 228-229) notoriously claimed that idealism is the position of com-
mon sense:
“But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded
that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to write,
7There is one complication. In 6.2.1, I mentioned the possiblity of cases where subjects have incom-
patible experiences without there being any reason to think any individual subject is suffering an illusion. I
discuss how the idealist should respond to this issue in 8.3.
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would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not
know what it is you call for? ... I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe
my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that
the real things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses.
These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life,
have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings.”
This aspect of Berkeley’s arguments has widely been dismissed or even ridiculed.8 For
example, consider Bennett (2001, 177):
“In his published works, I contend, Berkeley had little interest in rescuing the
plain person’s beliefs about sensible things. He did not want to connect them
rigorously with his ontology, or even to show that this could in principle be
done. ... Berkeley’s fundamental attitude to the plain person’s trees and stones,
in the deployment of his philosophy, was this disrespectful one.”
But these dismissals of Berkeley may be based on a misinterpretation.9 What does Berkeley
mean when he says that subjective idealism is the position of common sense? On one
interpretation, Berkeley is claiming that the philosophical thesis of subjective idealism is
itself common sense. If this is what Berkeley meant, he must have been dissembling. This
is because most people’s immediate reaction to subjective idealism is that nothing could be
further from common sense.
But textual evidence tells against this interpretation. For example, Berkeley (1948a,
43) mentions the “opinion strangely [i.e. greatly] prevailing amongst men, that houses,
mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, dis-
tinct from their being perceived.”10 Similarly, in the introduction to the Principles, Berke-
ley (1948a, 24) refers to his views as “newly known and contrary to the prejudices of
8See, e.g., Hume (1999, 203n): “[A]ll [Berkeley’s] arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality,
merely sceptical.”
9The discussion of this section draws from Bordner’s (2011) exposition of the role of common sense in
Berkeley’s arguments.
10See Winkler (1989, 7) for discussion of this obsolete usage of the term “strangely”.
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mankind.”11
If the thesis of subjective idealism is not itself common sense, how can we make sense
of Berkeley’s remarks? I think the most plausible interpretation is that Berkeley considered
subjective idealism to give the best account of our ordinary judgments about objects: the
judgments about objects we make in everyday life.
For example, consider the epistemology of our object discourse. According to Berke-
ley, our experiences would not justify ordinary object judgments if these judgments con-
cerned mind-independent items in the external world; after all, it seems the external world
“behind the appearances” could be very different from how it appears to us in experience.12
But in ordinary contexts, it seems trivial to infer statements about objects (e.g., ‘There is
a table’) on the basis of our experiences of them. So by identifying ordinary objects with
experiential items, Berkeley claims that we can best account for the ordinary epistemology
of our object discourse.
For a second example, consider the referential intentions of speakers making judg-
ments about objects. According to Berkeley, ordinary speakers naturally believe that the
world they perceive is the real world; they do not think that the perceived world is just a
copy or some “more real” world behind the appearances.13 Berkeley (1948a, 263) further
thought that the items we perceive are mind-dependent. Given this assumption, subjective
idealism is the view that takes the referential intentions of ordinary speakers at face value.
11See also Berkeley’s (1948b, 36) remarks in a letter to Percival: “The common crys being against any
opinion seems to me so far from proving it false that it may with as good reason pass for an agreement of its
truth. However I imagine whatever doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled opinion had need been introduced
with great caution into the world. For this reason it was I omitted all mention of the non-existence of matter
in the title-page, dedication, preface, and introduction, that so the notion might steal unawares on the reader,
who possibly would never have meddled with a book that he had known contained such paradoxes.”
12Says Berkeley (1948a, 79): “This which . . . hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd
notion, is the very root of scepticism; for so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind,
and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows, they could
not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known, that the things which are
perceived, are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?”
13See Bordner (2011, 322) for discussion of this point.
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In summary: Berkeley thought that subjective idealism was the best way to make sense
of our ordinary judgments about objects. This may be true even if the thesis of subjective
idealism is not itself common sense.
10.4.2 The distinction between ordinary and theoretical judgments
Taking a tack from Berkeley, the edenic idealist can respond to the ordinary language
objection by appealing to the distinction between theoretical and ordinary judgments. Ex-
amples of the former include: ‘The cup is tall’, ‘The book is blue’, etc. Examples of the
latter are theses like EI and realism.
The edenic idealist will grant that, qua theoretical judgment, EI is a surprising result.
So in one sense, it is true that EI conflicts with common sense. But even so, the edenic
idealist will claim that EI provides the best account of our ordinary judgments about ob-
jects.14 And our ordinary judgments are what matters to the question of realism vs. edenic
idealism.
To see why, it is useful consider the analogous issue in metaethics. Suppose that
everyone in a certain community thinks that divine command theory is completely obvious
(for example, when speakers in this community are explicitly asked what it is for an action
to good, they reply that it is for the action to be commanded by God). This by itself
wouldn’t show that divine command theory is the correct account of the semantic role of
‘good’ in that community. To decide this question, we would have to see how such speakers
actually use the term ‘good’. If divine commands have no bearing on how the expression
is actually used, then these speakers merely have false empirical beliefs about the meaning
of their term.
The edenic idealist will say the same thing about our common sense preference for
realism. It is ordinary use, not theoretical belief, which determines the semantic role of our
object terms. And it is here that EI has the advantage over realism. As discussed in 6.5.4,
14See 6.5.4 and 9.3.5 for related discussion.
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edenic idealism offers the best account of the referential intentions, usage, epistemology,
and pragmatics of our ordinary judgments about objects.15
10.4.3 Specific types of ordinary judgments
I’ve argued that, in order to avoid the ordinary language objection, EI only needs to
account for our ordinary judgments about objects. But does edenic idealism meet this
weaker condition? In this sub-section, I will consider a few cases.
First, consider the sentence T1 ≡ ‘This table actually exists’. On first pass, EI may
seem to be committed to the falsity of T1. This is because it is natural to view WE as the
actual world and the edenic idealist does not locate tables in WE . But as discussed in 6.5.2,
this is not the most attractive interpretation EI. Consider: even after the Oracle’s testimony
(see 6.4.1), we would continue to make judgments like T1. This is because we would still
need to distinguish things like tables from things like unicorns or golden mountains. To
acknowledge this aspect of ordinary usage, the edenic idealist will say that the predicate
‘is actual’ applies to items in WM in any ordinary context. So EI is not in tension with
judgments like T1.
One might object that, no matter what the edenic idealist says about WM , WE is the
only world that is really actual. To respond to this objection, it is useful to consider the
parallel objection in metaethics: “The quasi-realist might say that certain actions are good,
but this is goodness in name only.” The quasi-realist will reply that, if one believes that
goodness is something more than on the quasi-realist’s story, one is simply not using the
term ‘good’ with its ordinary meaning. The edenic idealist will respond similarly: as the
term is used in typical ordinary contexts, ‘actual’ is a predicate that applies to WM .
The edenic idealist will view other judgments in a similar way. For example, on first
pass, it is natural to say that the term ‘I’ refers to a subject in WE , since WE is the world
15One might wonder: how do we determine whether or not a given judgment S counts as “ordinary”? I
doubt that any precise analysis is available, but I think we have a good enough intuitive grasp of the distinc-
tion.
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generating our experiences. But even if we accepted EI, we would continue to say things
like ‘I am sitting on a chair’ in ordinary contexts. So in these contexts, ‘I’ will refer to an
entity in WM . By distinguishing contexts, the edenic idealist can also acknowledge senses
in which both ‘My pain is caused by the hot pan’ and ‘My pain is caused by the state of the
dust world’ are true.
For a final example, consider the sentence T2 ≡ ‘That chair is part of the external
world’. Sometimes, philosophers use ‘the external world’ as a term of art; it is used to
refer to whatever reality is “behind the appearances,” such as the dust world. On this usage
(which I have adopted throughout this dissertation), the edenic idealist will deny T2. But
‘the external world’ may also have an ordinary use. For example, we might use a sentence
like T2 to distinguish the chair from items in hallucinations. Because of the usefulness
of this distinction, ordinary speakers would continue to assert T2 even after the Oracle’s
testimony. So the edenic idealist will grant that, in any ordinary context, ‘the external
world’ refers to WM .
In summary: the edenic idealist will account for the ordinary use of terms like ‘I’,
‘actual’, ‘cause’, etc. by saying that these terms apply to items in WM in ordinary contexts.
Prima facie challenges to edenic idealism from ordinary language only arise when we view
some, but not all, terms from ordinary object discourse as applying to WM .
10.5 The battle cry objection
For the reasons outlined above, the edenic idealist will end up agreeing with the realist
on the truth value of almost any ordinary judgment about objects. But this close correspon-
dence raises its own questions. If the realist and edenic idealist agree on so much, why
should we think that there is really any substantive dispute between them? Wittgenstein
(1967) raises this challenge in the following passage:
“One man is a convinced realist, another a convinced idealist and teaches his
children accordingly. ... But the idealist will teach his children the word chair
after all, for of course he wants to teach them to do this and that, e.g. to fetch
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a chair. Then where will be the difference between what the idealist-educated
children say and the realist ones? Won’t the difference only be one of battle
cry?”
I think this “battle cry objection” may be an effective criticism of traditional metaphysical
versions of idealism. If the only disagreement between the realist and the idealist is over
the question of whether ordinary objects are mental or physical, it is tempting to say, in
Carnapian fashion, that these theorists are merely working on different linguistic frame-
works.
But whatever its success against theorists like Berkeley, the battle-cry objection does
not challenge the semantic idealism of EI. The edenic idealist’s disagreement with the
realist isn’t about metaphysics per se; it is a disagreement about the semantic role of our
object terms.16 And on this issue, the edenic idealist completely agrees with the spirit of
the battle cry objection: what determines the the semantic role for these terms is how they
are used.
One might still worry about the substantivity of the semantic disagreement between
EI and realism. But even metaphysical deflationists allow for the substantivity of semantic
disputes of this kind. In case one is unconvinced, it will be useful to mention several
concrete points of disagreement between the realist and the edenic idealist:
-Unlike realism, EI views ordinary objects as having edenic properties.
-Unlike realism, EI denies that it is coherent to suppose that all of our ordinary
object judgments are false (see, e.g., 8.2.3)
-Unlike realism, EI says that facts about how we interpret our experience are
relevant to determining which world is relevant to our ordinary object discourse
16Of course, there will be indirect metaphysical disagreement that results from this underlying semantic
disagreement. Since realists and idealists think that ordinary object terms refer to different things, they will
disagree on the properties of ordinary objects.
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(see chapter 7).
-Unlike realism, EI denies that results from fundamental physics are relevant
to the truth values of our ordinary object talk (see 8.4.3).
10.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have defended edenic idealism from a variety of objections relating
to subjectivity and ordinary language. This completes my defense of EI in this disserta-
tion. In the next chapter, I discuss some of edenic idealism’s applications to contemporary
philosophical debates.
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11 APPLICATIONS OF EDENIC IDEALISM
11.1 Introduction
In the past several chapters, I have defended the following semantic version of ideal-
ism:
Edenic Idealism (EI): Ordinary object terms refer to items in the manifest
world: the edenic world WM presented by our experiences.
If true, edenic idealism would have implications for many philosophical debates. In this
chapter, I discuss EI’s potential relevance to debates on composition, metaontology, exter-
nal world skepticism, and perception.
The discussion of this chapter provides a second, derivative set of reasons to endorse
EI: edenic idealism may help clarify various conceptual puzzles arising in certain contem-
porary philosophical debates. I say that these benefits are derivative because the edenic
idealist will diagnose these conceptual puzzles as resulting from a mistaken view of the
semantic role of ordinary object terms.
11.2 The debate on composition
EI is most obviously relevant to the debate over the existence of ordinary objects. If
ordinary objects are located in WM instead of WE , then both sides in this debate have
been looking for ordinary objects in the wrong place. The edenic idealist will say that,
for this reason, many of the standard arguments given in this debate are based on a false
presupposition. For example, some theorists have argued that fundamental physics has
implications for the existence (or non-existence) of tables and chairs.1 But if EI is true,
1For discussion, see Sider (2013, section 11).
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ordinary objects are not part of the world described by fundamental physics.
More significantly, EI provides a simple and direct argument for the existence of ordi-
nary objects:
(1) Ordinary objects are presented in experience. (premise)
(2) WM is the world presented in experience. (definition)
(3) WM contains ordinary objects. (from 1,2)
(4) If WM contains ordinary objects, ordinary objects exist. (EI)
(5) Ordinary objects exist. (from 3,4)
Steps (2)-(4) aren’t really necessary2: I’ve included them just to make EI’s relevance
to the debate as clear as possible. Put more simply, the argument is: we know chairs exist
because they are presented to us in experience. Note that this is exactly how ordinary
speakers would show that chairs exist, which should suggest that the above argument is on
the right track (i.e., that EI correctly identifies the things that ordinary speakers are talking
about when they use terms like ‘chair’).
Nihilists claim that our perceptual experience of objects does not show that they ac-
tually exist.3 This is because we would have the same experiences even if simple particles
were the only things causally affecting us. But if EI is true, what items in WE cause our
experiences is neither here nor there. What matters is what is presented by our experi-
ences. Since our experiences present objects, objects exist. There is no gap between our
experience and what WM is like “in itself”.4
2This is because (2)-(4) merely state what is implicitly grasped by competent speakers. Compare:
(1) John is a bachelor. (premise)
(2) A bachelor is an unmarried male. (definition of ‘bachelor’)
(3) Therefore: John is unmarried.
Since (2) states what anyone competent with the term ‘bachelor’ implicitly grasps, we wouldn’t normally
include it in the argument. Similar remarks apply to the original argument.
3See, e.g., Sider (2013, section 5).
4One caveat: the edenic idealist will acknowledge the distinction between illusory and non-illusory ex-
periences as it is drawn within our ordinary linguistic practice. For example, the edenic idealist will grant
that when a stick partially-submerged in water looks crooked, this experience is illusory. But she will deny
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The nihilist might object: “Composition either necessarily occurs or necessarily does
not occur. So if my arguments are successful, no objects exist in WM . So my arguments
still require a response.”
The edenic idealist will reply that, if our experiences present objects, it follows by
definition that WM contains objects. But, besides being phenomenologically obvious, the
object-directedness of experience has strong support from research in cognitive science.5
If one accepts this result, then one must reject either the eliminativist’s arguments or the
necessity of composition. The only other option would be to claim that our experience
presents an impossible world. I think this suggestion betrays a shaky grip on the semantic
role of the term ‘possible’. But even if WM isn’t a possible world, it would be no threat to
EI itself. We can call the objects in our experience actual, or merely possible, or impossible,
or whatever else we want to call them. What matters for EI is that ordinary object terms
refer to these items, no matter what label we choose.
11.3 Deflationism and ontological pluralism
In addition to clarifying the first-order debate over composition, EI is also relevant
to the literature on metaontology. In this section, I will explain how EI puts pressure on
deflationary conceptions of ordinary objects.
According to deflationists, the existence of ordinary objects is guaranteed by our hav-
ing adopted a certain form of linguistic practice.6 What it is for the sentence ‘The table
is brown’ to be true just is for it to be correctly assertible within ordinary discourse. And
what it is for the term ‘the table’ to refer just is for this term to have a certain syntactic role
in true sentences. One type of deflationism that deserves specific mention is ontological
that it is coherent to suppose that all of our experiences of objects are illusory. I discuss this feature of edenic
idealism in [reference suppressed for blind review].
5For discussion, see Dickie (2010).
6Examples of deflationists include Carnap (1950), Thomasson (2007), Chalmers (2009), and Hirsch
(2010). There are important differences between these theorists, but these differences are not relevant to the
current discussion.
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pluralism.7 On this view, there is no objective way to “carve” the world into existents; what
exists depends on our choice of linguistic framework. In one framework, tables exist, while
in another framework, tables do not exist.
While I think deflationism is an attractive view, EI puts pressure on a deflationary
account of ordinary objects. To see why, consider Chalmers’ (2010) description of the
phenomenology of object-directed experience:
“The phenomenology of vision seems to present a world that is carved into ob-
jects at its joints. One does not simply perceive a distribution of mass and color.
One perceives objects on top of other objects, each of which may be articulated
into objectual parts. Depending on one’s metaphysical views, one may think
that the world does not respect this articulation into objects. One might give
their existence some highly deflationary treatment on which their individuation
is a matter of convention or conceptual scheme, or on which there is no deep
fact of the matter about when there is an object or when there is not. But even if
one’s metaphysics is deflationary about objects, one’s phenomenology is not.”
(448)
According to EI, WM is the world presented by our experience. But as Chalmers
observes, our experience presents a world that is objectively carved into objects. This
means that the existence of tables in WM is independent of our linguistic practices. If we
were to adopt a linguistic framework that did not countenance objects, we would be failing
to mention items that are directly given to us in experience. Our direct acquaintance with
objects in WM rules out a deflationary view of these items.
The original oracle thought experiments (see 6.3)) also support this conclusion. In
each these cases, claims about ordinary objects would remain correctly assertible even after
the Oracle’s testimony. For the deflationist, this suffices to show that objects exist. But if
this is the whole story, we cannot explain why the cases seemed puzzling in the first place.
What generates the puzzles is our failure (in each case) to find anything table-like when we
“look out into the world”. But the very fact that we look out into the world to locate tables
7See Chalmers (2009) and Hirsch (2010) for two different versions of ontological pluralism.
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suggests that they are not the “lightweight” entities posited by deflationists. Instead, they
are the robust entities presented to us in experience.
In summary: if EI is true, then deflationists are mistaken about our concepts of ordi-
nary objects. There is more to these concepts than their role in certain correctly assertible
sentences. These concepts have the function of picking out items we are directly acquainted
with in experience.
This being said, the deflationist and edenic idealist agree on a central point: that de-
bates over the existence of objects are trivial. For the deflationist, they are trivial because
existence questions are settled by adopting a certain linguistic framework. For the edenic
idealist, they are trivial because we are directly acquainted with objects in experience.
There is a particular affinity between EI and ontological pluralism. Suppose there
is a creature C whose experience doesn’t present objects,or whose experience presents
very different objects than our own phenomenology. The edenic idealist will say that C’s
assertions will not concern WM . So the edenic idealist will agree with the pluralist that
speakers can have different ontological commitments without one side being in error. The
difference is that, while the pluralist views subjects as carving up a single world in different
ways, the edenic idealist views subjects as talking about different worlds.
It is also worth mentioning: while EI may be incompatible with deflationism and
ontological pluralism about ordinary objects, it is compatible with these views in other
areas of ontology. For example, the edenic idealist could be a deflationist about what exists
in the external world WE . And if the edenic idealist is also a microphysical idealist8,
she can adopt a deflationary view towards items in WM . Unlike ordinary objects, we are
not directly acquainted with items in these worlds and so deflationism is still an available
option.9
8See 8.4.4.
9It is interesting to consider how microphysical idealism and scientific idealism (see 8.4.4-8.4.6) compare
to ontological pluralism. For simplicity, let’s restrict attention to micro-entities. The pluralist says that there
are different ways of carving WE ; on some carvings, WE contains micro-entities, while on other carvings,
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11.4 External world skepticism
Next, I will consider edenic idealism’s potential relevance to the literature on external
world skepticism. Here is a simple example of an argument for this type of skepticism:
(1) If I am a brain in a vat, then my hand does not exist.
(2) I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat.
—
(3) I do not know my hand exists.
Of course, we could easily substitute other skeptical scenarios, such as Descartes’ evil
demon scenario, into the above argument. The standard response to the above argument is
to reject (2). But the edenic idealist will reject the first premise as follows:
(1*) My hand exists iff WE counterfactually supports experiences of my hand.
(2*) If I am a brain in a vat, WE counterfactually supports experiences of my
hand.
—
(3*) If I am a brain in a vat, then my hand exists.
Earlier, I argued that what WE is like in itself isn’t directly evidentially relevant to our
ordinary object assertions (see 5.4). This point still applies when considering traditional
skeptical scenarios. Suppose the Oracle told us that we are envatted brains. Just as with the
single-particle world, after several minutes, we would revert to talking about objects just as
we did before. Again, the lesson to learn is that we do not care what WE is like in itself.
What matters to us is the world presented to us in experience.
This response has some similarities with one of Putnam’s (1981, ch. 1) suggested re-
sponses to external world skepticism. Putnam, appealing to the idea that reference requires
an appropriate causal link, suggests that the ordinary term ‘my hand’ may refer to (say) the
it does not. In contrast, the idealist says that anyone working on a micro-entity framework is talking about
the microphysical world (as opposed to WE). The difference seems to be: frameworks for the pluralist
correspond to different carvings of WE , while frameworks for the idealist correspond to different worlds. It
is interesting to consider whether or not this disagreement is substantive. Regardless, I maintain that there is
a substantive difference between idealism and pluralism about ordinary objects.
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data structure in the computer that causes the relevant hand experiences. On this proposal,
our hands exist even if we are envatted brains.10
Like EI, Putnam offers a semantic dissolution of a skeptical challenge. But EI’s ad-
vantage is that it provides a much more plausible semantic treatment of ordinary object
terms. Putnam’s suggestion may seem unconvincing for the following reason: it doesn’t
seem plausible that we are talking about data structures when we use terms like ‘my hand’.
But with EI, we can avoid skepticism while maintaining that ordinary objects are exactly
what we always thought.
Of course, EI does not rule out all types of skepticism. In particular, the skeptic
might deny that WE counterfactually supports experiences of a world that is as complete as
we normally think it is. For example, why should we think that WE will counterfactually
support experiences of objects 10 seconds from now? But this skeptical challenge has more
to do with inductive skepticism than external world skepticism, traditionally conceived.
11.5 Perception
According to direct realists, perceptual experience consists in a subject’s being directly
related to ordinary objects in the mind-independent world. Our contact with objects is not
mediated by intermediary sense data, qualia, or intentional states. Instead, the presenta-
tional character of perceptual experience is directly constituted by the mind-independent
objects and properties that are being looked at.
Direct realists claim many advantages for their account. McDowell (2008) uses di-
rect realism to block Cartesian arguments for skepticism. Campbell (2002) argues that
direct realism is needed to explain the way in which our perceptual experience puts us in
a position to successfully refer to ordinary objects. But for present purposes, I want to
focus on Martin’s (2006) argument that direct realism offers the most phenomenologically
10I note that Putnam himself does not endorse this suggestion; he mentions some other possible responses
as well.
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accurate account of perception. According to Martin, when we introspect our perceptual
experiences, they seem to involve a kind of “openness to the world”. We seem to be di-
rectly acquainted with objects in percepteual experience in a way that we are not directly
acquainted with the objects of (say) belief. Crane & French (2016) precisify this claim as
follows:
Presence: the character of perceptual experience seems to involve the presen-
tation (as) of ordinary objects in such a way that it is immediately responsive
to the character of its presented objects.
Martin (2002) argues that only direct realism can account for the phenomenology of pres-
ence in perceptual experience.
Despite its attractions, there is a powerful objection that can be raised against direct
realism. The direct realist claims that the presentational character of perceptual experience
is directly constituted by the mind-independent objects and properties that are the objects
of perception. But as discussed in 6.2, there are strong reasons for thinking that the kinds of
primitive properties presented to us in experience are not actually instantiated in the mind-
independent world. For example, the argument from incompatible experiences suggests
that edenic colors are not actually instantiated in the external world. And results from
relativity and quantum mechanics challenge the idea that external space is anything like the
space presented to us in experience.11
In response to this worry, some direct realists have appealed to the idea that reality
consists of many levels. Says Campbell:
But how can we resist the way in which physics pushes sensory experience in-
side the head? Our understanding of sensory experience could be transformed
by giving due weight to the idea that reality can be described ‘at many levels’.
We can acknowledge that there is something fundamental about the physics of
our surroundings, at least in that all other facts about our world supervene on
11The objection that I raise in this paragraph is discussed by Robinson (1994, ch. 3). See Fish (2010) for
an overview of other objections to direct realism.
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the physical facts, while being ‘pluralist’ about our world, which can be de-
scribed ‘at many levels’, and the physical is only one level of description, even
if it is a particularly fundamental level of description. ... This opens the possi-
bility that characterizing the qualitative world we encounter in experience, the
colours and shapes, the beach ball on the sand, and so on, is simply a matter
of saying how things are ‘at a different level’ than the level of description used
by the physicist. This doesn’t require that those qualities and objects should
be in any way mind-dependent. The dissonance between the qualitative char-
acter of our experience and the qualitative character of the world as described
by physics may then be merely an artefact of our shifting from one level of
description to another. (Campbell & Cassim (2014, 3))
Campbell suggests that, even if no edenic properties are instantiated at the fundamental
level of reality, we can still allow that these properties are instantiated at non-fundamental
levels.
But I do not think this position is tenable. For example, given the impossibility of
an object’s being both edenically red and edenically green at the same time, the argument
from incompatible experience tells against the instantiation of any edenic colors. Similarly,
the arguments from science do not merely tell against the existence of edenic space at the
fundamental level; they tell against the existence of edenic space simpliciter (see fn. 10 of
chapter 6).
We have an impasse. On the one hand, phenomenological considerations seem to give
strong support to a view of perception on which we are directly related to objects. But on
the other hand, it seems clear that we are not directly related to items in the external world.
I think edenic idealism provides a promising way out of this impasse. With EI, the
qualitative nature of the external world does not threaten a directly relational view of per-
ception. This is because the edenic idealist can say that, in perception, we are directly
related to edenic objects in the manifest world. Indeed, since there is no gap between WM
and the world presented to us in experience, the edenic idealist can fully endorse the claim
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that the presentational character of perceptual experience is directly constituted by the ob-
jects and properties we are looking at. We might call the resulting view of perception direct
idealism.
In addition to avoiding the above objection about the external world, I think that direct
idealism can avoid many other prominent objections to relational theories of perception.
While it is outside the scope of this chapter to address these issues, I am interested in
developing this view in future work.
11.6 Summary
The discussion of this chapter provides a second, derivative reason to accept EI. By
clarifying the semantic role of our ordinary object terms, the edenic idealist is in a position
to clarify certain conceptual confusions that arise in contemporary philosophical debates.
Insofar as the edenic idealist can help dissolve or resolve these puzzles, it provides further
indication that EI is on the right track.
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A OTHER ARGUMENTS RELEVANT TO CAUSAL DEFLATIONISM
In this appendix, I will compare the arguments of section 2.4 to two other arguments that
may challenge the claim that the term ‘cause’ expresses a relation with a discoverable,
unified nature.
Pluralist arguments: As I will use the term, causal pluralism is the view that the ordi-
nary term ‘cause’ is ambiguous over multiple relations.1 Pluralists motivate their position
by citing cases where we have conflicting causal intuitions. For example, Hitchcock (2003,
10) considers the following case: “Two assassins, Captain and Assistant, are on a mission
to kill Victim. Upon spotting Victim, Captain yells ‘fire!’, and Assistant fires. Overhearing
the order, Victim ducks and survives unscathed.” In this case, we have conflicting intuitions
about whether Captain’s order caused Victim’s survival. According to Hitchcock, the best
explanation of these conflicting intuitions is that the term ‘cause’ expresses different types
of causal relations.2
While I am sympathetic to this argument, I do not think it goes far enough. In contrast
to the pluralist’s claim that the term ‘cause’ corresponds to more than one natural relation,
the arguments of section 2.4 suggest that ‘cause’ does not correspond to any natural relation
at all. These two conclusions have different methodological implications. Pluralists have
attempted to give analyses for each type of causation they distinguish.3 But on my view,
1See, e.g., Hitchcock (2003) and Hall (2004). Not every view labeled “pluralist” in the literature will
count as such on the usage of this chapter. See Hitchcock (2007) and Godfrey-Smith (2009) for useful
taxonomies.
2Hall (2004) provides a similar argument for distinguishing production causation from dependence cau-
sation.
3For example, Hall (2004) offers analyses of two types of causation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, philosophers
have raised counterexamples to Hall’s analyses (see Longworth (2006, 58-60)).
239
there will be no metaphysical analysis available for causation at all.4
Minimalist arguments: Some theorists have suggested that the term ‘cause’ is some-
thing like a family resemblance term. For example, Skyrms (1984) suggests that we employ
an “amiable jumble” of criteria when making causal judgments, with no explicit rule for
how these criteria should be weighed. Similarly, Psillos (2009, 2) claims that “causation
is very much like the common cold ... [although it has no unique nature], it can be traced
reliably by its symptoms.”
While I think it is plausible that we make causal judgments on the basis of a loose
set of criteria, this fact by itself does not show that ‘cause’ is not a natural kind term.
Consider: we make judgments about measles using a loose set of criteria, but ‘measles’
is still a natural kind term. So to establish that causation has no unified nature, further
argument is required.
To this end, Anscombe (1971, 93), Cartwright (2004), and Psillos (2009, 14-20) have
defended causal minimalism. According to causal minimalism, specific causal terms (e.g.,
‘push’, ‘freeze’) are semantically prior to the abstract term ‘cause’. Assertions employing
the term ‘cause’ do not express any content over and above what is expressed in assertions
using more specific causal vocabulary. If causal minimalism is true, then it is plausible that
the term ‘cause’ will not express a relation with a unified nature.
While I am not persuaded by causal minimalism, it is outside the scope of this chapter
to discuss this view. Whatever the status of this view, the arguments of section 2.4 provide
independent reasons to deny that causation has a discoverable, unified nature.
4Another potential shortcoming of the pluralist argument is dialectical. I suspect that theorists who view
‘cause’ as something like a natural kind term will not share Hitchcock’s intuition that there is no fact of the
matter about whether causation occurs in controversial cases.
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